FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Richard J. Barnet

The Legislator as Educator—*J. William Fulbright*
The Arc of Crisis—*George Lenczowski*
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Terrorism in Italy—*Alberto Ronchey*

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EDITOR'S NOTE

With this issue we resume our normal cover and publication schedule for the balance of 1979. The special cover and format for our year-end issue published in February were of course an effort to make clear its unique character.

The reader will find in this Spring issue a heavy concentration of articles on the Iranian revolution, its consequences in the Middle East, and the related problem of Western setbacks and Soviet activity in the Third World generally. As usual, the authors differ both with each other and with others whose work has appeared recently in our pages. In part this reflects simply our customary judgments of comparative manuscript strength, in part a continuing deliberate effort to offer a balanced spectrum of responsible views.

It happens that, in a letter included in the Comment and Correspondence section of this issue, Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard takes us mildly to task for the fact that three of the articles in our year-end issue expressly disputed views enunciated by the Committee on the Present Danger, while no Committee spokesman was invited to write for that issue. We have no apology to make on this score, having in the recent past printed forceful statements by Paul Nitze, among others, that put the central arguments now associated with the Committee in comprehensive form. Nor do we feel that we have neglected the viewpoint (hardly confined to the Committee) that sees Soviet military and political policies in a more alarmist light than some others in and out of government. Indeed, the analysis behind that viewpoint has seemed to us personally often highly persuasive; the difficulty, as always, is to relate it to affirmative policy suggestions of a credible character.

In a period of especially acute controversy, the credo reprinted below is all the more relevant. No more than at any other time in its history is *Foreign Affairs* the vehicle for any particular view.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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J. William Fulbright

THE LEGISLATOR AS EDUCATOR

My long tenure in the Senate, much of it under less than tranquil and serene circumstances, may have compromised my capacity for objective judgment of a legislator's role in our democratic system. But today, in face of the skepticism voiced in some quarters about the fate of the SALT II agreement, together with the developments in Iran, I confess to increasingly serious misgivings about the ability of the Congress to play a constructive role in our foreign relations. Though these misgivings are far from confined to the Congress, I find myself haunted by Alexis de Tocqueville's famous statement nearly a century and a half ago: "I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to be decidedly inferior to other governments. . . . Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient."

Tocqueville was impressed by the vilification heaped upon George Washington by Congress and the public for his opposition to joining the French in their war on England, and also by Washington's Farewell Address, in which he said, "The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."

As I contemplate the events of the recent past and even of the present, I am struck by the foresight of Tocqueville and the profound wisdom of Washington. I take some comfort from Thomas Jefferson, who had such confidence in the ultimate wisdom of the average man, although he and his principal associates were far from being average.

In the early years of this century, foreign policy professionals were confronted with the expansion of popular democracy beyond local and domestic matters to encompass foreign policy as well.

J. William Fulbright, currently Counsel to the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in Washington, served as Senator from Arkansas from 1945 through 1974 and as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959 through 1974. This article is based on his Elihu Root lecture at the Council on Foreign Relations, delivered on January 23, 1979.

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Prior to that time, public opinion exerted its influence on basic issues of war and peace, but otherwise played only a limited role in the refined arts of diplomacy. Reactions to the new surge of democracy varied. Idealists proclaimed the coming of an era of brotherhood and peace. Traditionalists foresaw an era of jingoism and demagoguery. Walter Lippmann, from the perspective of the 1950s, wrote of an ignorant and impassioned public opinion having imposed a "compulsion to make mistakes," and having reduced democratic politicians to "insecure and intimidated men," "with exceptions so rare that they are regarded as miracles and freaks of nature . . . . "

Others took a less despairing view, trusting in the educability of a democratic electorate. Among those was Elihu Root, who had served both as a Senator and as Secretary of State. In the very first article ever to appear in this journal, in 1922, he offered this simple prescription for a responsible public opinion: "that the democracy which is undertaking to direct the business of diplomacy shall learn the business." Far from despairing of the educability of the people, Root perceived advantages in the change from the old diplomacy to the new. Under the old system, nothing much could be done to deter a monarch or dictator from malign purpose, but in a democracy something could be done to deliver the people from mistaken beliefs which could lead to unnecessary conflicts. As Root put it:

> While there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about their duties to respect the rights of others, about what has happened and is happening in international affairs, and about the effects upon national life of the things that are done or refused as between nations. . . . [1]

Root's prescription is in the Jeffersonian tradition, more congenial to American thought and experience than the elitism of the old school of European diplomacy.

During the past 30 years this great and powerful nation, previously insulated by history and geography from the rest of the world, has been rudely projected into a leadership role for which it was ill-prepared. It should not surprise us that we have had some trouble with this new and difficult role.

In domestic affairs the diversity of our population, with roots in

[1] Elihu Root, "A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, September 15, 1922, p. 5.

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different foreign cultures, has given us strength and vitality, but in foreign affairs it has created problems. It is not easy for us to decide upon and to follow a foreign policy consistent with our own national interest when so many of our people and our legislators have deep emotional attachments to other countries which have interests different from ours.

Yet popular participation in foreign policy is here to stay, and it is useless, even for those who regret the passing of the old aristocratic system, to dream of its revival. Our prospects and our hope lie in Root's prescription, and in that of Jefferson, who wrote in 1820: "I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion."

In the final analysis, we have no alternative but to work with what we have. I am constrained to believe that we are capable of learning from our recent experiences in the international arena. But I confess I harbor the belief as a matter of faith, not because we have, so far, demonstrated such a capacity.

II

My own belief, built upon 32 years in public life, is that the basic issues of foreign policy—as distinguished from its details and technicalities—are well within the grasp of ordinary citizens, *provided* these issues are explained, clearly and accurately, by competent and responsible leaders. There is, I believe, a qualitative difference between the public's proper role in foreign and in domestic affairs. More of the latter fall within the daily lives and personal experience of our citizens; their judgment is often sounder in such matters than that of their representatives, who do well, in those cases, to accede to their constituents' wishes. To the extent that issues fall beyond the people's experience, or in instances of conflict between groups in which the larger interest of the community is unclear, the political leader has a greater responsibility—to identify the larger interest and to explain it. It then becomes his responsibility to lead and to educate.

It is in this area of activity, that of the legislator as educator, that we are experiencing difficulties in American government today. In an age of dramatic advance in the technology of communications, an age in which the very word "communications" connotes an industry, a major government agency, and even an academic discipline, we seem to have lost interest in the

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most basic tool of communication, which is clarity of word and thought, the articulation of ideas, the analysis of problems, and the exposition of programs through speech and writing. Our elected representatives, and the "communications" experts they employ, study and analyze public attitudes by sophisticated new techniques, but their purpose has little to do with leadership, still less with education. Their purpose, it seems, is to discover what people want and fear and dislike, and then to identify themselves with those sentiments. They seek to discover which issues can be safely emphasized and which are more prudently avoided. This approach to politics is the opposite of leadership; it is followership, for purposes of self-advancement, elevated to a science.

I do not suggest that a politician can build a successful career on foundations of pristine honesty and unflagging courage. Such a thesis, offered by a former politician, would be unconvincing as well as untrue. The trimming of sails, the evasion of certain issues, and the marshalling of arguments so as to make the most appealing, if not necessarily the most logical, case for your cause, are all commonplace in the political arena. I have never known a politician who did not resort to these and other devices.

I surely did, in 1946, for example, to secure the adoption of the exchange program. I did not at that time emphasize what I believed then, and still believe, to be the real value of the Fulbright scholarships—which is their contribution to the advancement of world peace and international community—because I was fairly sure that argument would not sell. I stressed instead the modest costs of the program and the availability to the United States after World War II of foreign assets which could not otherwise be redeemed. The bill was allowed to pass because influential Senators who might otherwise have opposed it deemed it insignificant. I was content to have them believe that, and I have no regrets today.

I never supposed during my 30 years in the Senate that I could take a leading or creative role in more than a few areas of public policy. I tried to explain this concept in a speech at the University of Chicago in February 1946, distinguishing between two issues that were then current, the poll tax and support for the recently established United Nations. I said at that time:

> The average legislator, early in his career, discovers that there are certain interests, or prejudices, of his constituents which are dangerous to trifle with. Some of these prejudices may not be of fundamental importance to the welfare of the nation, in which case he is justified in humoring them, even though he may disapprove. The difficult case is where the prejudice concerns fundamen-

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tal policy affecting the national welfare. A sound sense of values, the ability to discriminate between that which is of fundamental importance and that which is only superficial, is an indispensable qualification of a good legislator. As an example of what I mean, let us take the poll-tax issue and isolationism. Regardless of how persuasive my colleagues or the national press may be about the evils of the poll tax, I do not see its fundamental importance, and I shall follow the views of the people of my State. . . . On the other hand, regardless of how strongly opposed my constituents may prove to be to the creation of, and participation in, an ever stronger United Nations Organization, I could not follow such a policy in that field unless it becomes clearly hopeless.

The burden of my theme is that the modern legislator, with some admirable exceptions, has discarded the role of educator in favor of performing services for his constituents—and not really his constituents as a community, but the best organized, best funded, and most politically active interest groups within the constituency. Furthermore, there has occurred a reversal of priority between policy and politics. The responsible legislator will begin with a policy or program that he believes to be in the national interest and may then resort to technique and salesmanship to win its enactment. The new breed of Congressperson seems more inclined to test the market first, to ascertain what is in current demand, and then to design a program to fit the market.

Products of the media age, the new breed of legislator, it seems, aims not to convey an idea but to project an image. I would not blame this all on television, or the public relations industry, but they have clearly been important influences. (As long ago as 1948, when both television and public relations were in their infancy, it is said that an exhaustive investigation by an advertising agency of Thomas E. Dewey's public personality, in the wake of his second defeat for the presidency, resulted in the redesigning of the Governor's mustache.) The image most assiduously cultivated since Watergate is that of honesty and sincerity. Candidates go to considerable trouble and expense to cultivate images of rugged honesty, and there is no accusation more stinging than a lack of personal rectitude. The righteous indignation of the media-age politician brings to mind the eighteenth-century Vicar of Bray, who haughtily rejected charges of opportunism with the explanation that he had indeed an overriding conviction: "That whatsoever king shall reign, I will be the Vicar of Bray, sir."

Being defeated is not the most delightful experience of a public person's career. But there should be solace in the knowledge that the departure of any given officeholder is rarely, if ever, a catastrophe for the nation. Nor need it be the occasion for personal

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distress if the retiring legislator has the satisfaction of knowing that he has accomplished something useful for the nation, that he has used the power which was entrusted to him and did not simply hoard it. It is understandable that most politicians give preemptive priority to retaining office, or gaining higher office. It is less understandable that so many citizens indulge that frailty, absolving their representatives from the obligation of responsible behavior when electoral pressures invite irresponsibility. In this respect, if not in all others, I agree with Adlai Stevenson that "Your public servants serve you right."

In other respects, I am less certain that the people *deserve* inadequate leadership. The American people, I believe, have demonstrated on crucial occasions their ability to understand and support responsible foreign policies. I do not think, however, that the people, acting spontaneously, can be expected to counteract the effects of a vast advertising industry and the mass media put to the service of shallow and irresponsible political salesmanship. Here there is need of some kind of social contract between the leaders and the led, or of something akin to the Hippocratic oath applied to politicians. I agree with Edmund Burke that, "Your representative owes you, not his industry alone, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." I agree, too, that for the soundness of his judgment the legislator is and ought to be fully accountable to his constituents, who may grant him indulgence where he encounters obstacles but who owe him none where his personal ambition is allowed to take precedence over public needs. The unanswered question of leadership in America today is no longer the question to which Thomas Jefferson and Elihu Root addressed themselves, which was the educability of the people; the question today is whether their leaders possess the intellect and character to educate them about foreign relations.

III

In the course of my Senate career I made many speeches on foreign policy but only one, as I recall, elicited such enthusiasm from the executive branch that it was quoted approvingly for years following. In that speech, a lecture at Cornell University in May 1961, I raised the question whether our eighteenth-century constitutional procedures were adequate to the foreign policy requirements of the twentieth century, and I wondered aloud "whether the time has not arrived, or indeed already passed, when we must give the executive a measure of power in the conduct of

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our foreign affairs that we have hitherto jealously withheld." Over the following years—in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on such issues as the aims and conduct of the Vietnam War, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Dominican intervention, and the National Commitments Resolution—Secretary of State Dean Rusk took considerable satisfaction in quoting my thesis of 1961 and commending it to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Secretary was suggesting inconsistency on the part of the Chairman of the Committee, who defended himself by invoking Alexander Pope's observation that, "A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong, which is but saying, in other words, that he is wiser today than he was yesterday."

In the immediate aftermath of the relatively quiet Eisenhower years, there seemed merit in the more assertive exercise of executive power in foreign relations. During the three succeeding presidencies—of Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon—a dramatic resurgence of executive power in foreign policy took place. The armed forces were committed against Cuba in 1961 and the Dominican Republic in 1965—precipitously, without congressional sanction, and in violation of our inter-American treaty obligations. In Vietnam we fought a long, costly and ultimately futile war with no more cover of constitutional sanction than the dubious and later discredited Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. To my lasting regret I played a major role in securing the enactment of that Resolution, which I surely did not anticipate would be invoked as legal sanction for a full-scale war. If the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was, as claimed, the "functional equivalent" of a declaration of war, it must stand as the only instance in the nation's history in which Congress authorized war *without knowing* that it was doing so—indeed, in the belief, as the legislative history shows, that it was acting to *prevent* war. During this period, too, the executive had increasing resort to executive agreements—in security arrangements with Spain, for example—as means of expanding American commitments abroad, thereby eroding the treaty powers of the Senate.

In the wake of these events, and under the new circumstances to which they gave rise, many of us in Congress returned to our drawing boards, to reconsider the proper balance between Congress and the President in the making of foreign policy. The results of this reaction to what had come to be known as the "imperial presidency" included the National Commitments Resolution of 1969, the Case Act of 1972 requiring the reporting of executive

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agreements, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and a whole series of legislative amendments restricting and finally ending American military action in Indochina.

Since the end of the Vietnam War, Congress has steadily and rapidly expanded its legislative authority to restrict, define and mandate acts of foreign policy. Extending its initiatives into matters of detail as well as broad direction, and even into the internal affairs of foreign countries, Congress has broadened its area of influence and activity beyond the classical preserves of legislative authority in foreign relations, generally defined by the war and treaty powers. The imperial presidency, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, seems to have fallen as fast as it rose, while those of us who prodded what seemed to be a hopelessly immobile herd of cattle a decade ago now stand back in awe in the face of a stampede.

I am not inclined, however, to revive my formulation of 1961, calling for a more generous grant of presidential power over foreign relations. A new, more generally serviceable formulation seems required, one that will take account of the essential congressional role in the authorization of military and major political commitments, and in advising broad policy directions, while leaving to the executive the necessary flexibility to conduct policy within the broad parameters approved by the legislature. Equally important is the responsibility of the President to define and explain the national interest, to employ his office, as Franklin Roosevelt once defined it, as "preeminently a place of moral leadership."

After a career of three decades in public life, I am unable to generate enthusiasm or even sympathy for a "strong" presidency or an assertive legislature as such. The more pertinent question, as the historian Thomas Bailey has suggested, is not whether a President was "strong" in the sense of dominating and overbearing, but whether he was "a dignified, fair, constitutional ruler, serving the ends of democracy in a democratic and ethical manner." Similarly, as to the legislature, the important question is not whether it exercises its powers vigorously and aggressively, but whether it exercises them wisely, responsibly and, when the need arises, courageously.

Our proper objective is neither a dominant presidency nor an aggressive Congress but, within the strict limits of what the Constitution mandates, a shifting of the emphasis according to the needs of the time and the requirements of public policy. In

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times of presidential excess, such as the 1960s, an assertive Congress is a necessary corrective. In a time, such as the present, when Congress is asserting its prerogatives aggressively, but without a commensurate demonstration of public responsibility, there is much to be said for a revival of presidential leadership.

IV

We return inevitably to the legislator as educator. The trouble with the resurgent legislature of the late 1970s is not so much that it has gone too far, as that it has gone in the wrong direction, carping and meddling in the service of special interests but scarcely asserting itself through reflective deliberation on basic issues of national interest. With the weakening of the national parties and of the leadership structure and seniority system in Congress, legislators are more susceptible than previously to the pressures of special interests, toward certain of which they exhibit an unseemly timorousness. Although there is an appearance of strength in the pressing of claims upon a diminished presidency, many of these claims are pressed by powerful interest groups upon the legislators themselves, who, instead of having gained a measure of independence, seem only to have traded one thralldom for another.

The amenability of Congress to special foreign policy interests has proven costly to the national interest. Excessive attachments to one country or another, or rigid animosity as in the case of the Soviet Union, have deprived our foreign policy of both balance and opportunity. The same is true of dogmatic attachment to general principles, such as human rights. The common disabling factor in all attachments is that they jeopardize other foreign policy objectives of equal and sometimes greater validity in terms of both national interest and international policy. George Washington's admonition, to which I referred earlier, is perhaps more pertinent to us today than at any time in our history.

There come to mind, in this connection, such congressionally imposed enactments as the Turkish arms embargo, belatedly repealed in 1978, and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, still on the books despite having provoked a result opposite to its intent, while also disrupting trade and stalling détente with the Soviet Union. Because they are backed by powerful domestic interest groups, enactments of this kind are difficult to repeal even when their mischievous consequences have become obvious.

To some degree the situation might be improved by structural

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reform in Congress—the reconsolidation of fragmented committees, or the scaling down of overgrown staffs and their exclusion, so far as possible, from political activities. But the basic problem and its corrective lie elsewhere, in the character and quality of our representatives and in their attitudes toward their responsibilities as legislators. A common attitude among the majority in Congress—many of whom habitually run ahead of their party's presidential candidate in national elections—is expressed in the phrase, "We don't need him." This attitude, which sometimes extends to the party leadership, is apparently well-founded in electoral terms. But in terms of public policy it has different implications, making for fragmentation, divisiveness and the prevalence of special interests over the national interest.

I know of no way to alter this attitude by structural or procedural reform. A few years ago I suggested—not entirely frivolously—a constitutional amendment to prohibit sitting Senators from running for the presidency, so that Senators would find it necessary to focus their talents without distraction on "the world's greatest deliberative body," and would be set free at least from the pressure groups that had no special standing in their own states. For reasons that I trust no one will find mystifying, the proposal did not catch fire. I return, therefore, to the necessity of electing individuals with judgment to public office, legislators who place a higher value on the national interest than on their own reelection or advancement, legislators who will recognize that they *do* need the executive as a partner in the making of national policy.

V

At present I can think of no more convincing assertion of congressional authority in foreign affairs—which would also be a service to the national interest—than the repeal of the discredited Jackson-Vanik Amendment. In doing this, or even trying to do it, Congress could serve the nation with a salutary debate on basic questions of détente with the Soviet Union. Such a debate might begin with certain incontestable facts, notably that immediately upon the enactment in 1974 of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking equal trade treatment for the Soviet Union with the dropping of emigration controls, Jewish emigration, which had been increasing steadily, was drastically cut back, from 35,000 in 1973 to 21,000 in 1974, and then to 13,000 a year in 1975, before being allowed to increase again in 1978. At the same time, Congress might consider the advantages of trade with the Soviet

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Union, which, except for some large agricultural shipments, has stagnated since 1974.

Beyond that—especially with a SALT agreement in prospect—there would be high educational value in still another general review of the two schools of thought regarding Soviet-American relations, the cold war school and the détente school, which have competed inconclusively for the American people's allegiance for the last 30 years. We conducted a review of this kind in the Foreign Relations Committee in 1974, in the course of which a number of seminal questions were raised, including, for example: Is the Soviet Union driven by ideological zealotry to relentless expansion, or is it a more or less conventional great power, expanding its influence where it finds opportunities, retrenching where it must? Is the Soviet Union incorrigibly repressive in its internal affairs, and can outside pressure compel greater regard for human rights, or as Marshall Shulman has suggested, is the easing of repression "more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society under prolonged conditions of reduced international tension."[2] Finally and most important, is the Soviet Union an inveterate antagonist to the United States, or can it be a reliable collaborator in trade, arms control, and keeping the lid on regional conflicts?

With the normalization of American relations with China, still another, closely related set of questions could be usefully explored. Depending upon our basic view of the Soviet Union, we will play the "China card" either as an instrument of the cold war or as an added lever toward general détente. The Chinese, for their part, whose fear of the Soviet Union may be better founded than our own, will undoubtedly wish to play their "American card." It would be useful for Congress, through committee hearings and general debate, to consider exactly how far and in what ways Chinese and American interests coincide and in what ways they diverge, especially as to the Soviet Union. It will be interesting to see, for example, whether the congressional champions of human rights and free emigration will be as conscientious in measuring China's performance as they have been in measuring the Soviet Union's.

The underlying question (and in posing it I admit to suggesting the answer) is whether two nations as powerful as the Soviet Union and the United States can afford to play traditional balance-of-power politics, or whether they are not under a special

[2] Marshall D. Shulman, "On Learning to Live with Authoritarian Regimes," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p. 334.

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obligation to contain, limit and, wherever humanly possible, resolve differences which, because of the power of the weapons at their disposal, pose a continuing threat to the entire human race.

VI

By all accounts and available evidence, there is indeed a "new breed" of legislator in the United States. In addition to being younger, more independent of party and President but much less so of constituency and pressure groups, more oriented to service and less to policy, the new breed of legislator has a somewhat distinctive attitude toward power. He seems more interested in its acquisition than in its uses, which is tantamount to saying that he is not very interested in power at all, but rather in the things that attend it—position, perquisite and prerogative.

Power, unlike money, is a wasting asset. It cannot be saved for long periods of time or invested for purposes of growth. It can be squandered, to be sure, and it can be used selectively for greater effect, but it must be used or it does not exist. Real power is the bringing to bear of significant influence on the course of human events. An officeholder whose career is devoted to ombudsman service—useful though this may be—to the appeasement of powerful pressure groups, to the advancement of "safe" causes and the avoidance of controversial ones, will find at the end of his career, if he stops to think of it, that he never wielded power at all. Although he may have adapted skillfully to the course of events, he will not have significantly influenced them. He may, like the Vicar of Bray, retain his position, or he may improve it, but that will be his maximum achievement, having little to do with the exercise of power.

The American federal system is built on the assumption that our leaders will be individuals of honest and independent judgment, patriots in the sense of readiness to place the national interest over special interest or personal ambition. James Madison, writing in *The Federalist,* Number 10, conceived of the national legislature as an educational forum, which would "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consideration." The Founding Fathers expected this representative assembly to consist of individuals, as Madison wrote, "whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice."

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It is unlikely that the Congress, even in the time of the founders, ever fulfilled this description. There have surely been times, however, when it came closer to Madison's standard than it does today. It appears that in this age of poll-taking and image-making, of mass media and political salesmanship, the attributes required for winning public office have become quite distinct from the qualities needed to govern responsibly. The attributes most useful in seeking office—endurance, agility, ambition and a telegenic personality—are not necessarily antithetical, and may in fact be helpful, to the responsible conduct of office.

Unfortunately, however, the reverse is not true. The qualities needed to govern well—wisdom, intellect, competence and character—are of little use in modern election campaigns, and may, if not suppressed, be significant handicaps. Furthermore, individuals with these attributes also tend to have sensibilities which would cause them to be repelled by the hypocrisy and demeaning requirements of modern political campaigns. It seems likely that among our population of over 200 million there are men and women of the caliber of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson. There must be some explanation for the fact that they remain in obscurity.

VII

There is no magic, but neither is there any mystery, about the best way to draw individuals of intellect and character into our public life. The answer is through our educational institutions, which are the training ground of our leaders. To the extent that they allow their curricula to be composed of non-disciplines such as the "science of communications," of subject matter dealing with technique rather than substance, and of courses teaching skills that might otherwise be left for on-the-job training, our universities are condemning the nation to a leadership of hustlers—marketers of image and plastic personality, individuals with little knowledge of or concern for the needs of a free society, aspirants to personal prerogative but not to real power and its constructive uses. As the training ground for leadership, our universities have an obligation to the entire American people to maintain standards of academic excellence—in history and the social sciences, in literature, philosophy and the arts.

In his great address of 1774, Burke gave us a definitive conception of the legislature: "Parliament is not a *Congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and

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advocates; but Parliament is a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole."

Such a body cannot simply be called into existence. Burke, like our own Founding Fathers, assumed that the legislature would be as good, as wise and as responsible as the members who composed it. They had little if anything to say about structure and procedure in the representative body. Their concern was for the character of the representatives, whose "patriotism and love of justice," in Madison's phrase, was the only reliable safeguard of the public interest. They apparently did not doubt that the legislator would be able and willing to meet his primary responsibility as educator. With that assumption now having come into doubt, the task of our own generation is to educate our leaders before they become leaders. If they are to inform our discretions, we must first inform theirs.

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Donald S. Zagoria

INTO THE BREACH: NEW SOVIET ALLIANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD

Since 1975, seven pro-Soviet communist parties have seized power or territory in Africa and Asia with armed force. In the spring of 1975, after a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, North Vietnam's Communist Party took control of the South and its puppet Pathet Lao seized power in a demoralized Laos. After a short civil war in Angola in 1975–76, following the departure of the Portuguese, Agostinho Neto's Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeated two other Angolan parties contending for power. In February 1977, in a "red terror" directed against other military leaders who had previously shared power with him after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and his group of communist officers seized power in Ethiopia. In April 1978, Nur Mohammad Taraki's People's Party launched a successful armed coup in Afghanistan against the military government led by President Mohammad Daoud. In June 1978, in South Yemen, the communist group in a ruling coalition of leftists carried out a successful armed coup against President Salim Robaye Ali, the leader of the non-communist leftists, and his army supporters. Finally, in January 1979, after a North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Hanoi replaced the pro-Chinese communist government of Pol Pot with a pro-Soviet regime.[1]

[1] Writing in *Problems of Communism* in January-February 1978, the distinguished authority on Africa, Colin Legum, describes both Neto and Mengistu as in that category of "pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninists who, apart from needing Soviet assistance anyway, feel friendship for the communist world . . . [and] invariably react favorably to Soviet intervention and with hostility to any type of Western intervention." See p. 11 of his article "The USSR and Africa." Taraki is a veteran pro-Soviet Marxist. His biographic sketch appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Moscow, on May 17, 1978. *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1978, described Taraki as chairman of "the new, united communist party formed in 1977." See also the London *Times*, October 2 and 3, 1978. Abdel Fattah Ismail, General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party, wrote in the pro-Soviet organ, *World Marxist Review*, January 1979, that his party was guided by "the theory of scientific socialism and that it was determined to deepen its friendship and cooperation with "the socialist community countries headed by the Soviet Union. . . ." The models for socialist development

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Although the events leading up to communist victories in each of these cases was complex, involved a variety of indigenous forces, and certainly cannot be attributed only to Soviet manipulation, the Russians were active players in each instance. They were not innocent bystanders.

In Vietnam, Russian arms certainly contributed to the final surge that brought Hanoi's armies to Saigon and the Pathet Lao's to Vientiane in the spring of 1975. In the Angolan case, the Russians launched a massive airlift of sophisticated arms and 10,000 Cuban troops that was decisive in defeating the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), which were supported by Zaïre and by South African forces. In Ethiopia, after Mengistu's Marxist group seized power, another massive airlift by the Russians of two billion dollars worth of arms, 20,000 Cuban troops, 300 tanks and 3,000 Soviet military technicians was decisive in helping Mengistu rout Somali-led insurgents in the Ogaden and Eritrean secessionists in the north. Three Soviet generals worked out the Ethiopian strategy on the ground in the Ogaden. In Afghanistan, before the Taraki coup, Soviet advisers were well entrenched in the Afghan armed forces; the Soviets were the leading arms suppliers. And in South Yemen, before the communist coup, the Soviets were training the South Yemen army, the Cubans were training the "people's militia"—which played a critical role in neutralizing the army that was loyal to President Ali—and the East Germans were training the security services. Thus, it is difficult to believe, at a minimum, that the Russians were caught by surprise in either case. Finally, by signing a friendship treaty with Vietnam in November 1978, a treaty that was supposed to have neutralized China, the Russians in effect gave a green light to the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978.

Since these seven pro-Soviet communist parties have come to power, Moscow has served notice that it considers all of them to be new allies, and that it intends to help them consolidate power against their internal and external enemies. It has stepped up

in Afghanistan held out by Ismail as "the most striking" were "the Soviet Republics of Central Asia, socialist Mongolia and Vietnam." Details on recent developments in South Yemen can be found in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 2, 1978, August 27, 1978, and September 10, 1978. Also see an article by Congressman Paul Findley, Republican from Illinois, in *The Washington Post*, July 7, 1978. For reporting on developments in Afghanistan, see *The Washington Post*, November 7, 1978, November 23, 1978, December 6, 1978; *The New York Times*, November 18, 1978; *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 14, 1978; and *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 12, 1978. For reports on Ethiopia, see *The New York Times*, November 21, 1978, December 6, 1978, December 17, 1978, and *The Washington Post*, January 18, 1978.

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supplies of arms to most of them. Cuban troops remain in both Angola and in Ethiopia. There are now 6,000 to 7,000 Cuban troops in South Yemen as a result of recent transfers from Ethiopia. In addition to Vietnam, Moscow has signed friendship treaties with Angola (October 1976), Ethiopia (November 1978), and Afghanistan (December 1978), most of which contain clauses calling for consultation in the event of a threat to their security. Although Moscow has not yet signed such a treaty with the new communist government in South Yemen, it has warned that "progressive forces will not abandon it at a time of trial," and Brezhnev has personally pledged aid and support to the new government.

At the same time, the Russians have given extraordinary attention and publicity to all the new communist leaders. Taraki was given a state dinner at the Kremlin at which Brezhnev announced that Soviet-Afghan relations had assumed a "qualitatively new character." And Moscow dispatched Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Andrei P. Kirilenko to attend the December 1977 congress of the MPLA where the Soviet leader strongly endorsed the congress' avowed purpose of transforming the MPLA into a "vanguard party" based on "scientific socialism"—thus setting an example for other African states.

Meanwhile, the comforting assumption—widespread in certain Western political circles, including sections of the American government—that the Soviets will not be able to consolidate their influence in these countries, an assumption based on earlier Soviet evictions from Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia, may prove to be wrong, at least in the short run. In all seven of these new cases, the need of local communist leaders for Soviet support against their internal and external enemies could lead to growing dependence on Moscow.

Particularly after China's recent armed incursion, Vietnam will clearly require continuing security ties to Moscow. In Angola, Neto requires Cuban troops to help him consolidate power against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, which still controls most of the food-producing areas in the southern part of Angola and could yet mount a drive to overthrow the MPLA. In Ethiopia, Mengistu needs the Cuban troops because he has not yet completely routed either the Somali-led insurgents in the Ogaden or the popular Islamic-Marxist rebels in Eritrea, both of whom may pose long-term threats to his regime's stability. South Yemen's new communist government sorely needs Soviet protection because it is feared and despised as the potential Cuba of the Arab world by

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its three violently anti-communist neighbors, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Oman. The recent outbreak of border fighting with North Yemen will make South Yemen even more anxious for Soviet support. Finally, because Afghanistan is Russia's small and vulnerable neighbor, it felt the need for close ties to Moscow even before the communist coup. This need will continue. In sum, all of the new communist states will require Soviet or Cuban arms and protection against continuing threats to their own security which could last for some time. Over time, there is even the possibility that these regimes—particularly if they believe they have no other alternatives—may become increasingly dependent upon the Russians.

II

In addition to the seven instances cited above, in which pro-Soviet communists, with Soviet assistance, have seized power by armed force, there have been several other cases in which armed coups which may have been assisted by the Russians have only narrowly failed. Two such abortive armed coups have recently taken place in Somalia and the Sudan, countries whose leaders must have ranked high on Moscow's "hit list." Somalia's President Siad Barre broke off his Treaty of Friendship with Moscow and expelled Soviet advisers in October 1977. The Sudanese President Ja'far Muhammad Nimeiry, after crushing the Sudanese Communist Party in 1971 and executing its leader, has increasingly become one of the most vehement anti-Soviet spokesmen in the Third World.

On April 9, 1978, President Barre of Somalia announced that his government had put down an attempted military coup undertaken in the interests of the "new imperialists," Barre's code word for Cuba and the Soviet Union. In September 1978, Somali courts sentenced 17 army officers to death and jailed 36 others for their alleged complicity in the coup attempt. What makes Barre's charges plausible is the fact that even before the abortive coup there were reports of groups within the Somali army and government who wanted to reassess Somalia's relations with the Soviet Union. These groups evidently did not approve of Barre's break with Moscow in October 1977.

In July 1976, and again in February 1977, there were attempted coups against President Nimeiry in the Sudan. The Sudanese leadership subsequently charged that these coup attempts were "manipulated by foreign hands." As if to indicate whose foreign hands they suspected, in May 1977, the Sudanese government

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expelled all 90 Soviet technicians serving with the army and closed the Soviet Embassy's military department. Sudan also requested a reduction of the Soviet Union's diplomatic representation, claiming that that representation included excessive "non-diplomatic" personnel.[2] In June 1977, Nimeiry replaced the expelled Soviet military experts with Egyptians, Chinese and Yugoslavs and during a visit to China he launched a fierce attack on Soviet strategy in Africa.

The assassination in June 1978 of the leader of North Yemen, Col. Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi, may also have been related to Soviet-Cuban activities. This assassination was carried out by a special envoy of South Yemen who carried a booby-trapped parcel to al-Ghashmi's office. It took place four days before the South Yemen communists launched their own coup in South Yemen against President Salim Robaye Ali, whom they subsequently executed. The Soviets, the Cubans and the South Yemen communists had good reasons for wanting to get rid of both Yemeni leaders. The former president of North Yemen, al-Ghashmi, said publicly in June 1976, that North Yemen was planning to ask the Soviet Union to withdraw its military experts from the country. In December 1976, North Yemen signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with China. Finally, in August 1977, less than a year before he was assassinated, al-Ghashmi ousted the TASS correspondent from North Yemen.

Unfortunately, these events do not exhaust the record of irresponsible Soviet conduct in the Third World. Libya, one of Moscow's most enthusiastic supporters in the Third World, has been implicated in attempted coups against its neighbors in Chad and in the Sudan, and is well known for its support of the most extreme terrorist movements in the Third World. Yet within the past year, Moscow has doubled to more than 2,200 the number of Soviet military advisers stationed in that country.

III

Although it would obviously be absurd to attribute all of these developments to some kind of Soviet "master plan" for the Third World—complex indigenous forces which cannot be manipulated by outsiders are, of course, at work in each case—it is just as obviously naïve to believe that there is no pattern in these developments. The Russians evidently have a new strategy for expanding their power and influence in the Third World—a strategy

[2] The *Toronto Globe and Mail,* May 19, 1977.

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which supplements the less successful one they employed in earlier years.

The first surge of postwar Soviet interest in the Third World took place in the mid-1950s under Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev broke with Stalinist orthodoxy about the unreliability of the "national bourgeoisie," and embraced India's Nehru, Egypt's Nasser, Indonesia's Sukarno, Guinea's Sekou Touré, Algeria's Ben Bella and other Third World leaders as "national democrats" who were laying the groundwork for "socialist revolutions." Under Khrushchev, the Russians told local communist leaders in the Third World to cooperate with the "national democrats" and even to merge their party organizations with those of the nationalists so as to avoid mutual suspicions and mistrust.

But the fruits of this strategy of alliance with the "national democrats" were often bitter. Nasser's successor, Sadat, ousted the Russians in the mid-1970s and Sudan's President Nimeiry quickly followed suit. Sukarno, Ben Bella and Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah were overthrown by military coups. In other countries, the nationalists jailed, purged or even executed communist leaders. And even where the Russians managed to maintain some influence over leaders such as Touré in Guinea, Mrs. Gandhi in India, and the Ba'ath socialists in Iraq and Syria, these leaders used the Russians as much for their own purposes as the Russians used them for theirs. None of them faithfully followed the Soviet line on foreign policy.

Having realized the error of excessive cooperation with unreliable "bourgeois nationalist" leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets have come up with a new strategy for the 1970s and 1980s. They continue, in some cases, such as Iraq, Syria and Algeria, for example, to support non-communist "socialists" of one kind or another. But now that more orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups and parties have proliferated in many parts of Asia and Africa, the new element in the Soviet strategy is to help communist parties gain state power. Then, via friendship treaties, arms aid, and Soviet, Cuban or East European advisers, the Soviets will help the local communists hold onto and consolidate power. Ultimately, the aim of this strategy is to establish a new alliance system for the Russians in Africa and Asia, a looser eastern version of the Warsaw Pact.

The evidence of some Soviet success in implementing this strategy can be gleaned from the events following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Most of the nonaligned countries, even many of the radical ones, opposed that invasion and refused to

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recognize the new Cambodian communist state imposed by Hanoi. Even Moscow's Warsaw Pact ally, Romania, spoke out publicly against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and refused to recognize the new government. So did Yugoslavia. But in the eight days after the fall of Phnom Penh, 14 nations did declare formal recognition of the new Cambodian government. Those governments were, in the order in which they acted, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Laos, Hungary, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mongolia, Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Thus Moscow's new communist allies in Asia and Africa joined with Moscow's faithful regimes in Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Cuba in a critical test of allegiance to the Soviet Union that most of the Third World and even communist Romania could not pass.

IV

The new pro-Soviet communist regimes in Africa and Asia, imposed by force and backed as they are by Soviet power, pose serious new threats to many of the regional powers which are friendly to the United States. The South Yemen Marxists have already made known their intention to renew their support of the Marxist-Leninist rebel movement of the Dhofar region of neighboring Oman, one of the conservative pro-Western states in the Arabian Peninsula. The Dhofar rebellion, supported by South Yemen Marxists and Cuban advisers, smouldered for more than a decade before it was dealt a crushing blow by Iranian troops several years ago. The Iranians sealed off the border between South Yemen and Oman. Now, with Iran in revolution, South Yemen may be in a better position to rekindle the revolt.

The Omanis are clearly worried. Recent American visitors to Oman were told by the Sultan's advisers that "from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, the situation looks very bleak to us." The Omanis fear an attack by South Yemen with its MiG-21 fighters and its Ilyushin bombers, which are currently being flown—so the Omanis say—by Cuban pilots.

Over the longer run, the South Yemen Marxists and their Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers are undoubtedly aiming to bring down the conservative, pro-Western governments in Saudi Arabia and North Yemen as well.

The events in South Yemen are only one of a number of recent developments that have badly shaken the Saudis. The Saudis were already seriously alarmed over the extension of Soviet and Cuban power to Ethiopia just across the Red Sea, and by the

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revolution in Iran, just across the Persian Gulf. If the Saudis were to interpret all of these developments as an indication of a declining American power which can no longer guarantee their security, they might be tempted to make their own independent accommodation with Moscow. Such a development, combined with events in Iran, would radically alter the present balance of power in the Middle East.

Pakistan is also increasingly alarmed at the spread of Soviet power. It is now encircled by its old enemy, India, and by communist Afghanistan, both of which have friendship treaties with Moscow. Afghanistan also has long-standing territorial claims to the Pushtunistan region of Pakistan and might revive such claims at an appropriate moment. Iran, a neighbor on which Pakistan was counting to maintain regional stability, is now in the throes of a revolution. And Pakistan's faith in China must have been dealt a serious blow by China's inability to stop the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In such circumstances, it would not be surprising if Pakistan sought insurance through improved ties to Moscow.

In Southeast Asia, the spread of Soviet power and Vietnamese influence has greatly alarmed China and all of the ASEAN powers, particularly Thailand. The new pro-Hanoi communist regime in Cambodia brings Vietnam to Thailand's doorstep, and has increased Thai fears about the communist insurgencies in the northeast and the south that have been active for many years. China, on the other hand, now feels encircled by Russia on the north and Russia's ally, Vietnam, on China's southern border. As we have already seen with the Chinese incursion into Vietnam, regional tensions will almost certainly grow in intensity.

In southern Africa, Angola does not pose a larger regional threat for the moment because Neto has sought to improve relations with neighboring Zaïre. But Angola is one of the "front line" states close to Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, and if events in this region lead to a racial war, Angola could become even a larger staging area for Cuban and black nationalist forces preparing to fight the white minority regimes. That is why the South Africans and Rhodesians keep a wary eye on the Cubans in Angola, and probably continue to nourish hopes of overthrowing Neto.

In sum, the forcible extension of pro-Soviet communism backed by Soviet power to several new areas of the world poses serious new strategic problems for a variety of middle powers, many of whom look to the United States for leadership and support. The

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danger is not so much that Moscow will achieve hegemony in the Third World. This is unlikely for a great many reasons. The danger is rather that the spread of communism and Soviet power will upset tenuous regional balances of power, lead to intensified regional instabilities, and make even more difficult the settlement of a variety of regional clashes that could lead to war.

V

One shudders to think of what might have been the American response to seven communist takeovers in Asia and Africa at the height of the cold war. Clearly we have been sobered by our experience in Vietnam. But the lack of response today—indeed the lack of comprehension—is just as frightening. Analysts both in and out of government who call attention to these developments are accused of being "cold warriors" with "globalist" points of view that ignore "complex local realities." High-ranking officials in the State Department warn against "abstract geopolitical thinking," and allege that the Soviets have a "loser's mentality." And the Secretary of State himself recently said that the Soviet involvement in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was "unclear," and that we must not accept "oversimplified generalities as applying to different situations."

Certainly the proper American reaction to the communist surge in Africa and Asia is not to send half a million troops to these regions. Certainly the victory of communist forces in the Third World represents the outcome of complex indigenous situations which are not all manipulated by Moscow. Certainly Moscow will have some trouble consolidating its hold on these communist parties in the Third World. Certainly it is true that there is a qualitative difference between the victory of indigenous communist parties in Asia and Africa and the imposition of communism on Eastern Europe by Soviet occupation forces in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

But, in the meantime, are there no general problems for American foreign policy resulting from these developments? Many of our allies and friends are worried by the appearance of pro-Soviet communist parties supported by Soviet arms and Cuban gendarmes on their doorsteps. How do we reassure them? Regional stability is now threatened in many areas. How do we restore it? The credibility of American power has been shaken by these developments and by our apparent lack of response to them. How do we restore it? What is the significance of these developments

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for U.S.-Soviet relations? Are they compatible with our understanding of détente?

Most important of all, what kind of international order are we likely to build if one of the superpowers believes in the continued, uninhibited use of force to spread "liberation movements," and the other believes either that force is immoral or that it has lost its political utility? These are some of the questions that need to be discussed, and not in a sterile debate between "globalists" and people who profess to understand "local realities"— a debate which drives both sides into extreme positions.

VI

Evidently there are three levels at which these problems have to be addressed. First, there are broad questions that go to the very heart of our relationship with Moscow. Second, there is the need for consultation with our friends and allies in the regions affected, in order to develop strategies for dealing with the new communist regimes. Finally, there is the question of how we should relate to those new communist states.

President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has said on numerous occasions that détente with the Soviet Union is desirable, but that if it is to be enduring, and is to be accepted by the American people, it must be both reciprocal and progressively more comprehensive. "Reciprocal" means that one party cannot feel free to engage in the direct promotion of revolutionary violence while at the same time considering it an act of intervention if the other side affirms its own beliefs. To be comprehensive, détente cannot be conducted selectively. That is, it cannot mean accommodation in one part of the world and uninhibited exploitation of unavoidable turbulence in another. There must be some agreed-upon "rules of the game."

These are sound principles on which to base Soviet-American relations. But there has been little progress so far in getting the Soviets to adhere to them. Partly this is because the Carter Administration itself is divided on how best to pursue détente with the Russians. Partly it is because there is no national consensus, in either the Administration or the Congress, on our relations with Moscow. Partly it is because the President himself has sent inconsistent messages to the Russians. And partly it is because we have not given the Russians enough cause either for hope of better relations through a true détente or for fear of the results of promoting violence in the Third World. Whatever the reasons,

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Brzezinski's concept of a reciprocal and comprehensive détente, however sound, is not being implemented.

To achieve such a détente, the Administration must make two things clear to Moscow: first, that it will be to the Soviet advantage if they exercise greater self-restraint in the Third World; second, that it will be risky if they don't. In the past we have failed to provide the Russians with sufficient positive or negative incentives for self-restraint. By foolishly imposing congressional restrictions on trade with the Russians, and by linking those restrictions to Soviet emigration policies—rather than to Soviet foreign policy—we have deprived ourselves of positive leverage on Soviet behavior in the Third World. At the same time, we have not been able to demonstrate any kind of military or political response to Soviet activity in the Third World that might be a negative incentive for further Soviet advances. So far, these advances have been virtually cost-free.

There are three steps in particular that we need to take in providing Moscow with positive incentives for restraint. First, Congress should make the kinds of amendments in trade legislation that Senator Adlai Stevenson is now proposing. Stevenson's proposed amendments to the Trade Act would waive the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that ties most-favored-nation trading status to Soviet internal policies. The effect of Stevenson's amendment would be to increase the President's flexibility to trade with Moscow and to use such trade for "linkage." The Russians are still very anxious to obtain American technology and credits. By offering them such a possibility in exchange for real restraint in the Third World, we will at the least present them with a difficult choice.

Second, we should engage the Russians in preliminary discussions about regional security problems in various parts of the Third World. We cannot exclude the Russians from all negotiations on regional matters and then ask them for restraints in the regions. Ultimately, Moscow will have to be brought into a Middle East peace settlement. The Russians suspect that it is our intention to freeze them out of a variety of areas of the world in which they have legitimate interests. We should try to make clear to them that this is not our intention. Indeed, much as we dislike it, we will be forced to face up to the fact that Russia is now a global power capable of influencing regional developments almost everywhere. It is time that we engage the Russians in a broad dialogue on regional security issues and offer them a role in helping to maintain regional security.

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We also need to sign and to ratify the SALT II agreement as a symbol both of our desire to slow down the nuclear arms race and of our desire to pursue an evenhanded policy between Moscow and Peking. A congressional refusal to ratify SALT at a time when our relations with China are moving forward in high gear might well convince the suspicious Russians that we intend to form a new Chinese-Japanese-European-American axis against them, even though that is not our policy. Such one-sided diplomacy on our part would only increase Soviet paranoia. It could lead the Russians to take even more aggressive actions in the Third World, and against China itself, in a desperate effort to strengthen their position before the imagined anti-Soviet axis materializes.

In sum, there are a variety of overtures we need to make to Moscow in order to assure the Russians that, for our part, we are anxious for a more comprehensive détente.

But along with the "carrots" there should also be some "sticks." The Senate, when it ratifies SALT II, as I expect it will, should warn Moscow in a "sense of the Senate" resolution that the United States will no longer accept a narrow and unreciprocal détente, and that future Soviet conduct in the Third World will influence the future development of détente, including the prospects for SALT III. And Moscow should understand that if it continues to conduct violent interventions in the Third World wherever the opportunity beckons, we will eventually be forced into consolidating our new relationship with China.

We must be clear—and sufficiently modest—about the nature of the demands that we make upon Soviet behavior in the Third World. We cannot realistically expect Moscow to stop selling arms to its client states; but we can expect it to reduce the flow of arms, rather than to increase it, as it has recently been doing. We cannot realistically expect Moscow to stop trying to expand its influence in the Third World; but we can expect Moscow to stop transporting Cuban troops to various trouble spots. And we can expect the Russians to increase pressure on their Cuban allies to withdraw from Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and other areas of the world where those troops and "advisers" constitute daggers pointed at important Western interests.[3]

It is true, as the Soviets contend, that the United States intervened in the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s and that, in this sense, Moscow is now giving us back a little of our own

[3] There are reportedly a total of between 20 and 40,000 Cubans in 16 African states.

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medicine. But apart from the case of Vietnam, the United States, even at the heyday of its interventionism, did not employ combat troops to influence the course of events in the Third World. In small countries, a few hundred combat troops on one side or another can make a decisive difference in the outcome of a local war. Thus, we must make it clear to the Russians that in our continuing competition for influence in the Third World, the use of foreign combat troops cannot be allowed. In a word, the Russians should be put on notice that they cannot have both a stable détente with the United States, including expanded economic relations, and a cost-free license to stir the boiling pot of the Third World.

VII

There are also a variety of steps the United States will have to take to reassure pro-Western states—particularly in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions—that we will not abandon them. During Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's recent trip to Saudi Arabia, the Pentagon announced that it intended to increase sharply its arms supplies to North Yemen and to the Sudan. Secretary Brown was reported to have told the Saudis that the United States is ready to discuss the creation of a Persian Gulf command led by Americans. Brown also reportedly discussed with the Saudis the possibility of expanding port facilities for American ships in the Indian Ocean naval base of Diego Garcia. Finally, Brown is reported to have assured the Saudis that the United States is creating a "quick strike force" of American paratroopers and marines to be used in case of a request for help by Saudi Arabia or other Gulf nations threatened by a Soviet-supported coup. These are all worthwhile countermeasures. But they may not be enough.

We should also consider security pacts with critical countries such as Saudi Arabia, to assure them of American support in the case of an external threat. And the United States needs to adopt a much higher profile in the entire region from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa. Oman would welcome a much larger U.S. diplomatic presence. As of February, the American Embassy in Oman had only a staff of five. Oman also wants a stronger CIA station, to assess what is needed in the country and in the region as a whole. Steps such as these are needed as a short-term stopgap to convince the Gulf countries that the United States remains committed to their security.

Over the longer run, of course, the United States will have to guard against overidentifying itself with reactionary regimes

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standing on feet of clay. Such regimes will prove to be unstable no matter how many U.S. arms and how much U.S. support they receive. Iran dramatically illustrates the danger. At the same time, the United States will have to guard against the opposite danger—of assuming that all authoritarian regimes are equally unstable and unworthy of U.S. support.

It is time, too, for the United States to play a stronger and more creative role in fostering regional organizations, which could play an important role in minimizing the kinds of interstate conflicts on which the Russians feed. ASEAN, the organization of non-communist states in Southeast Asia that includes Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, could provide a useful model. The ASEAN states are increasingly aware that internal weaknesses in the region invite exploitation from outside. They say that the best way to promote regional security is by developing economic wellbeing and social justice on the one hand, and by forging regional unity on the other. The ASEAN states have adopted a common front in such international agencies as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT); they have intensified their efforts at regional cooperation; they have put forth joint proposals to the United States, the European Community and Japan for a commodity price stabilization scheme; and they have signed a treaty of amity and cooperation, the first binding agreement among Southeast Asian countries in the history of the region. More recently, in an effort to remove territorial frictions with its neighbor Malaysia, the Philippines has dropped its territorial claims to Sabah. Thus, without overemphasizing military activity, the ASEAN countries have gone a long way toward achieving the kind of regional cooperation that is necessary to keep predatory external powers out.

But achieving stability in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, will in the long run require the participation of the great powers. Now is the time for us to take the lead in convening a new international conference on the future of Indochina, a conference modelled on the 1954 Geneva Conference, which recognized the division of Vietnam and the political neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Such a conference should include Russia, China, the United States, India, the ASEAN countries, and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. If such a conference were to be successful, it would serve a number of purposes. It would reassure the ASEAN countries. It would set an important example for the peaceful resolution of regional

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conflicts. And, not least of all, such a conference could be used to demonstrate to both Moscow and Peking that our interest is in regional stability, not in siding with one communist power against another in an effort to gain one-sided advantages that can only raise tensions between the great powers.

Finally, in Northeast Asia, it is time to reverse the Administration's earlier decision to withdraw American combat troops from South Korea. No more troops should be withdrawn until there is an accommodation between the two Koreas. The Administration has wisely modified its earlier decision; it has left open the possibility that the withdrawal would be halted "if conditions so warrant." Conditions do now warrant such a change. The recent rise of regional tension in Southeast and Western Asia make it imperative that Northeast Asia should remain stable. The apparent revival of the North-South Korean dialogue is an encouraging sign, but it may be no more than a North Korean ploy designed to encourage the Carter Administration to continue its planned withdrawal. The only way to test North Korea's sincerity is to insist that American troops remain in South Korea until North and South Korea reach a peaceful settlement that is ratified by the great powers.

VIII

The United States will also have to devise policies designed to deal directly with the new communist governments in Africa and Asia. The place to begin in formulating such policies is with a recognition of the nature of conditions in much of the Third World that breed radicalism, and with a certain degree of empathy for those forces in the Third World that insist on radical change. As contemporary events in Iran demonstrate, radical change in the Third World is inevitable; and, in many places, it is desirable. Such change will come under a variety of auspices, some of them Islamic, as in Iran, some of them Marxist, as in Angola. If the United States places itself in opposition to all such changes, the result will be an isolated, besieged and increasingly nationalistic America that becomes irrelevant to the Third World. In fact, the United States, because of its commitment to pluralism, diversity and social justice, should be in a better position than the Soviet Union, with its monolithic notions of social change, to relate to legitimate Third World aspirations.

A second point of departure for American policy should be a clearer recognition of the nature of the Marxist movements in the Third World and their relationship to the Soviet Union. The

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potential weak link of the new Soviet alliance system in Asia and Africa is the same weak link that disrupted Soviet alliances with communist Yugoslavia and communist China—national communism. The history of the modern world demonstrates that in the radical mixture we call national communism, the nationalistic ingredient is far more powerful than the Marxist. The best current indications of this can be found in East Asia, where the most intense conflicts are between communist states—between Russia and China, between China and Vietnam, and until recently, between Vietnam and Cambodia. Indeed, in East Asia, the East-East conflict, that is, conflict between communist states, has replaced the East-West conflict as the source of greatest tension. Thus, we can assume that there are already conflicts of interest between the Russians and their new national communist clients in Asia and Africa, and that such conflicts will continue to develop.

Such tensions can already be detected in the relationship between Moscow and Neto's MPLA in Angola. Neto himself fought Portuguese colonial rule for two decades and is as much an Angolan nationalist as he is a communist. Moreover, he has had many differences with the Russians in the past. At times, Moscow even encouraged several of Neto's rivals to overthrow the MPLA leader because he was insufficiently subordinate. There are many recent signs of Neto's concern about excess Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola. Last December, Neto warned publicly about the need to "defend the independence of the Party"; in the same month he fired a Cabinet minister who had signed an agreement with Cuba calling for 6,000 additional Cuban technicians to be sent to Angola. The agreement, Neto said, had been signed without his permission. Neto has also made a marked effort during the past several months to improve relations with the United States. He entertained Senator McGovern and a number of American journalists who accompanied McGovern. Neto has also sought to improve his troubled relations with neighboring Zaïre. And recently he has sought to improve relations with Portugal in an effort to get Portuguese technicians to return to Angola. This would make Angola less dependent on Cuban and East European technicians.

In the light of these developments, the United States should reconsider its policy of nonrecognition of Angola. American recognition would encourage those less doctrinaire forces within the MPLA, led by Neto himself, who do not want to become excessively dependent on Russia or Cuba.

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By recognizing the new Angolan government, we would not be deserting the noncommunist forces that continue to oppose Neto's government. The conflict between Neto's MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA is likely to go on indefinitely. Savimbi's forces already control much of the south, especially at night. Eventually, a real peace in Angola will require negotiations between these two parties. But the United States will be in a better position to help mediate such efforts if it is directly involved in Angola.

The same principle of encouraging independence from Moscow should be applied in Vietnam. The Vietnamese communists fought a 30-year war against the French, the Japanese and the Americans to gain their independence from external powers. As a result of this experience, they cannot be anxious to become dependent on Moscow. To some extent, Hanoi and Moscow have parallel interests. But it would be a serious error to conclude that Hanoi has overnight become one of Moscow's vassals, even in the wake of China's armed incursion.

There are in fact many signs that Vietnam, like Angola, does not want to become excessively dependent on the Russians. Vietnam wants Japanese and American economic aid in order to rebuild its war-torn economy and to reduce its dependence on the Soviets. The United States should make it clear that if Hanoi demonstrates its independence from Moscow, we shall show more interest both in recognition and in providing assistance. But if Vietnam aligns itself even further with the Russians—and particularly if Vietnam provides Moscow with a base in Cam-ranh Bay and other military facilities—there will be no possibility of such aid.

In sum, the United States should recognize that Marxist parties which come to power in Africa and Asia are not simple agents of Soviet power. If we treat them as if they were, we will force them to become even more dependent on the Russians. This is the mistake we made in dealing with the Chinese communists in the 1950s, and it is the mistake we made in dealing with Ho Chi Minh. We should not repeat it in the 1980s.

The extent to which the new communist states of Africa and Asia follow foreign policy lines independent of Moscow is one basic criterion we should use to judge their behavior. A second is the extent to which they contribute to regional stability and order. Angola is seeking to improve its relations with Zaïre. It is also contributing to a peaceful solution in neighboring Namibia. We should watch carefully to see whether Vietnam and the new Cambodian communist government also seek to improve their

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relations with Thailand and the other ASEAN countries. Where the new communist states demonstrate good will in reaching accommodation with their neighbors, the United States should encourage them.

On the other hand, the new communist regime in South Yemen has declared publicly its intention to rekindle the Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman, and it has made its territory available to Soviet airplanes supplying Ethiopia in the war against neighboring Somalia. And the new Ethiopian communist regime itself has shown little restraint in its relations with two of its neighbors, Somalia and the Sudan. Ethiopian units have recently set up fortified camps inside Sudan's territory and Ethiopian MiG fighters, probably piloted by Cubans, have been bombing Sudanese armored units. Under such circumstances, the United States, in conjunction with its regional allies, should seek appropriate policies designed to restrain and to isolate both South Yemen and Ethiopia.

Thus, American policies toward the new communist states of Asia and Africa should be differentiated according to the behavior of these new states. Where they demonstrate independence from Moscow and willingness to contribute to overall regional stability, we should encourage them. Where they do not, we should isolate them.

IX

The challenge of dealing with communism in the Third World is as much a challenge to our understanding as it is to our policy. We need a much more sophisticated national understanding of radical movements and states than we presently have. Compared to the huge amounts of money and effort the government spends on collecting and evaluating military intelligence and "hardware," the amounts which it spends on political analysis are trivial. The problem is not merely a failure of gathering information or even a failure of proper evaluation. Even more serious, it is a failure to ask the right questions.

Many of the "right" questions to ask about the Third World today concern the nature of radical movements—their ideological origins, leadership, foreign policy orientation, social base, and so on. Yet there are very few specialists in the National Security Council, the State Department, the Pentagon, or even the CIA, who possess extensive and detailed knowledge about radical political movements of one kind or another in the Third World. There are even fewer who can relate these movements to the broader

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political competition between Russia and the United States. To the extent that the United States has such expertise, it can be found in the universities. That university expertise needs to be brought to bear on American policy in a more effective way than has been the case in the past. And the government's own capacity to analyze radicalism in the Third World must be greatly strengthened both qualitatively and quantitatively.

One widely noted recent analytical deficiency was the failure of the American intelligence community to understand and to evaluate the widespread opposition to the Shah in Iran. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case. Another recent example of such a lack of analysis was the government's abject neglect of developments in South Yemen. Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois, who visited South Yemen frequently in recent years, wrote in *The Washington Post* of July 7, 1978, that he was the only U.S. official, elected or appointed, to visit South Yemen since 1969, when the United States broke off relations with the country. When Findley returned from a recent visit to South Yemen and pleaded for more U.S. involvement in the country before the June 1978 communist coup, the State Department delayed. Even after the coup, according to David Binder, writing in *The New York Times* of August 5, 1978, the State Department concluded that "South Yemen, because it is small and has only 1.5 million people, does not pose a real threat to anyone and hence is not worth larger concern." This remarkable statement came at the very time that 15 Arab League states were organizing an economic, political and cultural boycott directed against South Yemen!

This appalling lack of understanding of developments within the Third World and their relation to U.S. security is a national scandal. We can no longer afford to be ignorant of what is going on in Iran or South Yemen or in the many other Third World countries which have the potential for becoming future "Irans" and future "South Yemens." This lack of understanding extends to our political parties as well. An important part of our difficulties in responding effectively to the Soviet challenge in the Third World is that neither our extreme liberals nor our extreme conservatives properly understand it. The Soviet offensive employs military power in behalf of "just" causes—or at least causes that are often perceived as just by many in the Third World. The extreme liberals in the United States are usually sympathetic to the causes, but they overlook or minimize the Soviet use of force to assist them. The extreme conservatives are primarily concerned with the Soviet use of force, but they generally ignore the political

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causes on behalf of which that force is employed.

Both stand on abstract principles. The liberals make a fetish of non-interventionism. The conservatives talk in equally abstract ways about "backbone" and "strength," by which they usually mean military power. Both are equally unrealistic—the liberals because non-interventionism is not a policy; the conservatives because more guns and missiles are not a sufficient answer to problems that are essentially political.

x

Over the longer run, there is room for optimism. Soviet expansion in the Third World has already run into a variety of forces that will work against it. The so-called "nonaligned" movement, which incorporates many of the Third World countries, is deeply split; the Yugoslavs, the Somalis and others have taken the lead in criticizing Cuba as a proxy for Soviet imperialism. This view has considerable support among a broad range of African and Asian countries. China still commands considerable respect in much of Asia and Africa, and Peking's activities will counter those of Moscow. The rigid Soviet stance is incapable of relating effectively to the national, ethnic and religious diversity that is characteristic of much of the Third World. The Russians find it difficult to deal with their friends as equals; yet the proud nationalists of Asia and Africa, having thrown off the shackles of Western colonialism, are not likely to tolerate a new Soviet colonialism. Once radical movements consolidate their power and turn their attention to economic development, the West will become increasingly relevant and the Russians increasingly irrelevant to them.

In many parts of the Third World, such as Northeast Asia and non-communist Southeast Asia, the Russians have not been able to expand their influence very much.[4] Recent events in Afghanistan and South Yemen have alarmed other Third World countries which are generally friendly to Moscow. In Iraq, there has been a new purge of suspected communists in the armed forces. Syria has restricted the writings of pro-Soviet journalists. The Iraqi and Syrian fears of communist infiltration point up the inherent contradiction in the new Soviet strategy. Moscow cannot expect both to woo Arab socialists and to try to replace them with local communists. Finally, the new U.S. ties with China, which have completely altered the global strategic chessboard, may in time

[4] See my article "The Soviet Quandary in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978.

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more than compensate for Soviet gains elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Thus, while there is room for concern about Soviet expansion, there is no need to adopt Chicken Little's view of the world—that the sky is always falling down.

In fact, the great majority of the nonaligned countries spoke out against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia earlier this year, and most of them did not extend recognition to the new Cambodian government. This reflects growing suspicions within the Third World about Soviet policies.

But although there is reason to be cautiously optimistic over the longer run, there is no reason to be complacent. Three very serious dangers now lie on the horizon. The first is that the Soviet expansionist drive in the Third World will make certain regional tensions even more acute. China has already attempted to give Vietnam a "bloody nose" in response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Will Russia now attempt to bloody China's nose in return? Developments in South Yemen and the Horn of Africa have heightened tensions all over the Indian Ocean, and could even contribute to undermining our efforts to reach a Middle East peace accord.

The second danger is that the Soviets, inspired by a conviction that the United States is still paralyzed by a post-Vietnam trauma, and angered by the new American ties to China, will continue or even increase their expansionist policies in the Third World on the assumption that the risks are minimal and the potential gains considerable. From the Soviets' perspective, moreover, what they are doing in the Third World is "just" and legitimate. They are helping to undermine "reactionary," "feudal," or white minority regimes. And the United States is being cast as the defender of the unpopular status quo. To expect the Soviets to give up such a promising field of endeavor, where they can hope to expand their influence while supporting "just" causes, is unrealistic.

The third danger is that this Soviet drive to expand its influence in the Third World will help stimulate a new cold war mentality in the United States which will relate all American difficulties abroad to the "Soviet menace"—a vast oversimplification of the problems we face. Such a mood in the United States could make it impossible to ratify SALT II; it could lead to a resurgence of the chauvinistic elements on the American political scene, and, eventually, to a serious deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Already some leaders of the right-wing of the Republican Party are charging President Carter with "appeasement" and calling him another Neville Chamberlain. This is irresponsible politics,

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and one can only hope that it does not represent a preview of the electoral campaign in 1980. We certainly need a more thorough public debate about the Soviet challenge and its implications for American foreign policy, but a debate in which the opposition party leaders appeal to the most primitive instincts of the American people is bound to be counterproductive and even dangerous. There is a vast middle ground for American opposition politicians between raising the spectre of "appeasement" on the one hand and accepting the Administration's present policies on the other.

In the past, the United States has displayed an unhealthy tendency to vacillate between unrealistic hopes and unreasonable fears about the Russians. It was the overselling of détente by Nixon and Kissinger that led us to have unrealistic expectations about Soviet behavior in the first place. Let us not now go to the opposite extreme and treat every crisis in the Third World as if it was the last showdown at the O.K. Corral with Moscow. That would make the situation in the Third World even more unstable and much more dangerous. As Adam Ulam has recently reminded us, it is a sobering thought that "no Soviet move or ruse has undercut the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy as much as what the Americans have done to themselves in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate."[5]

We have the resources, the strength, the technology and the allies to stand up to the Soviet challenge in the Third World without overreacting to it. But we cannot deal with this challenge either by returning to simplistic cold war formulas or by advancing equally simplistic anti-cold war formulas against "globalism." We will have to do better than that.

[5] Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1978*, p. 567.

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Robert Legvold

THE SUPER RIVALS: CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD

Like a siege, instability in the Third World has laid hold of Soviet-American relations. From the Angolan civil war in 1975 to the Iranian revolution in 1978, the turmoil has overwhelmed all other considerations in the relationship, save for the growth of Soviet military power, whose menace it serves to accentuate. Or so it would appear from the most forceful commentary of the day.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for example, warns of the adverse "geopolitical momentum" now running against us from Angola to Afghanistan, an area that Zbigniew Brzezinski calls the "arc of instability" and others describe variously as the "crumbling triangle" or the "crescent of crisis." Kissinger paints a picture of looming tragedy if the United States cannot somehow draw itself together and disrupt the current pattern of events. Unless this country acts decisively to constrain Soviet expansionism and prove to the Soviet leaders "that a relaxation of tensions is not compatible with a systematic attempt to overturn the geopolitical equilibrium," Kissinger worries, then "sooner or later a showdown is likely to occur with tremendous dangers for everybody."[1] Because the United States did not cut short Soviet (and Cuban) intervention in Angola and has not yet shown the wit or the will to discourage the Soviet Union from exploiting trouble elsewhere, according to him, it has imperiled the confidence of friends and allies. He speaks of countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia straying from their "clear-cut foreign policy orientation" to something "much more ambiguous," creating an "area of enormous uncertainty." Echoing him, the London *Economist* writes that "the Vietnam-mesmerised American reluctance" to counter "the Soviet-Cuban success in Angola in 1975 . . . led to the Soviet-Cuban success in Ethiopia . . . which, in conjunction with the turmoil in Iran and the coups in Kabul and Aden, is now having its effect on the political complexion of

[1] "An Interview with Kissinger," *Time*, January 15, 1979, p. 29.

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the whole triangle."[2] Within the "triangle" extending from Kabul to Ankara to Addis Ababa, the *Economist* warns that "former neutrals" may become "pro-Russian" and "some of the former pro-westerners nervously neutral."

The result, it maintains, would be an alteration in the global balance more important than any of the Soviet Union's recent gains in Africa and even more important than "the growing strength of the Soviet military establishment in Central Europe."

Zbigniew Brzezinski approaches the problem with less alarm, but, as the only spokesman for the Administration who has attempted to formulate the threat, he too focuses on the danger of the Soviet Union short-sightedly "exploiting" the "massive global chaos and fragmentation" inherent in regional conflict.[3] We face two problems, he says; one is "the growth of Soviet military power which has been sustained over the last 20 years" and which, unless "we take matching steps," could pose "very serious problems for us in the early 80s"; the other is "regional conflict, the fragmentation of wobbly social and political structures" all the way from Iran down to southern Africa. Worst of all, he asserts, the two trends may intersect.

For Kissinger, Brzezinski, and a great many others, regional conflict is not merely a serious issue between us and the Soviet Union; increasingly it is the prism through which they view the Soviet Union. What they think about that country, about its growing military power, about its foreign policy, even about its basic drives, depends in large part on their perception of its approach to the crises of Southwest Asia, the Horn, and southern Africa. Angola and all that followed has sharpened our growing fears of an eroding military balance. The image of Soviet and Cuban fighting in Angola and Ethiopia ripples all the way back to the level of the strategic arms race and the state of the balance in Europe. The assumption is that the Soviets are bolder because they are stronger than ever and, some would say, maybe even stronger than we.

The same events also remind many of the Soviet stake in turmoil and its penchant for exploiting trouble to increase the U.S.S.R.'s influence. At least that is the conviction and it deepens not only when the Soviet Union meddles in Africa but even when events go the Soviet Union's way without direct Soviet interference as, for example, in Afghanistan and South Yemen, where over the

[2] "The Crumbling Triangle," *The Economist*, December 9, 1978, p. 12.
[3] "The World According to Brzezinski," *New York Times Magazine*, December 31, 1978, p. 11.

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last year pro-Soviet regimes have emerged.[4] Thus, the flow of recent events in these troubled regions has had the second effect of reinforcing the axiomatic notion that Soviet policy thrives on conflict in the Third World and follows a strategy designed to promote it. Third, and ultimately, the same events demonstrate to observers like Kissinger that the Soviet Union has arrived at a historic juncture: having escaped the continental limits of its (military) power, they assert, the Soviet Union is only beginning the truly imperial phase of its development.

The views of Kissinger and Brzezinski deserve this prominence not only because they are two of the most consequential foreign policy voices in this country, but for three more fundamental reasons. First, what they say has a powerful resonance, capturing the sentiments of a great part of the U.S. Congress, including an increasingly partisan Republican Party, conservative policy groups like the Committee on the Present Danger, and a sizable part of the public. Second, their approach has no competitors. No other coherent or comprehensive interpretation of the problem of regional instability or of the Soviet challenge is emerging, least of all from the current Administration. A partisan quarrel appears to be building over the ability of the Carter Administration to deal with the situation, but there are few hints that the framing of the problem will be at issue. Third, as their views predominate, or seem to, the rest of the world and, particularly, the Soviet Union will judge us accordingly. The prominence of this view unfortunately will make the problem of superpower rivalry more difficult.

For, whatever the merits of the Kissinger analysis, it oversimplifies the issues and neglects the other side's perceptions. In what follows I have tried to introduce some of the complexities of the problem and to suggest other dimensions that we need to consider as our response develops.

The analysis is divided into four parts. In the first, I have

[4] This comment deserves explanation. While the Soviet Union has been deeply involved with the principal group which triumphed in both South Yemen and Afghanistan for months and years beforehand, what limited evidence exists does not suggest that the Soviet Union had any direct role in the immediate events leading to the overthrow of President Salim Robaye Ali in South Yemen or President Daud in Afghanistan. Thus, in Afghanistan the Soviet Union doubtless contributed to the Khalq penetration of the Afghan military and doubtless pressed for unity of the Khalq and Parcham (Marxist-Leninist) parties, but apparently had no major role in creating the disturbances leading to the arrest of Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Taraki or in formulating the coup that followed. Similarly in South Yemen, the Soviet Union doubtless pressed for the radicalization of the FNL and the erosion of President Robaye's power, but apparently had nothing to do with the murder of Lt. Col. Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashani or Robaye's execution. On the latter point, see Jean Gueyras' article in *Le Monde*, February 27, 1979, page 4.

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commented on the general nature of the problem—on the Soviet Union's enlarged field of opportunity, on its increased ability to intrude, and on the limited accomplishments of détente in creating mechanisms or standards constraining its intrusions. The second section deals with the Soviet view of the problem of regional instability and, in particular, the role of the superpowers, the third section with the complex nature of actual Soviet behavior. The final section is devoted to the implications for our own policy. In it I have ventured a framework for coping with the Soviet dimension of the problem and the problem's place in Soviet-American relations.

II

Instability in the Third World, of course, has always troubled postwar Soviet-American relations. Beginning with the Philippine and Malayan insurgencies in the late forties and preceding through the Korean War, the pact-building against communist infiltration in the Middle East in the mid-fifties, the Congo in 1960, the Vietnam War, and the repeated rounds of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, we have long regarded the Third World as a major area of Soviet ambition. But rarely have the setbacks to our own interests and apparent Soviet gains come in such an unbroken succession. And rarely has the shadow of further trouble seemed more ominous: the Iranian drama has not played out its last chapter and before it does the revolutionary Left may assume a more prominent role. Or, if Sadat's Egypt goes the way of Iran, as Khomeini's people predict, and falls under the sway of the Muslim Brotherhood, the consequences in the Middle East would be exceedingly grave. On the Arabian peninsula, one can worry about the stability of U.S.-Saudi relations or, for that matter, about the long-term durability of Saudi rule. To the south of Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens seem regularly to totter at, or as this March, over, the edge of war. In Africa, there is the specter of great violence in Rhodesia and chaos in Zaïre. In South Asia, Pakistan faces the permanent threat of separatist wars in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. Because of such fears, Pakistan may already be executing something of a tilt toward Moscow. These events undoubtedly seem starker in contrast to the relatively long interlude from the late sixties through the mid-seventies when the Soviet-American competition in the Third World had lost much of its urgency.

In truth, Soviet opportunities *are* greater at the moment. Some of these flow from the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in

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southern Africa and the rapidly eroding position of the white redoubts. Should the fate of Ian Smith's regime be decided in violence or should a black civil war follow in the aftermath, the Soviet Union will have a natural role to play as military patron of the liberation movements. Elsewhere, a number of regimes have come to rely on the U.S.S.R. for protection or aid. Ethiopia is a clear case in point, but so too are Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan and, to a degree, some of the radical Arab states, including South Yemen. (Cuba has of course long been deeply dependent.) Similarly, in areas of permanent instability such as the Middle East, each eruption of war seems to rewrite the Soviet Union's field of opportunity.

Then there are the opportunities presented by insurgencies and separatist movements looking for military aid. Should the Soviet Union wish to support a Baluchi revolt against the central government in Pakistan, or a revived Dhofari rebellion against the authorities in Oman, or the simmering war in the Spanish Sahara, it could well have the opportunity.

Finally, the Soviet Union stands to gain from ferment any place it is now less favored than the United States (or China). This is one of the intimidating features of the new momentum behind a militant Islamic nationalism: for, not only does the Soviet Union benefit when the United States is put at arm's length as in Iran or potentially in Egypt and conceivably in Saudi Arabia, but, should the essentially conservative force of Islam fail to cope with the political and economic aspirations of the people, the Soviet Union may find opportunities as more radical alternatives assert themselves.

Beyond the U.S.S.R.'s increasing field of opportunity, the second factor accentuating the importance of regional conflict in Soviet-American relations is its increasing ability to capitalize on opportunity. Over the last 20 years, the Soviet capacity for bringing military power to bear in the most distant local crises has grown enormously. As Angola and Ethiopia prove, Soviet options thus are increased by the greater military wherewithal it has to offer friends. Two decades ago, in the Congolese civil war it could manage little more than a few trucks and 16 transport aircraft for Lumumba's forces; three years ago, in the Angolan civil war, it ferried in thousands of tons of arms to the MPLA, not to mention more than 12,000 Cuban troops. In the Somali-Ethiopian war two years later it arrived with the Cubans, still more material, and a command structure in place.

Once a massive continental power with great armies and a

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modest navy guarding its sea flanks, the Soviet Union has over the last 20 years turned itself into a major naval power, capable of making its weight felt in virtually every quarter of the globe. True, notable deficiencies remain, but given the momentum of Soviet military development, it might be expected that the U.S.S.R. means eventually to have long-range fighting forces on a par with ours, including some version of the Marines, real tactical air support, and an adequate underway replenishment capability. For those who fear Soviet ambitions, the prospect is intensified by the assertions of Admiral Gorshkov, the commander of the Soviet Navy, about the importance of seapower for great powers—in peace or war—and the role he would assign the peacetime navy in protecting the "national liberation movement" from imperialism's harm.

Anxieties about the Soviet Union's enhanced ability to project force are increased by the overall growth of Soviet military power. At the same time that it has been building a modern navy, the U.S.S.R. has also been continuously enlarging and modernizing its strategic nuclear forces, upgrading its already massive forces in Central Europe, introducing a new generation of theater nuclear weapons, and more than maintaining its end of the arms buildup in the Far East.

The third reason that instability in the Third World suddenly plays such a central role in Soviet-American relations owes to the disruption of the process of détente. The efforts of the Nixon Administration to seek a consciously restructured Soviet-American relationship created certain expectations. Unfortunately, the search was interrupted long before the two sides got around to developing groundrules for the superpower competition in the world's unstable regions. Nonetheless, the residue of our expectations leaves us with a sense of betrayal at the arrival of Cuban troops and Soviet arms in Angola. Because détente fostered the impression of something fundamentally new in Soviet-American relations, it has for many made Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Indochina appear all the more treacherous.

Then and now, the Soviet leaders have insisted that they were merely fulfilling an obligation to the "national liberation revolution," which, they have said repeatedly, cannot be held hostage to détente. To the extent that neither the national liberation revolution nor change of other sorts is at issue—but rather the behavior of the two superpowers—the argument is neither helpful nor entirely relevant. One understands why at the time Henry Kissinger rejected the Soviet case as an attempt to have a "selective

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détente." For the same reason Zbigniew Brzezinski charged the Soviet Union with violating the "code of détente" when it intervened in the Horn of Africa two years later. The trouble is not that Kissinger and Brzezinski have evoked détente in the context of Third World instability but that they have done so without distinguishing between its mutually recognized accomplishments and its unfinished business. Because the recriminations of Kissinger and Brzezinski imply an elaboration of détente that was simply never there, they leave the two sides talking past one another.

Our perspectives regarding Soviet opportunities and capabilities should also be sharpened. Doubtless much of what has happened in southern Africa and Southwest Asia over the last two or three years pleases the Soviet Union and doubtless Soviet opportunities have increased. But several distinctions are worth keeping in mind. First, though the course of recent events, on balance, may serve Soviet interests better than our own, it has not been sparked or controlled by the Soviet Union. None of the regional events we are discussing was initiated by the Soviet Union nor were more than two—the Angolan and Ogaden wars—decisively influenced by it.

Second, there is nothing inexorable about the pattern of recent events. Nothing in the swift sequence of events bringing a pro-Soviet regime to power in Afghanistan in April 1978 contributed to the turn of events intensifying the pro-Soviet orientation of the South Yemeni regime two months later. Nothing in the MPLA's victory in Angola in 1976 dictated Siad Barre's decision to attack Ethiopia in 1977. And the disintegration of the Shah's rule had little to do with the disorders in these other cases.

Third, there is a difference between Soviet gains (often defined as the West's losses) and Soviet opportunities; much of what might be termed a Soviet gain does not necessarily give the Soviet Union enlarged access to or influence in a country or a region. Fourth, merely to list the expanded range of Soviet opportunity without attaching opportunity costs seriously distorts the picture. Examined closely, many of the Soviet Union's theoretical opportunities turn out to carry heavy prices and may not in the end look like much of an opportunity to the Soviet leaders. Sponsoring insurgency against Pakistan is one thing in theory; in practice, disrupting a carefully nurtured set of political relations in the subcontinent is another, particularly when the spillover would profoundly affect Soviet relations with the major Western powers. Similarly, rallying to the side of South Yemen in a war against

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the North is one thing in theory; taking on the Saudis, backed by the United States, in a long drawn-out conflict is quite another.

Similarly, when it comes to the Soviet Union's ability to seize opportunities, primarily through military intervention, again, Soviet strengths should be kept in perspective. In many instances, not much military force is required to swing the tide of events, provided it can be applied unhindered. If we choose to obstruct the Soviet Union, however, or if the Soviet Union takes on a well-armed local opponent, its ability to sustain fighting forces at great distances is inadequate. It lacks the amphibious assault capability, the tactical air support, and the oilers, repair ships, and other vessels needed to operate far from the fleet areas. Close to home, it has the resources to impede U.S. intervention, but farther away, say, in the Persian Gulf and beyond, its forces are generally no match for ours. Not only is the Soviet Union far from having the strength necessary to intervene at will, in most places, including the Angolas and Ethiopias, it cannot bring nearly as much power to bear as we.

Granted it is no easy matter to define the challenge we face free of exaggeration and with perfect attention to all of its nuances. To the extent that our instinctive way of framing the problem leads us astray, however, there is an advantage in trying to transcend our immediate perceptions. One place to begin is with the other side's perceptions. We have an obvious stake in coping wisely and effectively with the Soviet side of the problem of regional instability.

III

The Soviet leaders know how great are the interests of the United States and its allies in the Indian Ocean region and occasionally their press even acknowledges these as legitimate. Speaking of the sealanes in the area (and, therefore, of the markets, ports, and resources they link), one Soviet analyst writes, "There is, of course, no denying the importance of these routes for the West. It is by these routes that the capitalist world gets a large part of its oil, more than half of which lies under the sands on the coast of the Persian Gulf." He goes on to cite not only the traffic of westbound supertankers and tons of oil but also the flow of rubber and tin from Asia and beryllium, gold, uranium, and chromium from other regions—indeed, according to him, up to 80–85 percent of the United States' supply of "these important raw materials." When he gets to his basic point—that others, too, have a stake in the region—he in effect reaffirms Western interests.

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"These routes," he says, "are *also* vitally important for the developing countries . . . which depend on imports of manufactured goods and equipment," and the Soviet Union, and so on.[5]

At the same time, Soviet commentary is aswirl with accounts of American ploys and maneuverings designed to consolidate U.S. positions in the area, to throttle uncongenial change, to damage the role of the socialist countries, and to undo the security of progressive or revolutionary regimes in the area. To an American reader, the dominant themes in Soviet analysis appear bizarre and strangely out of focus, even disingenuous—so much attention converges on American initiatives or stratagems, on trends or opportunities open to the intrigues of the Western powers and their local clients.

The West's plans for a pan-African peacekeeping force, in Soviet analysis, for example are transformed into a NATO subterfuge, designed to ease the way to Western intervention in Africa's turbulent regions—and are linked in turn to a South Atlantic counterpart to NATO, a SATO, comprising South Africa and "certain Latin American countries" and blessed by the United States. Soviet analysts go on to describe a maze of mini-blocs, collusions, and local axes: the Saudis with the Egyptians, mobilizing the Arab League against progressive regimes like that in Aden, attempting to weld together a network of conservative, anti-communist Arab states dedicated to destroying Soviet influence everywhere in the Red Sea area, and underwriting every counter-revolutionary intervention from the Arabian peninsula to the heart of black Africa. One day the Saudis are bankrolling the war against Ethiopia, the next day reactionary Muslim opponents of the new revolutionary regime in Afghanistan.

If it is not the Saudis with the Egyptians, then, according to Soviet accounts, it is the French and Belgians with the Moroccans and Senegalese, rushing in with their military power to control events in Shaba. Or it is the Chinese with a whole array of states, not only with the United States and South Africa against Soviet-supported forces in Angola or with the Somalis against the Ethiopians but in even more far-reaching ventures. Thus, according to reports repeated in the Soviet press, "NATO circles" would like to establish a "so-called joint Afro-Asian force" made up of "Chinese, Iranian, and Egyptian personnel," and the Chinese are interested, or so the Chinese foreign minister supposedly indicated when in Zaïre after the 1978 Shaba events.

[5] Dmitry Volsky, "A Strategy without a Future," *New Times*, no. 33 (August 1978), pp. 4–5, my emphasis.

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No one can say how much of this the Soviet leadership actually believe or what weight they attach to whatever part of it they do believe. The contrast with American perspectives, in any case, goes much deeper. For the Soviet Union operates from two fundamentally different points of departure: first, it assumes that the United States and the West in general enjoys an illegitimate monopoly of influence in these areas. Viewed from Moscow, the West is overwhelmingly ascendant in all the key countries of Africa and the Persian Gulf region. Trade and investment patterns, economic and financial dependencies, and the educational and cultural residue of colonialism give the West an enormous advantage. This, a Soviet observer would argue, is buttressed by an elaborate infrastructure of military bases and a great deal of mobile military force. While recent events have conspired to weaken U.S. influence in several countries, Soviet analysts would be the first to note that the residual influence of the United States remains far larger than their own country's.

Second, the Soviet Union believes it is doing no more than Western governments have assumed the right to do for the last 25 years. To the extent that it means to play a larger global role, the Soviet Union insists on the prerogative of an active part in areas of instability. By and large Soviet analysts and presumably the Soviet leaders have convinced themselves that their country has played and will continue to play this role more selflessly than the West. They know that the Soviet Union has abetted revolution against legitimate governments in the name of the "national liberation revolution," but more of the time they view themselves as defenders of established or struggling progressive regimes. We are the more cynically subversive power in their eyes. Thus, our objections to their actions in Angola and the Horn come across as duplicity and as transparently self-serving.

Comparing U.S. and Soviet perspectives, the two are alike in the importance they give to the other's role. When thinking about the problem of regional instability those Americans who are most concerned tend to remove the United States from the picture, downplaying what it does or can do, focusing more on what may be done to it. In contrast, Soviet observers make us their point of departure. Our initiatives, ambitions, and jitters dominate their analyses and, to a great extent, shape their image of any given regional conflict. Indeed, if any factor possesses coherence in the Soviet view, it is the United States' efforts to dominate, that is, U.S. strategy.

As a result of the basic differences in the two countries' perspec-

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tives, however, the alarmed in this country worry about one set of trends; the Soviet leaders about another. While Americans dwell on the number of new Soviet clients from Angola to Afghanistan, the spread of Soviet military facilities and influence in the eastern Indian Ocean, and the destruction of our position in Iran, the U.S.S.R. emphasizes the assertiveness of old American clients such as the Shah's Iran, Saudi Arabia, and by Soviet criteria, South Africa, the reinforcement of American military positions from Diego Garcia to Northwest Cape in Australia, and the risk of the Western powers using instability as a pretext for striking against "anti-imperialist" regimes. While the *Economist* worries about a pincer closing on Saudi Arabia, the Soviets see Saudi Arabia and Egypt closing a pincer on South Yemen and Ethiopia. While U.S. analysts focus on Soviet activity which may disrupt Western mediation efforts in southern Africa and the Middle East, the Soviets resent efforts designed to cut them out.

To an extent all of what I have been decribing amounts to a matter of mirror images. But equally if not more important are those areas where the two sides are operating on different wavelengths.

The first of these is the place assigned to the problem of regional conflict or, more precisely, the problem of the Soviet (or the American) role in regional conflict. People like Kissinger have come to make Soviet behavior in areas of instability central to the relationship; the Soviet leaders do not make an equal issue of our behavior. As a result, an important discontinuity exists between the preoccupations of the two sides. I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union attaches less importance to change in these areas than we do, though an argument can certainly be made that its leaders often view the character of change in any given region differently. Nor am I suggesting that the Soviet leadership believes less in the significance of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World in general or in areas of instability in particular. Nor am I suggesting that the Soviet leadership does not care whether the United States intervenes in Iran or some other crisis situation.

But the fact is that the Soviet Union has not made the role we choose to play in regional conflict central to the relationship, and this is not likely to change even should the United States attempt to influence future events in Iran, come to the rescue of a collapsing regime in Riyadh, or sustain North Yemen in a war against the other Yemen. There are several reasons for the contrast. First, in general, Soviet analysts tend to assume that over time American interventions turn out badly; many in this country do not yet

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have the same faith about the Soviet Union's. Second, while Soviet analysts recognize that much of what has happened from Kabul to Luanda serves their country's interests and damages ours, they see no inexorable pattern to events; many in this country do. Soviet observers are more inclined to stress the unpredictability of events—the impermanence of the regime in Afghanistan, the uncertain effects of developments in Iran, the possibility that Pakistan will grow increasingly frightened and drawn to the West, and always the possibility that Angola or Ethiopia will reverse its close relationship with the Soviet Union. Third, the attention we now give to the problem of regional conflict is largely a function of our fears about trends within one region, the Persian Gulf. Soviet concerns in the Third World, including East Asia and the Middle East, are more diffuse and less easy to focus in a single dimension.

In a second important respect Soviet and American perspectives diverge. Put simply, we judge change in the region essentially from the vantage point of a status quo power, they essentially from that of a revisionist power. "There is," someone like Brzezinski is the first to recognize, "no such thing as simply maintaining the status quo in order for American values and the American system to survive."[6] But, when he then urges "an active and positive engagement by the United States in shaping a rapidly changing world in ways that would be congenial to our interests and responsive to our values," he is talking about reform of the status quo. As the beneficiary of the status quo in an area like the Persian Gulf—or at least as dependent on it—we worry about revolutionary change. By and large we judge change in terms of potential losses. In areas of our concern, Brezhnev and his colleagues are more interested in seeing the status quo destroyed. They judge change in terms of potential gains. We tend to fear the unknown; they to trust it.

This does not mean that the Soviet Union is ready to push every loose rock down the hill to see what may come of the chaos. On the contrary, as I suggested earlier, the Soviet leadership is not nearly so confident about the pattern of change in these regions as we are fearful of it and they have still less faith in their ability to guide change there. But the two countries do approach the problem of instability with a different tolerance for revolutionary change and a different sense of the stake each possesses in the status quo.

[6] "The World According to Brzezinski," *loc. cit.*, p. 9.

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Two conclusions follow for the United States. First, by overlooking the discrepancy between our anxieties and theirs, between our image of trends and theirs, we run the risk of oversimplifying and overdramatizing the Soviet dimension of the problem. In addition, while doing so, we fail to face the deeper and more complex difficulties in store for us both. We run a similar risk when we interpret Soviet behavior in simplistic patterns.

IV

"Look at what has happened since 1975," Kissinger said in a recent interview, "in the space of a little more than four years, we have had Cuban troops in Angola, Cuban troops in Ethiopia, two invasions of Zaïre, a communist coup in Afghanistan, a communist coup in South Yemen, and the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, all achieved by Soviet arms, with Soviet encouragement and in several cases protected by the Soviet veto in the United Nations."[7] It is a neat, cleverly integrated statement of the Soviet challenge, capturing one important aspect—but only part—of the truth. If one sets aside the question of timing as well as the question of scale, the Soviet Union has, indeed, been complicit in all these events, sometimes decisively so. The Soviets are creating a problem. They have seemingly ignored the effects of regional instability on Soviet-American relations, while exploiting opportunities that have come their way.

Still, it is important to recognize the ambivalence and restraint as well as the boldness in recent Soviet actions. To orchestrate our own policy shrewdly, we need to keep both sides of Soviet behavior in view—considering at the same time the aspects of Soviet behavior warranting concern and then the internal restraints and external constraints on their pursuit of global advantage.

The place to start is with the Soviet Union's increasing ability and decreasing reluctance to become militarily involved in Third World conflicts. What it did in collaboration with the Cubans in Angola and in the Horn is of a different magnitude and nature from anything before. Never has it taken charge of events so far from its own frontiers or, in peacetime, used military power so deftly or decisively outside Eastern Europe.

Rather than viewing the specific threat posed by Soviet interventionism as part of the evolution of the larger military balance, however, we would be wiser to define the problem more modestly, in terms of the specific difficulties specific capacities raise. This is

[7] "Kissinger's Critique," *The Economist*, February 3, 1979, p. 22.

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so for two reasons. First, there is no real evidence in Soviet utterances that recent Soviet actions are the result of a new Soviet "arrogance of power." To the extent that Soviet risk-taking serves as evidence, there is little support for the impression of an emboldened Soviet leadership. The Soviet leaders, while acknowledging the continued improvement of their country's relative military position, deny that the equilibrium between East and West has given way to Soviet superiority; they neither boast of nor confess to a politically significant military advantage. On the contrary, they explicitly disclaim any such advantage. One is hard-pressed to argue that Soviet actions in Angola or the Horn, let alone Cambodia, rank with Khrushchev's in Berlin in 1958 and 1961 or in Cuba in 1962. That they are redefining what constitutes a risk is also difficult to demonstrate.

Moreover, if we assume that Soviet actions are merely a symptom of a larger problem, we will divert ourselves from the specific problem. Maintaining the overall military equilibrium between our two countries is an important task in itself. But when the challenge of Soviet intervention is submerged in the general military threat and other aspects of the relationship, such as SALT, are subordinated to the issue of intervention, then we handicap ourselves in dealing with the local situation.

Our second concern grows out of the effective partnership the Soviets and Cubans have formed in bringing military power to bear in situations like Angola and Ethiopia. There are two sides to the problem. The first and more commonly discussed dimension involves the Soviet assessment of the partnership as an enduring instrument of policy. To what extent do the Soviet leaders regard collaboration with the Cubans as a new policy recourse, giving them combat potential without risking their own combatants? In how many other instances are they prepared to repeat the collaboration? The trouble is that there are no answers to these questions—probably not even among the Soviet leadership. Unless one believes that the Soviet Union has commanded rather than merely assisted the Cubans to fight in Africa, the answers are likely to depend on how many opportunities appear and, more important, how many are viewed similarly by the two leaderships.

The other dimension of the problem is less discussed. Because Soviet observers see "proxies" as a general phenomenon in international life, they are not likely to feel constrained in rallying others to the Cuban role. For some time, Soviet analysts have been devoting increasing attention to the contribution the French, the Moroccans, the Senegalese and other third parties make to

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the defense of Western interests by supplying expeditionary forces. As a consequence, I think the Soviet leaders will be more and more inclined to turn to the Cubans or to willing East Europeans or even to the Ethiopians to "internationalize" the response of progressive forces to the challenge of regional conflict.

Our third concern, it seems to me, should be the emerging weave of Soviet commitments in key parts of the Third World. In the last year the Soviet Union has accelerated the conclusion of "friendship and cooperation" treaties with a variety of African and Asian countries. These now total seven (excluding the two earlier ones repudiated by Egypt and Somalia), and though they vary in their elaborateness (the one with India being the least involved, the one with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the most), all of them create a special relationship, providing for consultation, non-collaboration with other outside powers, in some cases, a coordination of foreign policy, and, in the case of the treaty with Vietnam, mutual security assistance.[8]

As we have learned over time and as the Soviet Union is now learning in Indochina, special relationships like these create commitments and impose responsibilities. These pressures, combined with the Soviet Union's self-confessed desire to play a larger, indeed a central, role in international decision-making on regional conflict, risk drawing the Soviet Union into local instabilities far more than it may now intend. Similarly, the rather casual or ill-considered decision to grant a special relationship to parties like the Vietnamese who want protection for their own aggressive purposes is fraught with dangers. Indeed, the extemporaneous, unplotted entanglement of the Soviet Union in Third World conflict is more worrisome than the likelihood that the Soviet Union is embarked on building a vast alliance system in the Third World designed to service the sprawl of its military power and provide it with platforms for interfering in neighboring trouble-spots. The latter implies more sense of purpose and a grander strategy than the rest of Soviet policy suggests.

Our fourth concern is related to the third. This is China and the impact that the Sino-Soviet competition has on the Soviet approach to regional conflict. Indisputably, Soviet initiatives and reactions are heavily colored by its concern with China, and, correspondingly, with China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat and its determination to blunt this threat wherever and by whatever means it can. The more China dedicates itself to com-

[8] The seven are: India, Iraq, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.

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promising Soviet positions in the Third World, the more impetuous the Soviet Union will be in areas of instability. If, in turn, we appear to be forming de facto partnerships with the Chinese when crises come along, the Soviet leaders will find it still harder to act with restraint.

What should be our fifth concern grows out of a point made earlier. More than we often acknowledge, the Soviet Union finds one of its major missions in reinforcing the constraints on our policy—in neutralizing or counterbalancing our power, particularly in areas of instability where our role has been the most obtrusive. This parallels the U.S. aim of preventing the U.S.S.R. from exploiting targets of opportunity. Those in the Soviet Union who rationalize the growth of Soviet military strength do so in the name of staying our hand. As the Soviet ability to bring military force to bear in unstable regions swells, it will almost certainly arrogate to itself a larger responsibility for policing American actions. Brezhnev's warning to us in November not to intervene in Iran because the Soviet Union regarded this "as a matter affecting its security interests" reflects this intent. Ignoring this Soviet aim carries with it the risk of inviting confrontation once both sides set about containing each other's intervention.

Were the Soviet leadership clearer in its own mind about the implications of its growing web of Third World entanglements or more thoughtful about the implications of policing our behavior, the matter would be less worrisome. Unfortunately, and contrary to the assumptions of much Western analysis, all the signs are that the Soviet leaders apparently are not thinking systematically about these issues. In Africa, in response to our appeal for noninterference, for leaving Africa "to work out its own destiny," the Soviet press condemns this "neocolonialist ideological sleight-of-hand" intended to undermine "the trust of the African countries and people in the socialist states" and to "impel them to fall in with imperialist designs." In contrast, Brezhnev declared in regard to Iran that the Soviet Union "resolutely" opposes "foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iran by anyone, in any form, and under any pretext." The inconsistency between the Soviet position on southern Africa and on Iran is obviously self-serving; it also reflects the Soviet failure to think systematically about these issues.

Our sixth set of concerns relates to the *effect* of events. Quite apart from the reality or unreality of a "geopolitical momentum" or of an underlying pattern to events, if others—allies and friends, in particular—think there is a pattern, we have a problem, and the evidence is that many do. Second, even if the Soviet leaders

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do not see a pattern—and the evidence is that they do not—they may nonetheless draw the wrong conclusions from their success in Angola and the Horn. For they need not be persuaded of a great tide to events to underestimate the importance of the peculiar circumstances contributing to their success in these cases.

At the same time, in Africa and elsewhere, there has been an important element of restraint in recent Soviet policy, and this, too, deserves attention. Far from justifying Kissinger's allegation that in Iran "the margin between unrest and revolution came at least in part from the outside," the Soviet Union apparently did little to stir a boiling pot. Again, the Soviet Union has had no interest in getting dragged into the conflict over Spanish Sahara, even though some of the contenders are clients of sorts and the issue one of self-determination; indeed, the same can be said of Soviet behavior in the internal conflicts in Chad, Nicaragua, and so on. Obviously the Soviet Union is exercising restraint because it serves Soviet interests. The point is that holding back does in the view of the Soviet leaders serve these interests.

In some instances, as in Pakistan, Soviet restraint has been critical. Evidence of Soviet training camps for Pakistani insurgents in Northern Afghanistan is scanty, and some Western intelligence sources deny the existence of such camps. In some cases restraint has been the Soviet Union's point of departure: in the Horn the Soviet Union's first response was an intensive effort to mediate the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia; in Angola its first response was to support the Alvor accords—a compromise intended to prevent civil war on the way to independence—provided its friends, the MPLA, did not suffer in the process. And in some cases restraint has come later. In Rhodesia, for example, over the last year Soviet commentators have begun to place less stress on armed struggle and to speak more tolerantly of a negotiated settlement. In Namibia, the Soviet Union has ultimately gone along with the Western plan for elections.

Second, where restraint has given way to active intervention, the Soviet Union has acted with caution. In neither Angola nor Ethiopia did the Soviet Union rush in impetuously. In both cases there were several decision points at which the Soviet leadership checked to see that the coast was clear before proceeding. In Ethiopia, for example, the intervention came only after the Soviet Union had (1) attempted to avoid the war, (2) tried to end the war once it was underway, (3) made sure the Somalis were halted in the Harare-Jijiga-Diredawa strategic triangle, (4) sent senior officers from the ground forces to investigate the situation on the

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spot, and (5) determined that no other major patrons were likely to come to Somalia's aid. The last of these stages was not reached until the end of October or beginning of November 1977, four months after the war had begun. In Angola, the evolution toward a large-scale Soviet and Cuban intervention passed through at least as many critical decision-making junctures, and, at any of them, down to the last one—the OAU meeting in January 1976—the Soviet Union would almost surely have retreated had the events gone another way.

Third, not only has the Soviet Union not integrated its African interventions into an overall strategy—the thought that Soviet involvement in the Horn follows from that in Angola and will be followed by the same in Zimbabwe can only be argued a priori, not from the evidence—but it has not even followed a fully thought-out policy in the individual cases. In each instance the Soviet Union has been led by events, with the result that it has ended up at a point not necessarily anticipated when the story began. Those seeing the U.S.S.R. passing from intervention to intervention—almost as though on a schedule—need to consider how unsystematic the Soviet engagement has been in each individual case.

Finally, in all cases the Soviet Union has operated within constraints and understood them as such. The Soviet Union was least constrained in its two major interventions, Angola and the Horn, but these were exceptional episodes. In one it challenged no legal government, faced no plausible U.S. or Western opposition, and risked no anti-Soviet majority with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In Ethiopia, the same applied, and, in addition, the U.S.S.R. was upholding one of Africa's most sacred norms, the inviolability of colonial frontiers. Once the Soviet Union moves on to another level of intervention or another locale, the situation changes. In Eritrea and Shaba, it has had neither principle nor political sentiment on its side and it has limited or avoided involvement. Indeed, in the summer of last year the Soviets apparently attempted to mediate the Eritrean war in meetings in East Berlin between the Ethiopian leadership and Marxist Eritrean liberation forces. In the Ogaden war it apparently began warning its Ethiopian allies against crossing the Somali border long before we began warning the Soviet Union against crossing it, if one is to judge from the stress that Soviet speakers put on the issue before others raised it. In Zimbabwe, its influence and access are controlled by the policies of the front-line states and these, in turn, have supported Anglo-American at-

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tempts to achieve a negotiated settlement. And, in Iran, Soviet commentators in print and in private readily betray the large constraint on Soviet action imposed by the scale of the Western stake in the region.

V

Much of the current discussion in this country leaves the impression that our alarm over Soviet behavior in regional areas is deepening as a consequence of our helplessness to deal with it. We are not helpless, of course, but we must go much further in designing a well-conceived response to the Soviet dimension of regional conflict, one adequate for the long run and inspiring confidence in the near term as well.

This, however, has to be part of an overall policy toward the Soviet Union that is considerably more systematic, coherent, and balanced than at present. To be more systematic, policy needs a clear, coordinated set of objectives. It is not enough to seek a SALT agreement that does no harm to our security, regulates the arms competition in one or two noteworthy respects, and keeps the negotiating process alive. Our efforts in SALT must grow out of and be constantly nourished by a clear idea of what is to be accomplished: precisely what dimensions of the strategic arms competition do we want to regulate and think we can regulate? How are we to relate one arms control area to another, say SALT with MBFR? And, most important, how are arms control ventures like SALT to be integrated into our defense planning and our defense planning to share with arms control ventures the responsibility for securing our safety?

Similarly, in terms of the economic dimension, it is not enough to decide what our policy on export licensing should be or how better to achieve the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the measure making most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) depend on a more liberal Soviet emigration policy. First we must decide the kind of economic relationship we want to have with the Soviet Union and how this fits into the larger relationship we are trying to build.

So, too, if we intend to formulate clearly and for the long run how we wish to deal with the Soviet Union in areas of instability and what we expect of the U.S.S.R., we must go beyond a desire to fend off Soviet intervention in an escalating war in Zimbabwe or to undo the impression that the Soviets are up and we are down in the unstable regions of the world. Rather, we must sort out in

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our own minds what restraints we want the Soviet Union to exercise and at what price to our own freedom of action.

To be more coherent, policy requires a strategy, at least in the loose sense of the term, a sense of priorities, an appreciation of the interaction among the different dimensions of the relationship, a steady hand, and patience. At the moment, we are too inclined to settle for narrow, tactical linkages, linking trade with Soviet emigration policy or SALT with Soviet behavior in the Horn. As a consequence, we are not dealing with patterns of Soviet behavior or putting them in the order that matters most to us. We are also too quick to settle for easy, mechanical responses, such as playing the "China card" when more direct solutions seem elusive and too long term.

And we have fallen into the habit of dealing with aspects of the relationship in isolation. The human rights initiative, meritorious in itself, should have been better integrated into our larger Soviet policy and the strategy by which it was pursued made more consonant with a practical general strategy. The same can be said of our approach to the Soviet role in regional conflict. Rather than face the larger problem of regional instability and the role of both powers, relating this to the broader competition, we are choosing to deal with Soviet actions only in specific instances, taking them episode by episode. Finally, the difficult challenge of giving policy greater coherence is accentuated by conflict within the Administration, particularly when the conflict is not resolved by the President and the contending approaches are allowed to flicker in the public view, leaving the impression of a disjointed and ambivalent policy.

To be more balanced, policy must place an equal emphasis on the cooperative and the competitive aspects of the relationship. At the moment, other than SALT, an uncertain attempt to negotiate a complete nuclear test-ban treaty, and a sputtering attempt to do something about anti-satellite technology, the relationship is almost without active cooperative ventures. But it is precisely when the United States puts its foot down in crisis areas, moves to correct adverse military trends, and confronts the Soviet Union with abuses within the U.S.S.R. to which we object that the Administration has the greatest need for, say, promoting economic cooperation—not as a counterbalance to our firmness or as compensation for our firmness but as partial proof that our firmness is aimed at a more constructive relationship.

Were we working harder to produce a more systematic, coherent, and balanced Soviet policy, our response to Soviet behav-

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ior in regional conflict would benefit in several ways. *First*, it is critical that we begin talking to the Soviet leadership about the problem. We get no place by scoring them publicly when we have made little or no attempt to speak quietly and directly. Communication cannot be by public diplomacy or at the pillory. If an early summit were held, the President and the General Secretary could come to know each others' minds on this issue, something that will not be achieved without great effort by both men and without careful thought by those planning the meeting.

Second, not only should we talk to the Soviet leadership about the problem, we should make a far more strenuous effort to reduce the risks and moderate the effects of our rivalry in areas of instability. To this end no initiative is more desperately needed than a restored search for "rules" helping to regulate the role of the two countries in areas of instability. By rules of the game, I do not mean negotiated principles but patterns of restraint, usually tacit, perhaps merely insinuated, but consciously pursued. In the case of the problem of regional conflict, the first step is to spell out the standards of behavior both sides expect of each other. It is difficult to imagine any Soviet leader, even one who wished to accommodate us, having a clear image of what range of behavior we find tolerable or intolerable—because we do not. Moreover, the deeper issue is how we are to persuade, induce, or force the Soviet Union to give up the right to involve itself in troubled areas, if we are not prepared to give up this right ourselves. And, if we give up the right to interfere, how can we be sure that events will work out satisfactorily in cases that matter greatly to us? Constraining the Soviet Union is only half the issue.

Rather than face this dilemma, too many people are inclined to reduce the challenge of regional instability to a Soviet challenge. Thus, to select a critical example, at the moment the leadership of the Republican Party links the future of SALT to Soviet conduct in areas like Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. "Conduct," in this context, stands for good behavior and threatening SALT is meant as a way of securing the Soviet Union's good behavior or of discouraging its "misbehavior," The perceptual dimension obscures the heart of the problem, the longer-term, more insoluble form of the problem, the problem as a mutual problem, the level where our own behavior enters the equation.

Clearly we do not want the Soviet Union arriving with military power to depose governments it dislikes; nor do we want it to decide the outcome of local civil wars, revolutions, or anarchy with its military power or that of friends. But are we prepared to

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insist that it bring its military power to bear in no circumstance of disorder or threat menacing a legitimate government, even when sought? Equally important, are we prepared to reciprocate? Clearly we do not want it training insurgents to filter across borders and start or sustain separatist, civil, or regional wars, but may it not go to the aid of governments established by insurgent movements once they are installed? Clearly we do not want it to go about forming pacts with aggressive local powers who regard these as umbrellas permitting them to indulge their ambitions, but are we opposed to all Soviet pacts, including those that have a mutual security provision? If so, do we also deny ourselves in this regard? Granted that first we must sort out the answers for ourselves, eventually the answers will have to be clearly communicated to the Soviet Union if policy is to be effective.

One has to be realistic. Neither leadership has any inclination to draw up a "code of conduct" spelling out what it will and will not do in the next Third World crisis. Both are even less eager to negotiate further documents formalizing broad principles of behavior. Neither really trusts the other to speak honestly about the problem or to give a fair hearing to its concerns. And, most seriously, neither side will readily yield the right to intervene in troubled areas even were the other to do so.

Nonetheless, the Soviet leadership does acknowledge the need to give the overall competition stability and predictability. Moreover, Soviet foreign policy specialists are now discussing the importance of developing "rules of the game." While these are not yet raised in the context of superpower rivalry in areas of Third World conflict, it is perfectly conceivable that the Soviet leaders are ready to begin a serious discussion of the problem, provided our purpose is not simply to upbraid them.

Third, the success of American policy also requires a greater readiness to discriminate among different patterns of Soviet behavior and acknowledge restraint on the Soviet part, when we suspect the possibility. Take the case of the second Shaba invasion: We chose to dramatize Soviet complicity, even though there was real question about how directly involved the Soviets were and even though the Soviets themselves stated that they had acted with restraint. The justification was that after Angola and the Horn a message had to be delivered and, if the reaction to Shaba exceeded the situation, it nonetheless served a larger purpose. The cost, however, was to raise further doubt both in the Soviet Union and in Africa about our ability to distinguish Soviet restraint from activism.

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On other occasions the failure to discriminate has meant lost opportunities. In November, in the same *Pravda* interview containing his warning against American intervention in Iran, Brezhnev underscored his country's opposition to interference in the internal affairs of Iran by "anyone in any form and under any pretext." The latter idea has been labeled by the Soviet press "mutual noninterference," and it contains a distinct appeal for mutual restraint. The warning required a direct response and that the President gave in his press conference the following month. But the appeal, too, deserved to be picked up and that he did not.

Fourth, rather than focusing on Soviet (and Cuban) actions, we should address regional problems themselves, counting on solutions or partial solutions to place the healthiest limits on Soviet opportunities. To an important degree this has been the approach of the Carter Administration to the problem of change in southern Africa.

Finally, none of what I have proposed above is prudent or politically feasible unless the United States retains the capability and the option of responding forcefully where there appears to be no other way of inducing Soviet restraint and where other of our interests are not seriously jeopardized thereby. The quest for patterns of mutual restraint assumes that each side will unilaterally protect interests that cannot be protected by regulating the competition between us. As with arms control, the incentive to success will inevitably be a mutual awareness of the risks inherent when each side acts on its own to deal with its fears. In this spirit, Harold Brown's plan for a "mobile strike force" and, in general, the Administration's efforts to prepare this country for contingencies in which force may have to be used are sound.

But we must observe three conditions: (1) We should think carefully about the use of force, applying it only where it is a direct and appropriate recourse, not a "quick fix" substituted for other more difficult solutions. Force might indeed be wise in Iran if the Soviet Union were to intervene with force, but not otherwise. It would probably not be wise if our attempts to achieve a negotiated solution in Rhodesia fail and the Soviet Union chooses to underwrite the war that follows. (2) Our readiness to use force ought not to be regarded as a permanent imperative but as a momentary necessity until both countries come to a clear understanding of the role they intend to play in regional conflict and the way they intend to play it. And (3) we must face squarely the dilemma of when, where, and how we ourselves would contemplate using force to influence change.

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To be fair to the other side, the available evidence does not show that the Soviet leadership is going to be hard to divert from regular and ruthless intervention in areas of regional conflict or unintimidated by the prospect that we will answer intervention with counter-intervention. But, if we want to ensure that the resort to force does not become an increasingly necessary recourse, we must set out now to deal with the Soviet Union to regulate the role of the superpowers in areas of instability. Like each of the other critical dimensions of the Soviet-American relationship, this is a tall order because it takes us back to the essence of contemporary U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

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Richard J. Barnet

U.S.–SOVIET RELATIONS: THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Like the stock market, U.S.-Soviet relations are subject to mysterious rhythms. Despite occasional bullish pronouncements from Washington and Moscow, the downturn in relations that began when the euphoria of détente wore off in 1976 continues. Both countries are poised at the brink of major new weapons programs. The United States has openly befriended China, a nation regarded in Moscow as a mortal enemy. The risks of U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Africa grow as political compromises over southern Africa become more difficult. The strategic arms limitation (SALT) negotiations in Geneva and Moscow have been exhausting and the arguments over ratification in Washington promise to be embittering. The process has not led to an improved international climate. Indeed, a strong case can be made that in the last few years the SALT negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpowers.

The unfavorable political climate for the development of better U.S.-Soviet relations that has developed in the United States is a predictable, perhaps inevitable, consequence of the process of negotiation. One reason why the opposition to SALT is more enthusiastic than the support is that the goals of SALT are not entirely clear. The opponents can rightly note that any agreement, however minimal, raises the emotion-laden issue of whether we can trust the Russians. But the supporters cannot maintain that the arms race will be stopped or "capped," since the technological competition is intensifying. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress recently compiled an imposing list of strategic weapons that can be built lawfully under the SALT II agreement—and which, in the present climate, no doubt will be built.[1] The military buildup of each adversary can be interpreted

[1] Robert G. Bell, "U.S. and Soviet Strategic Weapons Systems and Programs Permitted Under the Tentative SALT II Accord," The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, January 4, 1979.

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by the other either as an effort to amass "bargaining chips" for future negotiations, as an indication of lack of faith in the possibilities of negotiation, or as a strategy of increased reliance on military power to achieve political goals.

The most important function of arms agreements is to reduce the element of ambiguity in U.S.-Soviet relations and to clarify intentions in such a way as to build confidence and political support in both societies. For this, a new approach to U.S.-Soviet negotiations is needed, whether the SALT II agreement is signed and ratified or not. The ambiguity in the U.S.-Soviet relationship cannot be sufficiently reduced through the painfully slow process of bilateral negotiations focused on narrow technical issues. The U.S.-Soviet strategic balance and the security of Europe are now discussed in a wholly separate and unrelated way, one in the SALT talks in Geneva and the other in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, but they are integrally related. There will be no significant progress in either forum until the goals of the superpowers are made clearer and a broader framework for moving step by step toward those goals is adopted. This article is an effort to explore what such an alternative framework might look like.

II

Whether any agreement on arms is feasible depends upon the intentions of the two powers. Most Americans assume that U.S. intentions are clear, and they focus on Soviet intentions. Indeed, the debate over SALT really comes down to a disagreement about Soviet goals, a fact that tends to be masked by discussions of numbers, throw-weights, and other technical details. American opponents of an agreement believe that this country should not accept limitations on the right to acquire, test, deploy, and use weapons (unless the agreements are clearly one-sided) because Soviet leaders are bent on expanding their military power one way or another. Creating uncertainty, to their mind, is the best guarantee of security. They would argue that stabilization of the nuclear arms race decreases uncertainty, creates illusions for Soviet leaders that they might bring off a successful surprise attack, and thus increases the risk that they may resort to war or the threat of war.

The proponents of arms control argue, on the other hand, that Soviet leaders have no such fixed intentions. There are already enough nuclear weapons in the world to make any rational leader sufficiently uncertain about the consequences to his own society

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of starting a nuclear war that he would never launch one as an instrument of national policy. But increasing the level of uncertainty increases the risk of preemptive war, because it creates a tense military environment in which Russian fears about what the United States is about to do may cause them to strike first. In the nuclear age no one chooses war over peace, but there are circumstances in which one might well choose war now over war later if those were believed to be the only choices.

The opponents of arms reduction believe that military power is assuming an ever greater importance in Soviet policy because the Soviet system has lost some of its attraction for other countries and military power is the best, perhaps the only, vehicle available to them for protecting their influence. This leads to a belief that the Soviets are uninterested in any significant arms reduction except under clearly one-sided agreements and that, accordingly, it would be unsafe for us to commit ourselves to that effort. The proponents of arms reduction stress the historic concern of the Russians with territorial security, their growing apprehension about the de facto NATO-Chinese alliance, and the fact that their weapons programs, military doctrines, and political uses of military power have been imitative of and responsive to U.S. programs, doctrines and operations. The role of military power in Soviet foreign policy will be determined, they maintain, largely by what other powers, principally the United States and China, do.

There is a third view of Soviet intentions, which says that since those intentions are unknowable they should be ignored. The classic military approach is to prepare against capabilities and assume the worst intentions. But that is a prescription for an unending arms race, and almost certainly for a war, since in that situation each side will consider itself secure only if it makes pessimistic assumptions and ensures that its capabilities exceed those of its adversary. What one side regards as a responsible "defensive" response to a threatening military posture looks to the other side like a preparation for aggressive war or political blackmail.

There is no way, then, of avoiding a serious assessment of Soviet intentions in developing a sensible arms policy. Such assessments are in fact always made, either explicitly or implicitly. To adopt either the view of the pessimists—that the U.S.S.R. will relentlessly project its power by military means until opposed by equal or greater power—or the view of the optimists—that it is a status quo power beset with internal problems—is unwise and unneces-

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sary. A serious view of Soviet intentions must be dynamic, that is, it must try to understand the relationship between Soviet decisions and external pressures, particularly the impact of U.S. policies. Arms reduction agreements should be designed to create controlled situations for testing intentions. In order to do so, they must be sufficiently broad and unambiguous to provide a framework for a significant demilitarization of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union that is quite different from the regulated arms race provided by SALT II.

To create situations for testing intentions requires a hypothesis about Soviet behavior from which to start. What do the Soviets want? Their 62-year history suggests that, like the leaders of most nations, the managers of the Soviet state have a hierarchy of foreign policy objectives. The most basic is to safeguard the physical security of the czarist empire they inherited. The next is to maintain control over the ancient kingdoms of Eastern Europe and the half of Germany they occupied during the Second World War. The third is to project their political influence in the world on a scale equal to the United States, and some day to become the number one power. There is no clash between the first objective and American security. It is a long time since this country defined its security as requiring the return of capitalism to Russia. As for the second objective, the situation in Eastern Europe is not ideal from a human rights standpoint, to say the least, but it does not threaten the United States, nor is there any way that the intrusion of U.S. military power could change the status quo. That was shown long ago in the streets of Budapest, when it proved impossible to turn Captive Nations Day rhetoric into an effective American foreign policy. The real clash between Soviet and American objectives concerns the role the Soviet Union aspires to play on the world stage.

Ever since the end of World War II the Soviet Union has tried to establish its legitimacy as a world power. In the beginning the strategy was merely to assert the claim. "The Soviet Union should take the place that is due it and therefore should have bases in the Mediterranean for its merchant fleet," said Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov at the London Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1945. In the same period they also asked for a share in the occupation of Japan. When the claims were summarily rejected by the West, nothing more was said about them. The early crises of the cold war—the Czechoslovak coup, the tightening of control over Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade—were attempts to consolidate power over the World War II conquests.

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As the Soviet Union recovered from the war it became more active abroad. In the Khrushchev years (1957–63), a time Zbigniew Brzezinski has called the era of "premature Soviet globalism," the Soviet Union gave aid to such far-flung regimes as Sukarno's in Indonesia and Castro's in Cuba. At the same time, a general support for "wars of national liberation" was proclaimed, although actual support was selective and, except for Vietnam and Cuba, largely ineffective. The culmination of the era of "premature globalism" was the Cuban missile crisis, which had two objectives: first, to defend the communist regime 90 miles from Florida with the same sort of bold stroke the United States had used many times to protect Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon, its clients close to the Soviet Union; second, to proclaim that the era of U.S. nuclear superiority had come to an end. The Soviets could now directly threaten U.S. territory and bring their missiles to bear on political crises as the United States had done so many times. The move succeeded in its first purpose and failed in its second. Indeed, the confrontation dramatized the reality that the United States had a huge military superiority which, American officials immediately made clear, they intended to keep. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told a Senate Committee in 1964 that "any disarmament treaty or agreement . . . that we participate in must be one in which we maintain what I call our favorable differential balance of power." The theory remained that U.S. strategic power to threaten the Soviet homeland and the capacity to project conventional forces to every corner of the globe were necessary to contain Soviet expansionism.

The Soviets immediately launched a military buildup that was designed to erase the American political advantage, and to make sure, as their diplomats kept saying, that future confrontations would never be resolved in the same humiliating way. In the intervening years the military buildup has continued at a steady pace; Soviet rhetoric is much more moderate than in Khrushchev's time, with the former chairman openly condemned as an adventurer; and as the Soviets have built up their missiles they have stopped rattling them. But they are exhibiting a greater willingness to project power at a distance where the opportunity presents itself, notably in Africa.

Just as in military hardware the Soviet Union has been three to five years behind the United States in developing major new weapons systems, so in acquiring the political accoutrements of superpower status—"show the flag" naval power, proxy armies, military aid—the Soviets have been imitators. Compared with the

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far-flung network of bases, alliances, aid programs and covert operations maintained over the years by the United States, the Soviet effort is modest; but we should assume that in the present environment it will increase. Like their now impressive military forces, the increased propensity to take political risks in, say, Africa, are designed to make a statement: anything the United States can do, we can do—perhaps not on the same scale, but for the first time we are now in the same league.

As Soviet military power has increased, their political problems have multiplied. The Chinese enmity is an obsession and the U.S.-China rapprochement poses the nightmare of a two-front war. The splintering of the international communist movement has made it clear, if illusions ever existed, that the triumph of political movements in other countries calling themselves Marxist does not necessarily add to the power of the Soviet state. The record of Soviet expulsions from the Middle East and Africa—Egypt, Sudan, Somalia—suggests that even in areas of great political vulnerability for the United States, the Soviet Union finds it hard to triumph. In summary, fantasies about world leadership may indeed motivate Soviet leaders but, as they themselves are aware, their practical prospects in a world in unbelievably rapid transition are most uncertain. One thing is clear, however: because of the enormous changes that have taken place in the world, no nation can reasonably aspire to the position of supremacy the United States, by virtue of the unique circumstances of the postwar world, occupied from 1945 to 1965. For this reason, Soviet aspirations in themselves are not a proper benchmark for setting U.S. policy.

There is nothing to suggest from the history of the arms race so far that either a weapons buildup by the United States or the achievement of marginal arms control arrangements will cause the Soviet Union to downgrade the importance of military power in its foreign policy. Indeed, the contrary is true. It is vital to U.S. security and to its economic health to induce the Soviet Union to accept a significant demilitarization of superpower relationships, because such a step is crucial for reducing the growing risks of nuclear war. It is also a precondition for limiting the worldwide arms traffic and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

III

A negotiating framework for demilitarizing the U.S.-Soviet relationship and for reversing the arms race would need to have clear goals and make explicit recognition of the interrelatedness of

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such crucial matters as strategic weapons, conventional forces in Europe and overseas bases. Such a framework would really represent a return to the approach embodied in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement of Principles of 1961 for staged comprehensive disarmament agreements leading to "general and complete disarmament." That approach was abandoned in the mid-1960s in favor of piecemeal negotiations on strategic weapons systems and later on conventional force reductions in Europe, because broad agreements were considered visionary or—worse—cynical propaganda. Step-by-step negotiations were considered the "serious" way to confront the arms race. When the Soviets stopped talking about "general and complete disarmament" and entered negotiations for the control of ICBMs, they demonstrated, as Henry Kissinger and others used to say, that they were "serious." But for many reasons—the relentless pace of technological development, the volatility of political moods in the United States, the cumbersome Soviet bureaucracy—small agreements may turn out to be more visionary than substantial agreements, that is, agreements with benefits for both sides that clearly outweigh the risks, and with the ability to communicate unambiguous intentions.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can embrace "general and complete disarmament" as an operational goal at this point; for this reason, the rhetoric in President Carter's inaugural address about moving to "zero nuclear weapons" was not particularly helpful. But both powers can establish a realistic set of common goals for substantial disarmament and demilitarization that could significantly improve the political climate, reduce the risks of confrontation, and improve the security of both the American and Soviet peoples.

What are the criteria for practical arms limitation agreements that can create a positive political climate in which it becomes possible to reverse the arms race? Four, I believe, are crucial. The first requirement is that the agreement demonstrably increase perceptions of security on both sides. Since limitations on nuclear weapons may appear to favor one side or the other if the conventional arms race continues, both must be included in the same negotiating framework—superpower relations and the security of Europe must be dealt with together. Second, the new arms relationship should have clear economic payoffs for both sides. Third, the principle of "rough equivalence" should be extended not only to numbers and characteristics of weapons systems, but to other aspects of the military relationship, including the right to acquire bases and to threaten the homeland of either power from

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such bases. Fourth, the primary purpose of the agreement should be to remove ambiguities about intentions. To that end, agreements that require and produce significant internal changes in the national security establishments of both societies would provide in themselves the best sort of verification, for they show clear political commitment and direction which is not easy to reverse. Thus, a serious program for conversion of military industry in both countries would be an important source of reassurance, for it would require the willingness of leaders in both societies to confront powerful interests with a bureaucratic and ideological commitment to the arms race.

The single most important measure toward fulfilling the four criteria I have proposed would be a mutually agreed-upon three-year moratorium on the procurement, testing and deployment of all bombers, missiles and warheads. During that period, the signatories would undertake to negotiate a formula for making across-the-board reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals. The mutual moratorium, not unlike that which preceded the negotiation of the atmospheric test ban, would enable the negotiators to keep ahead of technological development and would create a much more favorable climate for the ratification of long-term agreements.

The greatest perceived threats are not the weapons already built, although they are more than adequate to destroy both societies, but the weapons about to be built. New weapons systems convey threatening intentions and raise unanswerable questions: Are the Soviets seeking "superiority"? If so, is it to neutralize the effects of 30 years of U.S. "superiority," or do they really expect to play a similar role themselves in the next 30 years? No one can provide definitive answers about these matters. To have the questions occupy center stage is already disturbing the political atmosphere, and introducing a note of hysteria into a set of issues on which the soberest judgments must be made.

The question of ultimate intentions cannot be answered, but it can be rendered irrelevant by an agreement which is sufficiently clear and comprehensive. Within a controlled but continuing nuclear arms race there is always room for arguing that the agreement favors one side or the other. However, a freeze on all new nuclear weapons systems would make it clear that both sides indeed intend to stop the arms race.

It is in the interest of the United States to press for a halt of nuclear weapons and missile production this year. A rough balance of nuclear forces now exists—a balance which, in the view of

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the Administration, still favors the United States. The next round of the arms race can only work to the economic and strategic disadvantage of this country and create new perils for the entire world. The Soviet Union has made a public proposal for an end to new nuclear weapons systems, although its exact significance cannot be assessed until it becomes the subject of negotiation.

To supplement a moratorium on the nuclear buildup, the United States and the Soviet Union should enter into a "no-first-use" agreement. This suggestion has been made often in the past and the Soviets periodically propose it, but the United States has always insisted upon reserving its right to use nuclear weapons first because the option is considered crucial for the defense of Europe. However, in the context of a broad negotiating framework for reversing the arms race, a no-first-use declaration is in the interest of the West. It is some inhibition against the resort to nuclear blackmail—the very threat the next escalation of the arms race presumably is designed to counter. It would codify an international consensus that nuclear warheads are neither legitimate weapons of war, nor instruments of diplomatic pressure, but only instruments of punishment for the crime of using nuclear weapons. A permissive attitude toward making nuclear threats plays into the hands of terrorists, small powers, dissident groups and the like, and can only work against the interests of every great power. The no-first-use agreement would set a political context within which each side could undertake a series of unilateral steps with respect to nuclear deployments and doctrine for the purpose of eliciting reciprocation and providing reassurance. Such steps should include shifting away from counterforce weapons, war-fighting technology, preemptive strike doctrines, and other apparatus for initiating controlled nuclear war.

The argument that a no-first-use agreement would undermine the defense of Europe is unpersuasive, since the capability of the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe cannot be effectively countered by the threat to use nuclear weapons. Turning the expanse between the Seine and the Elbe into a radioactive wasteland, as has happened in various NATO war games, is no defense. The threat to spark a worldwide nuclear war, which is all a nuclear strategy for defending Europe is, merely emphasizes the weakness and contradiction in the present NATO security strategy. The ritualistic pledge to "defend your land as if it were our own" that President Carter delivered in Germany last May, implying as it does the sacrifice of Chicago and Detroit to "save" Frankfort and Munich, simply underscores the fundamental di-

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lemma of Western defense.

Given European perceptions about the need to be "defended" by nuclear weapons, however, a no-first-use agreement should be linked to a phased elimination of Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe. Thus, while a no-first-use agreement should apply equally everywhere, it should come into force only when agreements for redeployment of forces in Europe are also implemented.

The third element of a comprehensive framework for reversing the arms race would deal with European theater forces and overseas bases. Geographical asymmetries have always complicated arms negotiations. The Soviet Union enjoys a military advantage in Europe by virtue of the fact that it is a continental power and can bring its military might to bear on Europe more easily than can the United States, while the United States has a far greater geopolitical reach around the world. Although the Soviet navy is expanding in numbers and in its missions, at this point there is no comparison between the U.S. global network of bases, ships, and alliances and Soviet capabilities for projecting military, diplomatic or economic power at a distance. Since neither instance of military superiority can be translated into stable political power, there may be a mutual interest in trading one off against the other.

The MBFR talks, a technical sideshow in U.S.-Soviet negotiations, reflect the low priority both sides now assign to the crucial goal of stabilizing and reversing the arms race in Europe. These talks should be incorporated into the broader negotiating framework. By giving new importance to the issue, the two alliances would have a better chance of coming to agreement on substantial troop reductions and redeployments to reduce the threat of surprise attack. Within this context the Soviet Union should be asked to agree to the phased elimination of its nuclear missiles aimed at Europe.

In return for this asymmetrical Soviet concession, the United States would agree to phase out all foreign bases now used to station nuclear strike forces capable of hitting the Soviet Union. Such U.S. forward bases are a prime example of a structure that served a function in one generation that cannot be continued in the next. As a symbol of U.S. economic and military preeminence, those bases, it could be argued, provided forms of international stability in the bipolar world of the postwar era. But that world has now gone. The principal argument against the proposal that I have offered is that a substantial dismantling of those bases in return for a halt on Soviet deployments would create instability,

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because it might provide incentive for the acquisition of independent military capabilities by a variety of actors.

Competition with the Soviets over troop deployment and bases will hardly contribute to stability. Maintaining a U.S. military shield for the global array of nations we used to call the "free world" is no longer feasible. The collapse of the Shah is a good example of the inherent instability of the old arrangements based on exporting enormous quantities of U.S. military technology and stationing large numbers of Americans abroad. Since the United States finds it increasingly difficult to defend embattled regimes with military power in the face of local factors over which it has no control, the prospects for stability will depend more and more upon building an international consensus for demilitarization and on insulating local conflicts from superpower rivalries to the greatest possible extent.

A substantial portion of the U.S. military budget goes for the projection of military power abroad, not for the defense of the continental territory. The United States is unlikely to acquire any new bases, while the Soviets have better prospects of doing so, particularly in Africa. The acquisition of Soviet bases creates the possibility of dangerous confrontation, as almost happened over the Cienfuegos base in Cuba. A freeze on the acquisition of bases would now be clearly in the interest of the United States. It would be in the interest of the Soviet Union, too, if the United States agreed to remove certain bases which the U.S.S.R. finds particularly threatening. To negotiate U.S. withdrawal from or demilitarization of a variety of military installations around the world would be a significant concession in the eyes of the Soviets. (Some bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union are, it is true, used for intelligence, and would serve a verification function in an arms control arrangement. Such bases could be demilitarized and retained for verification purposes, and perhaps be put under international supervision. The French have recently proposed an international verification system.)

A substantial U.S. withdrawal from foreign bases would symbolize the fact that the global ground rules under which the two superpowers are operating are becoming more nearly equal. For exactly that reason, such ideas have always been fiercely resisted by most U.S. strategists. But the reality is that power shifts have taken place and that the Soviets will try to change the ground rules to make them reflect more accurately the new power realities in the world. The attempts may well come in the form of tests of strength and will in local confrontations where the risks of war by

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miscalculation are considerable. It would be far better to arrive at an understanding of the new ground rules by negotiation than through replays of the Cuban missile crisis under circumstances far less favorable to the United States.

IV

The freeze on new strategic systems, the change in nuclear doctrine symbolized by the no-first-use agreement, the ban on proliferation of bases, base withdrawals, force reductions and redeployments in Europe make up a framework of negotiation that could lead to a significant demilitarization of the U.S.-Soviet competition and to a demonstrably safer world. It will no doubt be argued that to link nuclear to conventional arms and superpower relations to the issue of European security, while throwing in the long dormant issue of foreign bases, is impossibly complicated. If we have such trouble arriving at limited agreements on strategic weapons alone, how can this larger package be negotiable?

The history of the negotiations suggests that "small" agreements (they never look small to the negotiators) have a fatal flaw. Because they take a cut at one piece of the security problem, they necessarily favor or appear to favor one side. A larger package improves the chances of taking account of asymmetries of geography and military establishments, and of balancing advantages and disadvantages on all sides. Even more to the point, a comprehensive agreement along the lines I have suggested has a destination, namely, a politico-military environment which is significantly different from what we have and a great deal more attractive than what we are likely to have if the arms race continues. Within a clear framework for reversing the arms race, risks that are unacceptable in the context of a continuing arms race become more acceptable because there is a greater payoff.

There are many ways to arrive at the point I have sketched. One way is to keep the basic agreements extremely simple—a nuclear weapons production and deployment freeze, a no-first-use agreement, equal force levels in Europe, a ban on acquisition of bases—and to supplement bilateral agreements with coordinated but independent initiatives, such as a Soviet phase-out of European-targeted missiles and a U.S. unilateral base withdrawal program. To do anything, however, requires placing a higher value on the process of demilitarization than on the fairness of the "military balance" at any given moment.

The superpowers will never agree to reverse the arms race

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without a prior reassessment of the political value of present and projected force levels in the world they now confront. That reassessment has not yet taken place in the United States, but it is long overdue. Were it to be made, the first new national security policy for the United States in 30 years would, I believe, emerge. Reversing the arms race will not happen until disarmament agreements become instruments of, rather than contradictions to, national security policy. And only when that happens will the agreements produce positive political consequences.

Why should the United States reassess the return it is getting on its massive investment in military power? The world in which present expectations from military investment and the ground rules for realizing them were formulated was vastly different from the one we face today. It was a world emerging from the chaos of World War II and one in which the United States had a unique role to play in constructing and maintaining the postwar international structure. Whether it was the right structure, or whether the United States should have acted differently, is now beside the point. What is important is that an extraordinary combination of economic and military power at that moment in history made possible a Pax Americana that lasted 20 years, and that that moment is over. Indeed, it came to end about ten years ago.

We have yet to grasp the historical meaning of the stark events of the past decade: the inability to impose the American will upon a third-rate power in Indochina despite an enormous commitment of military might; the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements that symbolized the global rule of the dollar; the disturbance of the international economy due to the shift in power over oil; the urgent pressure for a reordering of North-South economic relations; the systemic economic problems of the Western world; inflation; unemployment; ecological deterioration; and, most serious of all, a gathering cynicism about the capacity of the modern democratic state to solve its problems. But one thing seems clear. None of these developments that threaten American society and the West as a whole can be ascribed to Soviet strategy. The neat bipolar world for which our national security policy was conceived is so far from the present complex reality that the Russians are not even in a position to benefit from any of our recent misfortunes, including the defeat in Vietnam.

Another aspect of the new reality is that none of the major threats to American power, economic stability, and prestige can be allayed by the use of military power. Just as the tragic pictures of the last U.S. planes abandoning besieged Saigon symbolized

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the inability of the United States to project its military power successfully into a distant revolution, so, too, do the billions of dollars worth of sophisticated military hardware lying idle beside the struck oilfields and burning buildings in Iran symbolize the irrelevance of imported military power to domestic political movements, once those movements achieve a certain sweep and dynamism. (For those who refuse to believe that the most pressing national security problems facing the United States cannot be solved by force, it is always tempting to ascribe failures like Vietnam and Iran to the wrong choices of military technology; but there is nothing to suggest that bringing in the Los Angeles Police Department rather than the F14s would have saved the Shah.) Military power will no longer enable us to shore up the dollar, to preserve access to critical resources, or to exert political influence in the way we did. Military superiority did not prevent the consolidation of the Soviet control over eastern Germany, the most impressive example of their expansion to date—and an action taken at a time when the United States alone had the atomic bomb. Nor did it intimidate Soviet leaders from making their country a dangerous military power.

The long-term interest of the United States is in the sort of political stability in the world that can support the economic relations on which the maintenance of American democracy depends. The military investment has been primarily designed to reinforce certain models of development in Third World countries and to discourage others. The fate of the Shah and the likely fate of the Mobutu regime in Zaïre suggest that a reassessment of long-term interests, and a more skeptical look at what military power can do to achieve those interests, is overdue. Our world-wide military apparatus is an anachronism in a world in which our major corporations are developing long-term relations with revolutionary regimes in China, Angola, and elsewhere.

What is true for us about the political payoffs of military power is, happily, as true or truer for the Soviet Union. Its nuclear stockpiles did not keep China from defying it; indeed the nuclear issue seems to have triggered much of the bitterness and paranoia in Peking about the "social imperialists." The vaunted Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe has failed so far not only to produce "finlandization" in Paris and Bonn or any noticeable effort in that direction, but it has even failed to secure compliance in Bucharest with Moscow-directed targets for defense spending. A long list of recipients of Soviet military assistance, including Guinea, Egypt, Sudan and Somalia, have shown how

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grateful or intimidated they were by keeping the gifts and throwing out the givers. The complexities and perils of the new world order into which we are heading has made it difficult for the Kremlin to bring its military might to bear on the crisis in Iran, a nation on the Soviet border, a historic Russian objective and, were Soviet control to emerge, a powerful symbol of a shift in the world balance of forces. What the Soviets have developed through the acquisition of military power is the increasing capacity to neutralize U.S. military power. Thus, a relatively risk-free operation like the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon is no longer feasible because of the presence of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. Now, a similar intervention would involve risks of a naval war and therefore, presumably, would not be tried.

To achieve these diminishing returns from the accumulation of military power, both superpowers are being forced to make ever greater investments. These investments have not only an economic cost—increasingly, they have a national security cost as well. The Soviet Union, many observers believe, faces a series of fundamental domestic challenges: a sluggish economy, inefficient agriculture, the impending ascendancy of a non-Russian majority, the hazards of political succession, and the rise of a variety of dissident movements. The heavy burden of the military preempts not just scarce capital, but political energy and managerial skill needed to address the real threats facing Soviet society. Because of the military burden, the Soviet Union is unable to develop its productive capacity. Instead of developing a domestic capacity to satisfy the sharply increased expectations of Soviet citizens for a better diet and a better standard of living, Soviet leaders find themselves importing grain to support the new meat-eating habits of the population and deferring critical investments in the engines of the economy.

With respect to the United States, too, the negative correlations between increased arms spending and security are becoming clearer. The military budget is a major element in the federal deficit which is feeding a dangerous inflation. The cumulative military burden of 30 years has helped to enable less burdened commercial rivals, West Germany and Japan, to secure competitive advantages in the world export market. The military emphasis, which gave a boost to employment and to the gross national product a generation ago by financing jet aircraft and electronics technology, has over time distorted the technological thrust of the nation. Military spinoffs for the civilian market in the 1960s and 1970s have been few; the dominant role of the Pentagon in

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research and development has preempted talent and research dollars, and has contributed to the slowdown in innovation for essential civilian markets.[2] The 30-year cumulative effect of maintaining the worldwide military apparatus has adversely affected the U.S. balance of payments and led to the weakening of the dollar.

In a time of austerity, increasing the military budget while the domestic programs are being slashed raises the issue, not of guns versus butter, but of missiles versus the local police and firefighters. The distortion of priorities has become so acute that as the Administration counsels a three percent "real" increase in military spending each year, essential services in every major American city are being cut. To suggest that the threat of "finlandization" in Europe is a greater threat to the people of Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles or Detroit than the loss of social services, the breakdown of the education system, the rise in crime, the alarming increase in infant mortality, the impending municipal bankruptcies, or the failure to invest in an alternative energy system is to distort national security strategy, and to misconstrue the meaning of "strength".

The argument for a national security policy based on a new process of demilitarization of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry rests, therefore, on two developments that have taken place in the last decade which affect both nations in similar ways: diminishing returns and increased risks from the deployment of military power, and steeply rising costs of the military establishment, which increasingly are forcing unacceptable and dangerous domestic choices.

There are numerous objections that can be levelled at any effort to break the arms logjam. What if China does not cooperate? If China seriously believes that the Soviet Union is bent on a military takeover of the world, then it should welcome arms agreements sufficiently broad and significant to dispel such suspicions. At any

[2]According to *Science Indicators—1976* of the U.S. National Science Board of the National Science Foundation (pp. 186–87), 64 percent of government research and development in the United States is in defense and space, but only 15 percent in West Germany and seven percent in Japan. See also Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy*, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1974. A ranking Commerce Department official quoted by Professor Melman reports that government studies indicate that no more than between five and ten percent of military expenditures have a civilian spinoff. See also Melman's "Inflation and Unemployment as Products of War Economy," in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1978. For the negative effects of military expenditures on technological development, see J. Hollomon and A. Harger, "America's Technological Dilemma," *Technology Review*, July–August 1971; A. Szymanski, "Military Spending and Economic Stagnation," *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1973; W.M. Leonard, "Research and Development in Industrial Growth," *Journal of Political Economy*, March–April 1971.

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rate, a three-year moratorium provides the time to try to secure Chinese cooperation; if it is not forthcoming, no Chinese military developments in that period could significantly change the military environment or disturb the possibilities of a new and more stable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

A serious new effort to reverse the arms race that goes well beyond SALT II is essential to stop the drift toward war. The war that all seek to avoid will most likely come as the First World War came—by miscalculation. Moreover, the risks of such miscalculation are multiplying. Some are inherent in military technology itself, as in the trend toward counterforce weapons and limited war doctrines, which induces military planners to design preemptive strategies and to move toward advanced states of readiness for their nuclear forces. Other risks flow from the new international economic and monetary disorder of the 1970s. And, meanwhile, four hundred billion dollars a year in armaments are spread across the planet. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can control the new rush of political developments that is transforming the familiar world we have chosen to simplify with old catchwords like "cold war" and "détente," but the illusion of control persists, and with it the danger of fatal confrontation.

It has been fashionable for a few years to note that the overwhelming problems facing mankind are not rooted in the "cold war," but in the challenge of creating an international order that will accommodate North and South, offer the possibility of stable economic growth, and promote the sensible use of scarce resources. Old habits of mind persist, however, and the Carter Administration, no less than its predecessors, seems caught in the trap of equating national security with military hardware. When two rival nations are caught in the same trap because neither can make sense of a world that defies control by any nation, the greatest threat of all is the fatalistic belief that the war no one wants cannot be avoided.

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George Lenczowski

THE ARC OF CRISIS: ITS CENTRAL SECTOR

The "arc of crisis" has been defined as an area stretching from the Indian subcontinent in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west. The Middle East constitutes its central core. Its strategic position is unequalled: it is the last major region of the Free World directly adjacent to the Soviet Union, it holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the proven and estimated world oil reserves, and it is the locus of one of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century: that of Zionism versus Arab nationalism. Moreover, national, economic and territorial conflicts are aggravated by the intrusion of religious passions in an area which was the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and by the exposure, in the twentieth century, to two competing appeals of secular modernization: Western and communist.

Against the background of these basic facts, postwar American policy in the Middle East has focused on three major challenges: security of the area as against Soviet threats to its integrity and independence, fair and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and safe access to its oil. Two major policy formulations, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, had the Middle East as their direct primary object; the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, while occasioned by the Indochina crisis, affected—however indirectly—the Middle East as well. Broadly speaking, each of these presidential pronouncements expressed a policy of containment of "international communism," but devised different methods of coping with it: while the Truman Doctrine aimed at safeguarding Greece and Turkey (later with an implicit Iranian extension) by means of economic aid and military advice and supply assistance, the Eisenhower Doctrine focused primarily on the Arab world and pledged direct employment of U.S.

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military power. The Nixon Doctrine put a limit on direct military intervention but, to compensate for this retrenchment, pledged other forms of assistance—including a clearly adequate supply of weapons—to those threatened countries which would henceforth assume greater burdens of self-defense.

The Middle East is not a political monolith. On the contrary, it is divided into a number of subregions along national, linguistic, religious, and ideological lines. The most obvious division is that which separates the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) from the Arab core. American policy has faced different types of challenges in each of the two. Let us look first at the course of American policy in Turkey and Iran and the present situation in these two countries, and then focus on the implications of the Iranian revolution for the whole area.

II

After World War II, Turkey and Iran were the two countries most immediately threatened by Soviet territorial expansionism and political subversion. In 1945, Turkey was confronted with Soviet demands for control of the Turkish Straits and cession of its eastern districts of Kars and Ardahan, and in 1945–46 Iran faced the danger of disintegration as a result of the formation on its territory, under Soviet sponsorship, of two separatist entities: the autonomous republic of Azerbaijan and the dissident Kurdish republic of Mahabad; Moscow's refusal to withdraw its Red Army from Iran's northern provinces in violation of wartime pledges; and infiltration of Iran's central government by the Soviet-sponsored Tudeh Party.

In what was undoubtedly one of the most realistic and imaginative eras of American foreign policy (with Dean Acheson its chief architect, consistently followed by John Foster Dulles), the United States launched a truly bipartisan policy, largely free of domestic sectarian considerations (except for marginal dissident groups), to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of these two Northern Tier states. This policy was marked, in addition to the Truman Doctrine, by such steps as American encouragement to Iran in 1945–46 to resist Soviet pressures (and to refuse ratification of a northern oil concession obtained by the U.S.S.R. under blackmail conditions), inclusion of Turkey—along with Greece—in the NATO alliance in 1950–51, formation of the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO) in 1955, and finally in 1959, conclusion of three bilateral

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security agreements establishing virtual alliances with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.[1]

Thus, through unilateral policy declarations, multilateral arrangements, and bilateral military assurances, the Northern Tier was assured of a serious and sustained American commitment to save it from sharing the fate of Eastern Europe. Naturally, support for independence and sovereignty of the Northern Tier states was logically linked to concern for their internal stability, the strength of their governments, and their determination to put the highest possible priority on resistance to Soviet expansionist schemes.

Ideally, the most desirable type of government in both countries would be one that was: (a) democratic, i.e., sharing America's basic values; (b) based on a free enterprise system; (c) committed to economic development and social justice both for their own sake and so as to reduce tensions leading to instability; (d) nationalist in the positive sense of the word, i.e., clearly perceiving its overriding national interest in terms of safeguarding its sovereignty and integrity from the danger that threatened it most, in this case Soviet imperialism. Political realism, however, dictated caution in expecting that all these four conditions would be fulfilled. Democracy is a system that is largely limited to the West European and North American areas; to expect its rapid transplantation to Afro-Asia where one or another form of authoritarianism has prevailed since time immemorial would be wishful thinking.

Similarly, developing countries, due to insufficiency of private risk capital and entrepreneurship, are often compelled to choose the path of a mixed economy combining the private and public sectors. There was no major problem with the two states' commitment to economic development: both ardently desired it. Its connection with social justice—a more equal distribution of wealth—presented a more complicated matter (as witnessed by the land reform issue in Iran and its negative effect on productivity), but the difficulty in slicing the pie could be overcome provided the pie was steadily increasing in size. Nationalism as defined above was, however, a condition *sine qua non,* a minimum

[1]As noted, Turkey was already a member of NATO, so the alliance relationship was complete, explicit, and in the form of a treaty ratified by the Senate. However, the United States did not join CENTO, and the assurances of American support to Pakistan and Iran conveyed in 1959 were in the form of executive agreements never submitted formally to the Congress and not imposing reciprocal obligations on Iran or Pakistan similar to those contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. Nonetheless, in the case of Iran, continued congressional support for actions taken pursuant to the 1959 agreements undoubtedly created—in practice if not in strict legal terms—the elements of an alliance relationship with the United States.

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without which any U.S. commitment to assist and protect those countries would make no sense.

III

In the first postwar decade (1945–55), of the two key Northern Tier countries Turkey emerged as meeting at least three, and striving to attain all four, attributes of an "ideal" government: with the advent of the Democrat Party to power in 1950, a single-party tutelage system was transformed into a multiparty democracy without revolution; a new government under Adnan Menderes was anxious to expand the private sector and encourage foreign investment; and Turkey's foreign policy priorities and determined resistance to communism dovetailed with similar American objectives. As a result, a period of close U.S.-Turkish cooperation, formalized through alliance links, followed. An impressive part of American foreign aid was, year by year, channeled toward Turkey. In return, Turkey maintained a big and steadily improving military establishment—in fact, with ground forces of nearly 400,000, the largest of any of the NATO members east of the Atlantic—and provided facilities for its allies in the form of bases, radar screens, missile sites, etc.

In the face of this show of strength and cooperation between Turkey and the West, in the early 1950s Moscow formally renounced its territorial and maritime claims and, after Stalin's death, embarked on an ostensibly conciliatory policy which involved offers (sometimes accepted) of economic and technical assistance. The Turkish coup of 1960 which resulted in the ouster of the Democrats, temporary military rule, and a period of shifting coalition governments did not change the fundamentally nationalist and anticommunist posture of successive Turkish cabinets, thus assuring the continuity of alliance with the United States.

Beginning with the 1960s, however, difficulties arose from the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. Twice restrained by strong (and deeply resented) American diplomatic intervention in 1964 and 1967, Turkey finally took matters into its own hands in the summer of 1974, invading and occupying large areas of Cyprus. The resulting arms embargo by the U.S. Congress was lifted only last fall, and the related denial of military facilities by the Turkish government only then relaxed. Even prior to the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had in 1973 denied the U.S. Air Force the right to overfly its territory during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War; lack of full cooperation has again been manifest recently in the negative Turkish reaction to the use of Turkish bases by a very small rescue

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team of U.S. Marines earmarked to protect the U.S. Embassy in Iran.

In addition to these international strains, Turkey's internal politics entered a turbulent phase in the mid-1960s, with harmful impact on its foreign policy. Serious stresses were caused by the interlinked factors of: (a) poverty and, despite the advances of the 1950s, a general state of underdevelopment and the resulting unemployment; (b) political polarization, with the rise of new and militant forces on the left and right of the political spectrum; (c) inability to form a clear-cut governmental majority; (d) aroused expectations and frustrations of workers, especially in the mid-1970s on the part of those returning from Western Europe in the wake of retrenchment of the European economy. For the past ten years at least, Turkey has been plagued by sporadic urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

More broadly, much of this malaise and turmoil can be ascribed to the rise of a young politically awakened generation of students and workers. In the mid-1940s—the period of mortal threat to Turkey's survival—many of them were not yet born or were mere infants, and apparently the Turkish school curricula were deficient in providing pupils with solid knowledge of recent history. Certainly the incidence of Marxist groups and movements today (especially clustered around the Technical University in Ankara) is striking if we consider the historical record of Russo-Turkish relations. Recently there has been a revival of religious tensions (as between the Alevi minority and the Sunni majority, especially in southeastern Turkey) against the background of a broader struggle between theocratic and secularist orientations. Outbreaks of violence have led to the proclamation of martial law in 13 Turkish provinces.

Is Turkey then threatened with a revolution which, because of presumed popular support, might effect a radical change in its political system and foreign alignments? The answer should be cautiously negative—for Turkey has certain built-in safeguards that are likely to cushion it against abrupt changes. First of all, the country does not have a single elite group or power center symbolizing oppression against which popular grievances could be directed. Second, Turkey possesses, in periodic elections, a mechanism for peaceful change which (though subject to occasional military interference) still works: impersonal institutions (parliament, the electoral process, parties) have acquired legitimacy with major segments of the population. And third, the army has thus far proved to be a cohesive instrument, patriotic and

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disciplined, serving as the ultimate guarantor of order and security.

Moreover, in spite of the tensions and irritations in American-Turkish relations, the two main Turkish parties, the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party, have never ceased to voice support for continued membership in NATO and, even at the lowest ebb of relations with Washington, were unwilling to burn their bridges with America. This of course does not mean that the U.S. government or Congress can afford to be complacent on the presumed assumption that logic dictates Turkey's alignment with the West. Domestic disarray, especially if fed by external stimuli (in this case resentment against U.S. policies fanned by communist agitation), may under certain circumstances generate so much emotionalism that rational considerations may be thrown overboard and a political group catering to mass passions emerge to dominate the scene. Should this happen, the strategic balance in the eastern Mediterranean as well as in the arc of crisis would be seriously affected.

IV

The Iran that had to deal with external pressures (and internal change) from 1945 onward stood in many respects in marked contrast to Turkey. Ruled by a monarchy with a longstanding tradition of authoritarian rule, Iran was nonetheless experiencing a democratic interlude that began in 1941 and was based on the constitution adopted in 1906–07. It represented a less cohesive society, divided into urban, rural, and tribal sectors and, though with Farsi as the dominant tongue, noted for its ethnic and linguistic pluralism. And its national unity had been subjected to serious trials as a result of the wartime occupation by Russia and Britain. Also, in contrast to Turkey, Iran saw the growth in the 1940s and after of a substantial Soviet-supported communist group, the Tudeh Party, which in addition to its hard-core Leninist cadre attracted some frustrated liberals and intellectuals. The Tudeh succeeded in penetrating labor unions, including the workers in the southern oilfields and the Abadan refinery. Less disciplined than the Turkish populace, the Iranian body politic exhibited centrifugal tendencies, with many elements prone to collaborate with one or another foreign power for selfish or ideological reasons.

And, while both countries had an Islamic past, Iran had a tradition of dualism expressed by the ancient (and semi-deified) institution of the monarchy side by side with the Shi'a religious

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organization which, based on belief in the 12th Hidden Imam, has given only a grudging recognition to the legitimacy of any secular king. This dualism was expressed in Article 2 of the Iranian constitution, according to which a body of five learned theologians (*mujtahids*) was to make binding pronouncements on the conformity of the laws passed by the parliament with the sacred law (*shari'a*) of Islam. This body, however, with powers comparable to the judicial review of the U.S. Supreme Court, was never established—a rankling point with the Shi'ite religious leaders.

The oil crisis and accompanying political turmoil of the Mosaddeq era (1951–53) almost toppled the Shah, who returned to power following a brief exile in 1953 only after an Army coup conducted with planning help by the CIA. Feeling that the parliament had proved itself unable to maintain stability, the Shah then embarked on a program to entrench his own power at its expense, and to use that power to create a modern state. By 1963 he had gained virtually total control of the country.

It is too early to judge the Pahlavi era. Historically, it must be compared with the preceding era of the Qajar dynasty, an era of weak but despotic power wielded by a series of self-seeking and increasingly degenerate rulers, when Iran was more of a territory crossed at will by the armies of neighboring countries than a state in the modern sense of the word. Both in this light, and by comparison with its neighbors, Iran's Pahlavi dynasty, from 1925 onward, must at least be credited with bringing about major and positive changes. Its impressive record includes safeguarding of the national independence against repeated Soviet threats; building of a seemingly strong centralized state; modernization and development in the economic, technical, and social sectors; cooperation with the United States in preserving regional security; and the projection of a stabilizing influence in the Persian Gulf.

After 1963, the pace of internal change in Iran picked up, with the Shah carrying out a white revolution that included a major redistribution of land (including royal lands and also substantial holdings of the church), as well as measures for the emancipation of women, the spread of literacy, expansion and improvement of education, and giving workers a share in the profits of enterprises employing them. To achieve land reform (supervised by two energetic ministers, Arsanjani and Valian), the Shah had to suspend the parliament for two years inasmuch as the latter, dominated by the landowners, had repeatedly frustrated his efforts in this direction in the past. This suspension of constitutionalism expressed the reality of Iran's political process: to assure acceler-

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ated modernization, a concentration of power was needed. In effect, the regime returned to the authoritarian pattern of the pre-1941 period.

Moreover, the Shah justified his supremacy by national security considerations: in 1954 a Soviet espionage ring, involving 600 officers in the Iranian army (including 60 of colonel rank) had been discovered, while throughout the 1950s and early 1960s police repeatedly uncovered clandestine communist cells and printing presses. The reorganized security organization, SAVAK, grew in power and expanded its activities. The line dividing legitimate from subversive dissent began to be blurred and, with the passage of time, increasingly coercive measures were applied to active dissenters. Yet, with all this, much freedom was allowed to the people. This was especially true in the economy (where the private sector was dominant), in religion (the mullas continued their religious functions unimpeded, with ready access to thousands of worshipers in the mosques), and in freedom of movement (as attested by frequent travels abroad and the massive study in foreign countries by young Iranians—50,000 in the United States alone). In short, while this was an authoritarian state, it was not totalitarian.

By the mid-1970s the Shah seemed to have reached the pinnacle of power: his authority was uncontested by any overt opposition group, he led the successful OPEC fight for the quadrupling of oil prices, and his international stature was symbolized by the 1971 celebrations in Persepolis, marking 25 centuries of Iranian monarchy. The notion of the sacred kingship of the Achaemenian era was revived, notably in a speech delivered by the Shah in front of Cyrus the Great's tomb in Pasargadae, and respectfully listened to by foreign heads of state and numerous dignitaries.

In terms of essentials of political power, the Shah appeared to hold all the trump cards. He had full control of the organized state machinery, exercised direct command over the impressive military establishment (285,000 army, 100,000 air force, and 28,000 navy), had a ubiquitous security apparatus, and enjoyed unprecedented wealth from oil revenues (averaging nearly $20 billion a year from 1974 through 1978). According to the political laws of the twentieth century, an authoritarian system was not supposed to succumb to civilian revolution short of a lost war with foreign powers.

And yet in the course of 1978 this imposing power structure crumbled with a speed that was truly astonishing. The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, after nearly a year of turmoil, ostensibly

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on a vacation but with his future clouded. The Regency Council and the cabinet of Shahpur Bakhtiar which he left in a caretaking capacity lasted less than a month. By February 11 the regime collapsed and the army surrendered to the revolutionary group rallied around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a 78-year-old religious leader just returned to Iran from a 15-year exile.

V

It is not difficult to identify the four main opposition groups that formed a loose coalition that followed Khomeini's leadership exercised from afar (from Najaf in Iraq and subsequently from Paris).[2] These were in the first place the Shi'i religious leaders who resented the erosion of their authority as a result of modernization and secularization and who bemoaned the loss of economic power subsequent to the land reform. Allied with them were the bazaar leaders—merchants and entrepreneurs of a more traditional type—who were bypassed in the modern economic development, especially in the 1970s, when the norm became multimillion-dollar deals worked out with the government by a new breed of businessmen conversant with foreign languages and often with formal technocratic education. These two opposition groups were not noted for their democratic proclivities (the first had clearly a theocratic goal of establishing an Islamic republic based on the *shari'a*). But jointly they had the highest capacity for mobilizing mass support in the poorer and traditionalist districts in Teheran and other cities, where for 15 years at least the mullas—through their mosque-centered religious classes—had been indoctrinating young pupils in the spirit of hostility to the Shah.

The third group could be identified as the discontented intelligentsia, representing a segment of educated classes which somehow had not found a comfortable niche in the fast-developing economy and burgeoning bureaucracy. This group cultivated liberal and democratic ideas, clamored for political participation and a return to constitutionalism, was basically secular in its orientation and, broadly, carried the legacy of the late Premier Mosaddeq as attested by the revived name "National Front."

The fourth group was composed of the ideological Left and included the never fully suppressed Tudeh Party, the avowedly Marxist Fedayan-e Khalq, a variety of radical student groupings and urban guerrilla bands, and activist elements among the

[2] The reader may wish to compare my analysis with that of Professor James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978–79, pp. 323–342.

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laborers and the big city proletariat. Committed to a class struggle principle, in some cases carefully indoctrinated, these various segments of the Left aimed at the "smashing of the bourgeois state," with some of them meaning, in effect, the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist regime allied to the Soviet Union. (Some years earlier, Communist China had had its ideological representatives in the Iranian Left; but in the 1970s, Peking began gradually to cultivate the Shah, viewing a strong Iran as one more obstacle to Russia's global "hegemonism.")

But to identify these opposition groups (of which not only Western intelligence agencies but also lay students of Iranian affairs were fully aware) does not in itself explain why the monarchy suffered such a stupendous defeat. The opposition groups had been there for a long time, partly suppressed and partly tolerated, depending on the degree of their militancy. The question is: What factors were responsible for the activation and mobilization of these dissident forces?

Post-mortem evaluations are bound to vary, and the objectivity of some judgments is likely to be influenced by the role some analysts have played in the U.S. policymaking process. In this writer's view it is useful to distinguish between the major and the contributing factors leading to the revolutionary mobilization. The major factors were undoubtedly the mistakes committed by the Shah's regime, notwithstanding all its merits in developing and modernizing the country. These mistakes could be listed as follows:

1. *Lack of an effective party organization.* Such an organization is required in any authoritarian system, if only to serve as a mobilizing and indoctrinating agency. The Shah's experimentation with such artificial pro-government parties as the Mellioun, the Iran Novin, and finally the Rastakhiz-e Iran was clearly unsuccessful. He had to rely nakedly on the army, secret police, and bureaucracy.

2. *The spending spree* in which the government engaged on a massive scale, often without adequate preparatory study, especially following the big money influx after 1974. This produced a rampant inflation—between 35 and 50 percent annually—and deep discontent among the less privileged groups in the society. Paradoxically, great oil-generated revenues proved to be a mixed blessing.

3. *Questionable development plan priorities.* Excessive emphasis was put on industrialization (invariably favored by bureaucratic technocrats as tangible and visible) while agriculture was ne-

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glected—at least on a comparative scale. As a result Iran changed from agrarian self-sufficiency into a food-importing country to the tune of some 50 percent of its requirements. This was accompanied by the exodus of the rural population to urban centers. As a result a new city proletariat, clustering in shantytown slums (especially in the south of Teheran) increased in size by leaps and bounds, providing typical "cannon fodder" for any skilled agitator with a demagogic appeal.

4. *Estrangement of religious leadership.* Although the Pahlavi dynasty, with its modernization program, was basically in disagreement with the objectives of religious leaders, a major collision could have been avoided by the exercise of greater tact and diplomacy and possibly by the rational appeal that the religious establishment and the regime faced a common enemy, atheistic communism, and should cooperate for mutual protection. Instead, the government adopted a scornful attitude toward the ayatollahs and the mullas and, for unexplained reasons, in 1977–78 the cabinet of Premier Jamshid Amouzegar reduced an $80 million subsidy given regularly to mosques and religious foundations to a reported $30 million. After the land reform, this was the second financial blow suffered by the religious establishment.

Two further acts of unnecessary irritation deserve mention. In 1976 the Shi'a Islamic calendar based on the solar year since the Prophet's *hijra* was replaced by the Imperial calendar dating from the foundation of the Iranian Empire by Cyrus the Great. Thus the Islamic year 1355 became the Imperial year 2535, a difference of 1180 years. It was a grand symbolic assertion of the Achaemenian legacy of sacred kingship and a bold rejection of the Islamic legacy as the central spiritual fact in Iran's history. History teaches us that such attempts—as witnessed by Napoleon's abortive design—have little chance of success.

The second act of irritation was of a strongly personal nature: under the inspiration of the Minister of Information (responsible for the supervision of the news media), there appeared on January 8, 1978, in the major daily *Etala'at,* an article attacking the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and alleging that he was a homosexual and a British stooge. It was in fact the publication of this article that triggered the first massive antigovernment riots in the holy city of Qum that very month.

These then could be listed as major mistakes that could have been avoided had the Shah listened to the advice of more independent statesmen. In the prevailing climate of obsequiousness and conformity such independent advice was not encouraged and,

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naturally, not forthcoming.

Next, there were certain contributing factors to the malaise and the turmoil. First, one should mention corruption which, with the surge of oil-based affluence in 1974, attained major proportions and compromised some very highly placed persons (such as the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Navy). Furthermore, the participation of relatives of the royal family in a variety of business ventures—even without resort to any illegal actions—had a demoralizing effect on the business community and officialdom, a fact recognized by the Shah himself when, in the early fall of 1978, he issued a *farman* banning any such participation.

The second contributing factor was the coercive methods applied by the secret police, an issue particularly publicized by liberal dissenters at home and abroad and often mentioned as one of the principal causes of violent resistance. Actually, there are good reasons to doubt whether corruption and coercion would in themselves cause so much revolutionary ferment. On a comparative scale they did not appear any more severe than in the adjoining countries, whether the oil-rich Arab monarchies or the one-party military dictatorships. In fact, secret police supervision, jailing on mere suspicion, long imprisonment without a court sentence, and executions after summary trials—acts that sharply contrasted with the due process of law in the West—were not uncommon in both categories of states.

Moreover, certain radical dictatorships were prone to resort to individual assassinations of their political enemies and those accused of deviation from the official party line. In short, coercion in these countries has often exceeded in crude brutality the measures applied by the Iranian security organs, and yet it seldom if ever led to massive revolutionary protests. Interestingly enough, however, Western news media seemed to concentrate with an almost sadistic persistence on these features of the Iranian regime, and the interviews liberally granted by the Shah to certain Western news commentators who specialized in provocative and insulting questions addressed to the monarch encouraged adverse publicity and, correspondingly, emboldened the opposition.

Another contributing factor was the presence in Iran of an American expatriate community composed of some 40,000 industrial, business, and military specialists. They were all prosperous, enjoying better housing, possessing more conspicuous automobiles, and thus forming a sharp contrast to the general population. Their very numbers—necessitated by the requirements of rapid technological development—were too large from the point of view

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of social tolerance and their demand for consumer goods, services and amenities added another spur to the rampant inflation.

Undoubtedly, a major though hardly measurable factor could be clandestine and overt Soviet activities. The U.S. and other Western governments must have had some information on this point. To the lay observer, the following appear to be reliably reported and relevant: the importation of large consignments of paper to the Soviet Embassy in Iran (presumably to help print and distribute anti-Shah literature); heavy purchases by the Soviets of Iranian currency on the European markets; increasingly hostile (to the Shah) broadcasts during the fall of 1978 from the Soviet Union and from clandestine radio stations beaming "liberation" propaganda; official Soviet threats (including the invocation of Article 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty which authorized entry of Soviet troops into Iran should the latter become a base for foreign anti-Soviet aggression); and finally the recent surfacing of the suppressed communist groups, clearly well organized and equipped. This evidence does not clearly demonstrate a major Soviet role to this point—or negate the point often made that a true Islamic state in Iran might pose uncomfortable problems for the Soviet Union in relation to its own Muslims. But clearly the Soviets played at least a background role, and perhaps a more important and direct one than we yet know.

How the Left now behaves toward the Khomeini forces may throw the Soviet role and attitude into much clearer perspective. Even though communism and Islam are antithetical, Soviet theory and practice both attest that Islamic religious circles can and should be used under certain circumstances to achieve communist objectives and that they should not be antagonized by overt attacks on religion. In 1952–53, for example, there was a virtual tactical alliance between religious militants under Ayatollah Kashani and the Tudeh, in support of the Mosaddeq government.

Last but not least, the posture adopted by the United States both before and during the crisis should not be ignored as a contributing factor. There is no doubt that the American stress on human rights had, however indirectly, an impact on the Iranian situation. As early as 1976, i.e., during the electoral campaign, slogans about human rights appeared to the Iranian Embassy in Washington as having inimical connotations regarding Iran and as dovetailing with the campaign of the American news media against the Shah. Thus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Shah felt under some pressure in early 1977, when he adopted liberalization measures which gradually relaxed his hold on power.

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Certainly the full-blown emphasis of the Carter Administration on human rights thereafter encouraged the opposition in Iran to believe it had a degree of American sympathy—and this basic impression was not sufficiently dispelled by the subsequent effusive remarks by President Carter about the Shah as an ally and Iran as an "island of stability" during their mutual exchange of visits.[3]

The accumulation and overlapping of these direct and indirect factors brought about an explosive mixture that proved easy to ignite. The arson-caused fire that engulfed several hundred people inside a movie theater in Abadan in August 1978 (and which was blamed by the opposition on SAVAK's provocation) triggered a new wave of riots more violent and more massive than those of the early part of that year. From early September onward the Shah's government was under siege. Its indecision must be counted as another crucial element in the direction and above all in the sweep of what took place in early 1979.

On the one hand, there were successive concessions to the opposition—restoration of the Islamic calendar; the ban on business activities of the royal family; quick acquiescence to demands for substantial pay raises of oil workers and other public employees; the recall from abroad and subsequent arrest of General Nasiri, former head of SAVAK; detention of former Premier Hoveyda on corruption charges; repeated releases of hardened political prisoners from prisons. But these were invariably taken by the opposition groups as signs of weakness and confirmed their resolve not to compromise but to press for complete capitulation.

On the other hand, the martial law decreed in early September was not consistently implemented. Hesitation to use force with firmness while the protesting crowds were still manageable and unarmed (although force was used on several occasions) had a snowballing effect on the size and militancy of demonstrations. The army might have kept its cohesion when it faced, say, a mob of 5,000. But it was much harder to expect the same loyalty from soldiers when confronting a mass of 100,000 or more.

[3] In my personal experience, Iranian government officials deplored what they believed to be a hypocritical manipulation of the human rights slogans by both the Ford and the Carter Administrations. They pointed out that, in practice, the main violators of human rights—the totalitarian communist states—did not feel adverse effects from such campaigns. The 1975 Helsinki accords which legitimized Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe without any substantial effect on the observance of human rights in the U.S.S.R. and the new warm relationship developed between Washington and Peking without questions asked about millions killed since the advent of communists in China—all appeared to the Iranians as examples of a policy that, in its ultimate effect, was designed to hurt America's authoritarian allies in the less-developed countries more than her real enemies.

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To sum up, there were two courses of action open to the Shah: either to grant the return to constitutional rule early enough and thus, by voluntarily restricting his powers, save the monarchy; or to stop the protests decisively at an early stage before they gained momentum. In the event, he did neither. Whether his failure to act reflected the private advice (or absence of advice) of the American and British Ambassadors cannot now be known. Publicly, the posture of the Carter Administration was one of clear-cut support at least during September and October, when the possibilities of dramatic action, either to move to constitutional rule or to restore order firmly, seem in hindsight still to have existed. By November, both possibilities and posture were cloudier, and Washington reports of divisions within the Administration surely did not help. While the National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was reported to favor strong all-out support and kept in direct touch with the Shah and his close collaborators, other elements in the Administration seemed to be less sure of the propriety of such a course. The glare of publicity accompanying these differences proved very damaging to the execution of U.S. policy. For the Shah, already suspecting some sinister double play by Washington (ever since he was advised earlier in 1978 to get rid of General Nasiri as chief of SAVAK), the reports from Washington had a devastating effect, to which much of his indecision in the last weeks before his departure could be traced.

In January, as the Shah was about to leave the country, the American Deputy Commander in NATO, General Huyser, arrived and over a period of a month conferred constantly with Iranian military leaders. His influence may have been substantial on the military's decision not to attempt a coup and eventually to yield to the Khomeini forces, especially if press reports are accurate that he or others threatened to withhold military supplies if a coup were attempted. What such a coup would have meant by January is not clear even in hindsight, or whether by that stage it would have had as its objective the Shah's restoration or simply military rule. In any event, the Iranian military forces are at least temporarily shattered, with their combat effectiveness unlikely to be restored for a very long time, and even their capacity to assist in bringing about law and order highly doubtful for some months.

VI

Whether or not American policy affected the outcome in this or other respects, a word is in order on some of the other criticisms directed at American policy. One of these is that American

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diplomats in Iran tended in recent years to associate only with the upper crust of Iranian society, ipso facto loyal to the Shah, and that they avoided contact with dissident intellectuals and lower class groups; furthermore that this isolation from the "masses" made them oblivious to the depth of seething discontent.[4]

One cannot avoid the feeling of a certain naiveté in such an assertion. By virtue of his functions, a diplomatic representative has to associate primarily with members of the government and the ruling establishment. To seek deliberate contacts with the opposition in an authoritarian system is to court disfavor, accusations of double-dealing, and possibly an invitation to leave as a persona non grata. Moreover, it may plant a suspicion about the general policy of the diplomat's home government toward the country in which he is accredited.

As for the alleged isolation of American diplomats from the broader strata, available evidence does not seem to support this thesis. Members of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Information Service (not to mention other multifarious contacts in the business world, academia, etc.) were generally well aware of the sources of discontent and could identify various opposition groups. An extra social hour spent in the company of a well-known dissenter (a poet, a professor) would not have brought any major revelations—the themes of their grievances were so well known that they could have been predicted in considerable detail by such an American official. The only valuable piece of information that such a conversation might theoretically yield would be to learn of some actual conspiracy or plan for revolutionary action—but conspirators don't as a rule make foreign embassies privy to their plans.

A related complaint has been addressed to the inefficacy of our intelligence agencies in gauging the revolutionary mood in Iran. It seems evident that the political tidal wave of late 1978 surprised most political observers both foreign and domestic, and quite probably the revolutionary leaders themselves. But were its constituent elements not reported adequately by the CIA? And even if not, one is bound to ask whether the critics have faced up to the problems of conducting independent clandestine intelligence activities within a country that is America's formal ally—or to the disturbing question whether Congress, in a stampede of "anti-spying" puritan fervor, has not reduced, to a point of partial paralysis, the capacity of the CIA to operate according to the highest standards of professionalism.

The third controversy revolves around the heavy U.S. arms

[4] See, for example, Bill, *loc. cit.*, pp. 339–340.

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supplies to Iran, allegedly giving the wrong tilt to Iran's budgetary process and resulting in excessive concentration on unproductive weapons rather than on socially desirable programs. Considering the impressively high level of Iran's oil revenue (roughly $20 billion a year, as previously noted), and the fact that annual arms spending never exceeded some $6 billion—thus leaving a husky $14 billion or so for development—this argument does not seem very persuasive. Iran was in a fortunate position to afford both guns and butter. The basic problems of overspending and lack of proper development priorities were essentially separate from the level of military spending.

There are doubtless many lessons to be learned from what happened in Iran. I have suggested that the major factors lay in the policies of the Shah's government itself, although U.S. policy and action also played a role. But any debate on "who lost Iran?" can only tend to exaggerate the extent of U.S. influence, at least since 1963 or so, and above all to obfuscate the essentials of the situation the United States is now facing.

VII

Clearly, as of early March 1979, the final word has not yet been said in Iran. While Ayatollah Khomeini as a self-admitted "strong-man" (a designation he acknowledged in a televised interview in Paris) has appointed a cabinet headed by Mehdi Bazargan, with three deputy premiers of whom at least one has a leftist background, his initial coalition already shows signs of disintegration. The communist-leaning elements, physically entrenched on the university grounds in Teheran, are making a bid for power through attacks on the radio station, power plants and other public institutions and facilities as well as mounting an invasion of the American Embassy. Moreover, certain diehard pro-Shah elements, especially in the provinces, have not yet fully capitulated.

Even assuming that operationally Khomeini's Islamic forces will prevail in the immediate future, the rift between theocratic, liberal, and communist-leaning orientations is likely to deepen and in due time lead to further turmoil. We also should not write off completely the elements that have had a stake in the Shah's regime. Although the time-honored Persian principle of *takiyeh* (concealment of one's true thoughts and outward conformity in order to survive under adverse conditions) may lead a good many people to offer their fealty to the revolutionary leadership, their

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loyalty may prove of dubious value after the Khomeini-National Front coalition has made inevitable errors in governing and after the initial revolutionary ardor of the masses has cooled off. By the same token, there is a limit to the physical and mental durability of a leader who today heads the revolution at the age of 78. Should his charisma—which played such a major role in coalescing the disparate elements into a common front—no longer be there, it may prove very difficult to maintain not only the initial unity but power as well. Even such a seemingly farfetched alternative as the restoration of monarchy under propitious circumstances must not be written off with complete finality.

The present change to a new regime is bound to have effects on the foreign policy of Iran, and its direction has already been foreshadowed during Premier Bakhtiar's transitional period. Iran will withdraw from the CENTO Alliance, will substantially reduce its military expenditures, and will abandon its role as a "policeman in the Persian Gulf." It will establish a closer relationship with a selective set of Arab radical and Islamic states, with Colonel Qaddafi's Libya (rumored to have supported Khomeini's campaign) enjoying a place of privilege. Similarly, we may expect a closer liaison with the Palestine Liberation Organization and a hostile attitude toward Israel, as attested by the declared intention to stop supplying it with Iranian oil. This will also mean that, in contrast to the Shah's policy of divorcing production and exports of oil from politics, a new era of interrelationship between petroleum and foreign policy may be inaugurated.

As for the attitude toward the United States, some ambiguities and contradictions have already become apparent. While Ayatollah Khomeini's public pronouncements have been characterized by marked xenophobia and dark hints at "cutting off the hand of foreigners" so conspicuous in Iran, Premier Bazargan has expressed regret at the massive exodus of American specialists (compelled to leave because of the inability of the new regime to ensure their safety), no doubt realizing that a substantial segment of Iran's economy will be paralyzed due to the absence of expert management.

Assuming that the new Bazargan government does not fall to communist subversion and that it has the national survival and interest of Iran as its goal, there is no reason why a normal relationship should not be established between it and the United States. On those issues likely to provide a contrast with the Shah's policy—such as CENTO membership, the Persian Gulf, American advisers, and levels of oil production—a modus vivendi can

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certainly be found. CENTO as a collective security organization is useful but not essential. What counts more is the conceptualization of the bilateral relationship between the United States and each of its members—Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. In this relationship there is a natural mutual interest: for each of these signatory states to survive as an independent entity, the American protective "umbrella" comes into play, regardless of formal arrangements, to prevent absorption—direct or indirect—by the U.S.S.R. of these strategic territories. A change of government, however traumatic, provided it is independent, does not substantially modify this reality.

Renunciation by Iran of its hegemony over the Gulf may produce a dangerous vacuum. But this should only spur the U.S. government and Congress to give more urgent priority to strategic planning in the Indian Ocean-Gulf area and to the proper relationship with the riparian Arab states, as against the isolationist trends so conspicuous during the recent congressional debates on the Diego Garcia base and armaments.

Similarly, assuming that internal security in Iran is restored, a good number of American technicians are bound to return. Iran cannot afford to abandon half-finished projects or the already constructed factories because in the fervor of revolutionary struggle the Ayatollah opposed the presence of foreigners in the country. It has a continuing stake in employment of its workers and in development, and will be anxious to restore a respectable credit rating on international money markets. The issue of the functioning of banks—whose interest-taking is considered unlawful usury by Muslim fundamentalists—may prove thorny but not insurmountable, as the example of neighboring Saudi Arabia proves. As for oil, its probable politicization should provide a further stimulant to a rational American energy policy which, instead of imposing bureaucratic obstacles to the development of domestic resources, would encourage, through deregulation and favorable taxation, maximum efforts in the direction of research, exploration, and development.

Part of the difficulties in American-Iranian relations can be ascribed to the existence of two competing nationalist philosophies in Iran. At the time of Mosaddeq, it was claimed that he was a true nationalist while the Shah was described as a Western stooge by his Iranian and Western critics. Actually, a true nationalist is the one who not only works for the welfare of his nation but who realistically and accurately defines the greatest threat to its survival. Mosaddeq defined the empire-relinquishing Britain as Iran's

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chief enemy; in a similar vein, Ayatollah Khomeini during his press interviews in exile concentrated on the United States (and Israel!) as dangerous adversaries while passing under discreet silence the overwhelming presence of Russia to the north, as if Soviet encroachments in Gilan in 1920 and Azerbaijan in 1945 had never occurred. By contrast, the Shah identified the Soviet Union as the only real challenge to Iran's survival and, logically, sought help where it could be most effective—via close collaboration with the West.

In practice, however, Khomeini's verbal hostility toward America (attenuated by some qualifying phrases) need not be necessarily translated into sustained action. Moreover, his anti-American syndrome may be based not on a rational view of the United States as a really imperialist country bent on dominance of Iran and greedy exploitation of its resources, but rather on a broader religious-cultural foundation on which his dislike of what is foreign, secular, and modern is built. This syndrome may not be shared by such of his Western-educated collaborators as Premier Bazargan and Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi.

Moreover, the behavior of Khomeini's communist allies even during the first weeks of the revolution would seem to indicate that the initial prudence and low profile (as enjoined by Stalin) during the period of struggle against the Shah has given place to more open assertion of their true nature. The Fedayan-e Khalq and Tudeh groups have already presented demands for the formation of a "true people's army," control by workers' committees (i.e., soviets) of the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Radio and Television, recognition of elected representatives of strike committees as the core of the revolutionary movement in Iran, and dismissal of the newly appointed commander of the air force, General Said Mahduddin, as "the pawn of the old regime." This bold coming into the open (thus far, however, with no identified leadership) is bound to give some sobering thoughts to the new revolutionary government.

Much of this scenario of future American-Iranian relations is, as has been repeatedly stressed in these lines, based on the assumption that (a) the religious-National Front coalition will prevail in the contest for power with the Communists, and (b) order and tranquillity will be restored to the country in a reasonably good time. At this stage it would be hazardous to make firm predictions with respect to both matters.

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VIII

Even on the best (or least unfavorable) assumptions concerning the new regime in Iran and U.S.-Iran relations, there can be no doubt that the United States now faces serious challenges to its basic interests in the Middle East. The Northern Tier, toward which U.S. policy—having contributed to its freedom from Soviet encroachments and internal stability—could have been termed successful till the mid-1970s, is in a state of disarray, with Afghanistan subjected to a Marxist regime, Turkey suffering dissension, and Iran in the throes of revolutionary turmoil, the outcome of which was (and still is) difficult to predict.

Access to oil is now subject to double jeopardy, partly because of the politicization of oil policies by the producing states (as attested in differing ways by the 1973 Arab embargo and the 1978–79 Iranian stoppage), and partly because the main routes of access have become more vulnerable than ever: with Iran's power in safeguarding the security of the Strait of Hormuz seriously disrupted, with the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb dangerously wedged between the Marxist-dominated states of South Yemen and Ethiopia, the pipelines to the Mediterranean from Iraq and Saudi Arabia subject to the whims of transit countries, and the Suez Canal—despite its reactivation in 1976—still vulnerable to any new outbreak of hostilities should efforts at the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict fail. And behind all of this looms the power of the Soviet Union either directly, through the local political groups subject to its guidance, or through such proxies as Cuba and East Germany, both particularly busy in South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. One does not have to be a Saudi Arabian to view this increasing Soviet presence—direct and indirect—as an encircling movement stretching in a broad arc from Afghanistan to the southern reaches of the Red Sea.

Inevitably, the new situation in Iran, and in the Northern Tier of which it remains the keystone, is closely linked to events in the Arab world. There, in recent years, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—both under prudent and moderate leaderships—have emerged as two principal anchors of American presence in the Arab world. Each of them is playing its own specialized role in influencing the events in the region: Saudi Arabia with its religious posture, money, and oil; and Egypt with its manpower, military capacity, and cultural leadership. Since President Sadat's advent to power, both have tended to cooperate with each other, in contrast to the fratricidal conflict of the Nasser era. Together, they possess an impressive potential for stemming the tide of radicalism and

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keeping the channels of contact with the West intact. However, both their mutual solidarity and their survival as regimes dedicated to peace and moderation are not assured.

A first essential for American policy is to convey the strongest possible assurances to both countries. The most immediate occasion for such action is the conflict between North and South Yemen, which apparently bulked large in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's discussions of February 1979 with the Saudi government.

Unfortunately the problem of restoring American credibility in the Middle East goes far deeper than such measures, however useful they are in themselves. The overthrow of the Shah has dealt a further serious blow to that credibility, regardless of how one allocates the responsibility for what happened. But the roots of the problem go back to the proclaiming of détente in the early 1970s as a basic American policy. Fundamental causes of tension such as the Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe and Soviet efforts to upset the status quo outside the extended Soviet empire through the support of revolutionary and "national liberation" movements have not only continued but, it appears, been ratified by the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and accentuated by subsequent Soviet behavior in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. The United States, and the West generally, have appeared to extend a series of unilateral concessions, and have been unable to prevent or reduce Soviet advances in a number of strategic areas in the Third World, including Angola and Ethiopia.[5] And the picture has been compounded within the United States by the decrying of arms sales and by the all-too-effective campaign to discredit and dismantle American intelligence services—tools of policy the United States had employed constructively in the Middle East over the years.

The reversal of these trends, and the restoration of a strong American posture in the Middle East, will not be accomplished

[5] An Iranian newspaper publisher put these thoughts in the following way in a private conversation with the author in 1978: "We believed in and respected America for her ideals of human freedom, for her imposing achievements in providing the highest standard of living for the masses anywhere in human history, and for her firmness and resolution in dealing with threats to those values. We respected and admired America for your stand in saving Iran in 1945, in rescuing Berlin in 1948, in insisting that Israel should abandon its conquests in Sinai in 1956, in landing your troops in Lebanon in 1958, and in expelling the Soviets from Cuba in 1962. But since Vietnam we have witnessed in the last decade a series of retreats and defeats in many parts of the world." Even if this may appear as an oversimplified view of international politics after World War II, the point is that it largely reflects the current perception of America's power and influence among friends and enemies alike. The deteriorating position of the dollar—once an eloquent symbol of America's might—has further contributed to this perception.

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overnight or by any single action. It remains of critical importance.

Finally, while the general malaise of the Arab world may be ascribed to a number of causes, the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to provide its central focus. In the spring of 1977, responsible Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, welcomed President Carter's outline of three basic principles for a peaceful settlement: (a) withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories with only minor modifications of the 1967 boundaries (thus echoing Secretary of State William Rogers' proposals of 1969); (b) full peace, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, between Israel and its Arab neighbors (thus exceeding U.N. resolution 242 which spoke only of the end to belligerent status); and (c) a "homeland" for the Palestinian people. The latter expression, though not devoid of some ambivalence, had nevertheless a connotation of ultimate self-determination, in consonance with the trends of the twentieth century, an era of decolonization and emancipation.

Unfortunately, to these same countries, the Camp David agreements seemed to represent a falling away from these principles. From this standpoint Premier Begin had emerged victorious in the contest of wills between him and the other two leaders. As an astute politician and tough negotiator, he could derive considerable satisfaction from seeing his own plan (initially presented to Sadat in December 1977) and that of former Foreign Minister Allon accepted in their essential parts: Israel would obtain a virtual separate peace treaty with Egypt, would merely grant internal administrative autonomy to "the inhabitants" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would only redeploy its forces in these areas without withdrawing them, would make no commitment as to the nonproliferation of Jewish settlements, and would retain the right of veto over Arab immigration into the stipulated autonomous territories. Moreover, there was no provision for a linkage between the agreement concerning Egypt and that referring to the Palestinian areas.

The rejection of the agreements at the Baghdad meeting in the fall of 1978 was predictable, and it was notable that Saudi Arabia voted for the Baghdad decisions despite its general position of support for Sadat as leader of Egypt. Inevitably, the Saudi position has tended to harden in the wake of the Iran revolution.

As of early March 1979, efforts to conclude an Egyptian-Israeli Treaty appear to be at a climactic stage. But even if this should be accomplished, it will only have moved the problem to a further stage in which the initial tests will include whether clearcut autonomy is granted in the West Bank and Gaza.

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The basic option for the United States is whether to acquiesce in Israel's territorial acquisitions at a time when key Arab countries come forth with peace initiatives. As noted, the stability and survival of moderate Egyptian and Saudi Arabian leaderships may ultimately depend on the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the same token, a lasting settlement of the complex Lebanese imbroglio with its upsetting effect on the entire region is hardly conceivable without resolving the fate of displaced Palestinians. As for the latter, the major challenge for Washington will be whether to recognize the reality (admitted even by Israel's Moshe Dayan) of the Palestine Liberation Organization and, through diplomatic contacts, explore with it various avenues toward peace. The formalistic argument that any contact with the PLO is out of the question so long as it engages in terrorism and calls for the demise of Israel as a state should be subjected to close scrutiny. The United States has favored opening the channels of communication with various terrorist and guerrilla groups in North and Black Africa at one time or another, and the question arises whether the peace-making process would really gain by making the PLO an exception. It does not require prophetic vision to predict that public manifestations of cordiality between the non-Arab Ayatollah Khomeini and the PLO's Arafat are likely to put even greater pressures on Arab states in defense of the Palestinian cause.

In a broader sense—always accepting as a given that the existence and security of Israel are not in question insofar as the United States is concerned—the issue is whether American policy should or should not run counter to the principle of self-determination in the Middle East, a principle which is being supported vigorously in Africa. This appears to be a basic issue which, if mishandled by Washington, is likely to further estrange the Arab world from America, enormously complicate the position of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, deepen radical trends, and open more widely the gates to influences hostile to the United States and the Free World at large.

IX

So one returns in the end to the fundamental principles that guided postwar American policy in the Northern Tier and by extension in the rest of the Middle East—above all the principle of national self-determination.

With regard to the Northern Tier, much that has happened cannot be easily reversed, but there is no reason to abandon these

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countries to their own fate and to signal in advance America's uncritical acquiescence to disintegrating trends or to communist penetration. In Iran the overriding issue today is whether the present government should be looked at as a mere Kerensky-style prelude to further deterioration or whether it will find ways of restoring order and stability under non-communist auspices. There is no doubt that with the departure of the Shah, the West has lost an ally whose concepts of international security closely coincided with its own and that, to borrow George Ball's phrase addressed to Israel, the dilemma for Washington and its allies will be "how to save Iran in spite of herself."

More broadly, in the Northern Tier any genuinely nationalist regime, i.e., a regime striving to safeguard its independence, should be considered eligible for normalization of relations with the United States and such cooperation as may be required to assure its orderly development. Should any violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity by its more powerful neighbors occur, no useful purpose would be served by concealing them—in the name of détente—from the American public or downgrading their importance.

And, in the same way, adherence to the principle of self-determination in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is basic to assisting the moderate leaderships in the Middle East to make themselves credible in the eyes of their people, and thus to beat back external or externally supported threats to their survival. The factors that have made the arc of crisis an area of vital national interest to the United States are, if anything, stronger today than they have ever been. The task of helping to restore fair peace and stability in the area is harder than it has been; it is critical that it be tackled anew from a firm basis of principle.

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R. K. Ramazani

SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Who should maintain the future security of the Persian Gulf? This question looms large in the minds of policymakers in the United States, Western Europe, Japan and, of course, the Persian Gulf states. The fact that this question is raised with a deep sense of urgency in numerous capitals of the world indicates the extent to which Iran was perceived as having ensured Gulf security before the outbreak of its recent revolution. Although American rhetoric spoke of pursuing a "twin-pillar policy," the United States itself actually relied primarily on Iran to perform the role of the "policeman" for the Gulf region.

Prior to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the perception of Iran as the main protector of Gulf security was reinforced by the American reluctance to fill the power vacuum left by Britain as a result of its historic decision to withdraw forces in 1971 from the area "east of Suez," including the Persian Gulf. As the most populous and the strongest military power in the area and as the main country straddling the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which some 57 percent of world oil trade must pass to world markets, Iran was willing to undertake the burden of responsibility for Gulf security—the immediate problem then being the creation of a federation of the Trucial and other small states near the entrance to the Gulf.

When Saudi Arabia emerged as a world financial power after the 1973 war, it seemed for a time to be regarded as the "linchpin" of American policy in the Persian Gulf. The Carter Administration in particular seemed to have some preference for the financial power of Saudi Arabia as contrasted with the military power of Iran. In fact, however, the idea died on the vine. Saudi Arabia lacked the population and military power necessary for playing a major security role in the Gulf region, and in any case Riyadh was unwilling to undertake such a role.

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But Saudi Arabia was willing, especially after the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, to use its monetary prowess in support of a more active diplomacy, as a means of neutralizing the influence of such "radical" states as South Yemen and Iraq and bolstering the governments of such "moderate" states as Oman, North Yemen and Egypt. Although Saudi dollar diplomacy was extended to states located outside as well as within the Persian Gulf, it complemented the Iranian security role in the Gulf area. Saudi Arabia's increasingly active diplomacy, added to Iran's security policy, poured concrete meaning into the hitherto empty rhetoric of an American "twin-pillar policy."

Plainly, Iran will no longer act in any sense as a pillar of American policy in the Persian Gulf. Even before the short-lived government of Dr. Bakhtiar was formed, he told the United States that a future government in Iran would abandon Iran's "policeman" role and would confine its security concerns to the defense of the country's national boundaries. Now, with the Khomeini forces precariously allied with the Bazargan government, this policy seems nailed down. In response, Washington circles appeared to be weighing two possible alternatives. One was to search for a new "second pillar," on the assumption that Saudi Arabia would now be willing to play some Gulf-wide security role, but could not do so alone even if it were willing, because of its small population and still low levels of military and underlying economic strength. On this view, despite its geographic distance from the Persian Gulf proper, Egypt loomed as a desirable candidate partly because it shares the Saudi concerns with the perceived Soviet and communist threats to the region around the Red Sea.

The other initial idea about Gulf security was a spin-off from a larger conception of American security which called for reliance on "regional influentials," to borrow the phrase of the National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. India would presumably qualify as such a regional power center in the Indian Ocean with its twin arms of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Most recently, however, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to the Middle East in February 1979 has suggested a new American security formula in the Middle East that may be broader than either of these. Clearly, it is a formula for a more forward American policy, overturning the previous more distant approach of the Carter as well as Nixon and Ford Administrations toward the Persian Gulf. His pronouncements were intended particularly to assuage Saudi anxieties that had been intensified largely by the perceived American failure to support the Shah's

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regime, in the context of a background of perceived Soviet and communist gains in Afghanistan and especially in the Horn of Africa. But they also went further than ever before in warning the Soviet Union that the United States would not tolerate any future threat to vital American interests in the region either as a result of overt Soviet incursions or Soviet-supported communist coups in the Gulf states, and in signaling to Moscow that the United States is committed to a growing military and economic relationship with "pro-Western" governments of the Middle East toward the same end.

Apparently, what is now envisaged would include a sharp increase of American military supplies and economic aid to "pro-Western" governments outside the Gulf as well as within it, including Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, the Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Saudi Arabia would be expected under the new formula to play a more prominent military and economic role in the small states of the lower Persian Gulf. Significantly, the new formula would also include the expansion of a "quick-strike force" of American paratroopers and marines (an idea first broached by Secretary Brown a year earlier) to be used in case of a request for help by Saudi Arabia or other oil-producing Gulf states threatened with the turmoil of a Soviet-supported coup. Moreover, it would possibly involve the construction of more port facilities for major American ships in the Indian Ocean naval base of Diego Garcia. However, President Carter stated at the end of February that American bases in the Middle East itself are not envisioned.

II

This new American commitment to the future security of the Persian Gulf has clear advantages and disadvantages. If in fact it clarifies the intention and resolve to defend vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, it may well reduce the chances of Soviet miscalculation and simultaneously assure American friends and allies of the U.S. commitment to their independence.

One need not be a doctrinaire student of geopolitics to realize, in the light of actual Soviet behavior, that ever since the end of World War II Moscow has sought to expand its power and influence—at the expense of the West in general and the United States in particular—in a widening circle of regional states lying south of Soviet borders. The Soviet thrust, first into the Northern Tier, and then into the Eastern Mediterranean, has since 1968 been extended into the Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf area. Its principal instruments have included the encouragement of nation-

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alization of Western oil companies and the acquisition of oil and gas privileges for the Soviet Union, propaganda attacks on the CENTO alliance and American military sales, transfer of Soviet arms, support for national liberation movements, massive infusion of Soviet and Cuban arms supplies and military personnel, encouragement of communist participation in national-front governments and support for communist coups. Now the potential for Soviet and communist pressure on the states located in and around the Persian Gulf has increased substantially as a consequence of the Iranian revolution. Anti-American sentiments have been fomented by Soviet propaganda, and there are emerging signs of Soviet influence on militant leftist elements in Iran.

The other great advantage of the emerging American security posture is the apparent reversal of the decade-old reliance of the United States on one or two local powers to maintain regional security. The indiscriminate sale of billions of dollars worth of arms to the Shah's regime had been justified as a way to avoid the commitment of American troops to the defense of the strategic Persian Gulf. To be sure, the Shah's own preoccupation with military strength underpinned his enormous purchases of sophisticated military equipment, but U.S. eagerness to comply with Iranian requests during the Nixon Administration paved the way for the massive transfer of arms once the explosion of oil revenues made this financially possible for Iran and economically profitable for the United States. However one evaluates the diverse causes of the Iranian revolution, there is little doubt that these unrestrained arms transactions contributed to its outbreak. They not only diverted badly needed funds from social and economic projects, but also placed unprecedented burdens on Iranian skilled manpower resources and economic and communication infrastructures.

And the new American commitment to the economic and military strength of half a dozen states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and secondarily North Yemen and the Sudan) seems a healthy corrective to the previous temptation to treat Saudi Arabia as the "linchpin" of American policy in the whole Gulf area.

There are, however, several disadvantages in the nascent American security posture. One is the potential polarization of the Middle East into camps of "pro-Western" and other nations. Secretary Brown's new prescription would seem to suffer potentially from all the previous shortcomings of American security policy in the Middle East, especially since the creation of the

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Baghdad Pact (subsequently the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO). His commitment to the security of the "pro-Western" regimes in the Middle East, like Secretary Dulles' commitment to the Northern Tier states in the 1950s, may be portrayed as a new American effort for the "enslavement" of Middle Eastern governments. And his planned American "quick-strike force" that would come, on request, to the aid of any government threatened by a Soviet-supported coup smacks of the ill-fated Eisenhower Doctrine that allowed the United States to go to the aid, also on request, of any pro-Western government threatened by "international communism." That doctrine was invoked by a Middle Eastern government only in one instance, the Lebanese crisis of 1958, and in hindsight the cost of its invocation far exceeded the actual benefit. Neither the Eisenhower Administration nor the Chamoun government gained in the long or even the medium term from American intervention in that earlier Lebanese civil war. It simultaneously increased popular resentment against the United States and deepened ancient communal divisions within Lebanese society.

A second potential disadvantage is the intensification of arms transfers to the Middle East. No aspect of past American security policy in the Middle East has been subjected to greater criticism. Whatever the short-term financial benefits of unrestrained arms sales, on balance indiscriminate arms supplies can contribute more to destabilization than stabilization of the region. This apparent new American commitment to a sharp increase in arms supplies also raises serious questions about President Carter's often repeated, but still unfulfilled, goal of limiting the sale of arms worldwide.

A third shortcoming of the new American security formula is the possibility that it may hobble efforts to achieve security in the Persian Gulf, by linking them to the extremely difficult Arab-Israeli peacemaking process. These efforts aim at two quite different objectives: to align the "pro-Western" Gulf regimes with the United States; and to break the deadlock on peace negotiations. The increased American security commitment to Israel as well as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia is intended to attain both objectives. However, as a result of this coupling, the more easily attainable objective of future security in the Persian Gulf will almost certainly be obstructed by the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict.

However, the greatest shortcoming of the new American security scheme is that it addresses threats to Gulf security that may be more hypothetical than potential. The United States has made it

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emphatically clear, and rightly so, that the American commitment is intended for defense against "external threats." This appears to exclude threats emanating from within the region as well as internal coups—unless either is supported by the Soviet Union. As a consequence, two of the more likely sources of instability and conflict in the Persian Gulf are not covered.

First, let us take domestic crises. If the Iranian revolution has taught us nothing else, it should have made clear that the sources of domestic conflict and upheaval in the Persian Gulf societies are more pressing than hitherto anticipated. Unlike the Dhofari rebellion in Oman that received ample Soviet and communist support both directly and indirectly, the Iranian opposition was transformed into a full-scale and bloody revolution within a year primarily as a result of misguided and disastrously executed economic, social and political decisions of the indigenous elite. As early as 1972, and repeatedly thereafter, I warned that international capability was no true substitute for internal political stability in Iran no matter how actively it tried to project its power abroad in the pursuit of its national objectives.[1] Without any significant outside aid, thousands of strikers and millions of street demonstrators finally brought down with their bare hands one of the world's best-equipped military forces. It is not likely that Saudi Arabia, for example, will face the challenge of internal communism; it hardly has a native proletariat. But there is ample reason to envisage the outbreak of a genuine indigenous internal convulsion to which the present American security scheme would be irrelevant.

Second, this scheme would not bear directly on the containment of regional conflicts. The Persian Gulf region is as rich in potential conflicts as in oil, although, as we shall see, the Gulf states have had a remarkable record of peaceful settlement of their disputes. The spillover of conflicts from the more conflict-prone adjacent areas into the Gulf region proper is also a major problem. The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the Arab oil embargo and the explosion of oil prices have been followed by the growth of unprecedented social and economic ties between the Gulf states proper and other Middle East societies on the one hand and South Asian nations on the other. It is difficult to envisage a future Arab-Israeli war that would not quickly spread to the Gulf area as a result of Saudi Arabian arms transfers to the Arab confrontation states, or an Israeli preventive or preemptive attack on

[1] See R. K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972, pp. 96–102.

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Saudi Arabia. It would also seem more likely today than, for example, in 1971, that a conflict in South Asia would swiftly spread to the Gulf area—probably not as a result of another Indo-Pakistani war but of an armed conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan or Afghanistan and Iran. Again, a political upheaval in Afghanistan or Pakistan, or a separatist movement in Baluchistan or Pushtunistan, would be likely to spill over into the Gulf.

On balance, therefore, the new American security formula could at best aid the objective of security in the Persian Gulf only indirectly, peripherally and partially. The American commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia against "external threat" and internal Soviet-supported coups seems to address, in the last analysis, two hypothetical threats emanating from the Soviet Union, and the increased U.S. security commitment to Egypt, Israel and Jordan can hardly contribute to the solution of the urgent problem of security in the Persian Gulf proper.

The uninterrupted flow of oil supplies to the world is the pivotal problem, and the bulk of the Gulf oil, including Saudi oil, must pass through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, whose security must be our paramount concern. Furthermore, the Iranian revolution has shown for the first time that the disruption of oil supplies can be used as an instrument of domestic political coercion by a non-communist opposition and that it can have as adverse an effect on oil exports as an oil embargo. Without necessarily implying that oil workers in other Gulf states are susceptible to the same kind of call for strikes as in Iran, the main point is that Secretary Brown's emerging security formula would be clearly inadequate as a deterrent against potential threats to oil supplies arising from both domestic crises and regional conflicts in the heart of the oilfields and in the main artery of oil transportation.

III

The most effective way to cope with domestically and regionally based threats would be for the Persian Gulf states themselves to continue their own search for indigenous security arrangements. This search is all the more appropriate at this particular time when the sense of a common security concern has heightened to an unprecedented degree in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Any indigenous security arrangements made at the initiative of the Gulf states themselves could have the full support of the United States if the local states should so desire. Such arrangements could prove more effective not only against domestic and regional threats, but also against Soviet threats if the local states

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should choose to seek American and other Western support.

The problem with Secretary Brown's security formula for the Persian Gulf is not merely the shortcomings discussed above. Equally important, its existence might cause the United States to overlook the great potential for indigenous regional security arrangements in the area. A wide variety of considerations now seem conducive to the definition of common security problems in the Gulf, the adoption of common security strategies, and ultimately the creation of common procedures and institutions for the collective attainment of common objectives.

First of all, the Persian Gulf is a distinct and compact region. Geographically it is an "arm" of the Indian Ocean and a "finger" of the Middle East. These two larger regions are relatively undefinable, but the Gulf area is physically set apart as a shallow and narrow semi-enclosed sea. It is connected to the high seas only by the strategic Strait of Hormuz, squeezed between the Iranian shore and the Omani tip of the Musandum Peninsula.

Second, all Persian Gulf states have a vital stake in freedom of navigation and the control of pollution. The Gulf's special geographic features have been acknowledged repeatedly at international conferences on the law of the sea as a justification for the adoption of special regional regulations. Because of its limited access to the Gulf waters, Iraq has been the greatest advocate of the concept of "transit passage" through the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran as one of the straits states has favored a kind of "regulated transit passage," and Oman as the other straits state has insisted on the application of the traditional concept of "innocent passage" to the strait. Despite such divergencies regarding the details, however, all eight Gulf states share a deep sense of obligation with respect to the maintenance of secure and unimpeded navigation. The Gulf waters constitute not only their main trade artery and the vital route for their oil exports, but also an increasingly important source of their food supplies. Because they share the shallow and narrow waters and navigable channels of the Gulf, the littoral states also share a deep sense of common concern with the problem of pollution.

Third, all the Gulf states have a heightened interest in social and economic development projects. The revolutionary rise in oil revenues has financed ambitious economic development projects particularly in the large oil-producing states of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Iraq. The Iranian revenues increased from $194 million in 1972 to $22 billion in 1974, and their massive infusion into the economy lay at the heart of the social and economic

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dislocations that in combination with political repression and unprecedented corruption led to revolution. Saudi Arabia has also launched an extremely ambitious economic development plan (1976-1980) that calls for a spectacular $140-billion expenditure. Saudi society is now having to grapple with the side effects of swift modernization. The signs of rapid inflation, corruption and waste are already visible and their adverse political consequences cannot be ruled out. The Gulf states in general have in common the blight as well as the blessing of sudden wealth.

Fourth, all the Gulf states are prone to internal political upheaval, but the larger oil producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, are more susceptible to political convulsion.

It would, however, be a mistake to predict the rise of a religious opposition against the Saudi royal family on the model of that in Iran. The danger of this kind of analogy is increased by talk about the phenomenon of the so-called "resurgence of Islam." To be sure, the signs of religiously based political opposition are everywhere to be seen in the Muslim world, from Mauritania to Malaysia, but two points should be borne in mind in order to avoid drawing false analogies. First, the relationship of the religious leaders (the ulama) and the wielders of political power has been generally different in the Sunni, as contrasted with the Shi'i, communities. For example, the ulama in Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not been so completely kept out of the political process as they were in Iran. Second, the Iranian revolution probably owes much of its fervor and zeal to the character of Shi'ism as a historically revolutionary, messianic and legitimistic movement. The anti-establishmentarian thrust of Shi'i Islam is also marked by a perpetual drive for social justice and equality hallowed by an ethos of martydom that is unparalleled in the larger world of Sunni Islam.

The doctrinal-political differences between Shi'i and Sunni Islam do not of course preclude the rise of religiously based opposition in the Sunni communities, whether secularized as in Turkey or traditional as in Saudi Arabia. What will make the real difference, however, are the basic human conditions, as one learns from the Iranian experience. All Gulf regimes would face potential internal political explosions if their peoples felt dissatisfied, hopeless and resentful of great disparities in wealth and power.

Fifth, the Gulf states share not only a common aspiration for economic modernization, and an uncertain political future, but also an urge for the control of their own destiny in world politics. Political awakening is the hallmark of every Gulf society at a

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crucial time when the outside world increasingly covets their oil, their most precious and finite natural resource. Many of them have enjoyed the status of independent states for less than a decade, and all of them share the desire to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence in the future. The West in general, they know, is committed to the maintenance of their political independence. For this fundamental reason none of them is likely to become permanently "anti-Western." Just as the Iranians have risen to challenge their excessive dependence on the West in general and the United States in particular, Iraq has begun to question its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union. On balance, suspicion of the Soviet Union is prevalent in the Gulf societies and the perception of a common threat from Moscow is yet another potential element of commonality among them.

IV

Despite all these factors of commonality, would it be realistically possible for the Gulf rulers and governments to develop a sense of common security responsibility? Since all the peoples of the Gulf are Muslim, would it be posssible to develop such a sense out of their common faith? The commonality of faith in general is counterbalanced by the division between the Sunni and the Shi'i communities in the Gulf area. Most Iranians and more than half of the Arab population of Iraq are the followers of Shi'i Islam. Given the fact that these are the two most populous nations of the Gulf, the Shi'i believers numerically predominate in the Gulf.

However, Saudi Arabia, though with a much smaller population, is the site of two of the most holy places in Islam (Mecca and Medina), the birthplace of Islam and the home of a distinctively puritanical branch of Islam (Wahhabism). Furthermore, this sectarian division is compounded by the cultural disparity between Arabs and Iranians. For these reasons, therefore, Islam is unlikely to play a unifying role in the Gulf and might at times exacerbate regional differences.

Yet, as noted in the previous section, there are cohesive factors that do counterbalance these ancient sectarian and cultural divisions. Those elements of cohesion are more "modern," in the sense that they largely represent the ethos of the "world culture," one that knows no boundaries of religion, culture and race. It is a culture in the process of worldwide diffusion and is based on "advanced technology, and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and, above all else, on the acceptance in the

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political realm of the belief that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation-state."[2] Will these states that are in the process of becoming modern nations in this age of rampant nationalism be able to develop in practice extensive ties translatable over time into an obligation to maintain their security collectively?

This important question should be addressed on the basis of the experience of the Persian Gulf states themselves. Most of these have attained the status of independent and sovereign political entities only recently. Nevertheless, their past interrelationships contain an important clue to their future ability to cooperate with each other.

Fortunately, the Gulf states, as contrasted with the Arab confrontation states and Israel, have not been plagued with the kind of intractable conflict that has plunged those countries into four wars in 30 years. The most remarkable fact about the experience of the Gulf states, on the contrary, is their demonstrated ability to settle peacefully numerous multifaceted, overlapping and interlocking disputes in a short span of time. These include the Bahrain settlement (1970), the historic Iraq-Iran conflict resolution (1975), and a series of other agreements between Iran and every Arab state of the Gulf and between the Arab states themselves, like the important agreement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia over the land boundary in the Neutral Zone, and between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi oasis.

Why should there be this predilection for peaceful settlement of disputes in the Persian Gulf? My own examination of the record suggests that the impressive web of agreements that the Gulf states have developed over the years has been rooted in the imperative of practical necessity. Given the universal urge for social and economic development in the area, on the basis of uninterrupted income from oil and in the face of the nightmare of oil depletion, the Gulf states have accorded regional security the highest priority because they are, in the last analysis, hostages of each other.

Armed conflict diverts scarce resources from economic development in any society, but in the Gulf area it would destroy the very foundation of economic betterment and political survival. The dramatic settlement of the conflict between Iraq and Iran is the best illustration of the influence of this all-important mutual

[2] See Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston: Little Brown, 1966, p. 8. I have called attention to the utility of Professor Pye's concept of "world culture" with respect to the study of modernization and Islam. See R. K. Ramazani (Guest Editorial), "Islamic Studies: A Concept and Approach," *The Muslim World*, October, 1968, pp. 279–283.

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vulnerability on the security behavior of the Gulf states. After decades of smoldering hostility, Iran and Iraq decided to resolve their ancient and festering conflict as soon as it became clear that armed skirmishes might finally lead to an all-out war that would result in the mutual destruction of their oil facilities and the disruption of their oil exports.

The experience of the Gulf states also reveals that they have in fact gone beyond the avoidance of armed conflict and the peaceful settlement of disputes in their search for regional security. Ever since the settlement of the Shatt al-Arab dispute between Iraq and Iran in 1975, the Gulf leaders have pressed forward for mutual defense cooperation despite a number of setbacks. In that year their foreign ministers first discussed in Jiddah the possibility of plans for mutual defense against external threats, and also, significantly, mutual aid in case of internal coups. Subsequent developments in the Horn of Africa and the coup in Afghanistan intensified their common concern with the advance of Soviet power and influence around the Persian Gulf. This concern reached a new peak by the middle of 1978 when Iraq began to share the Saudi and Iranian perceptions of the threat to their security. The Shah and the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, even held "security consultations."

Has the Iranian revolution increased or decreased the chances for further development of a security consensus in the Persian Gulf area? The answer will, of course, partly depend on the outcome of the revolution, but, assuming that an Islamic republic in some form is established, a best-case and a worst-case scenario may be envisaged.

The best case would be an Iran turned inward but still clearly anti-communist, which confined its security perimeter to the defense of Iranian national boundaries, pursued a hands-off policy in the Gulf, and concentrated its energies on badly needed domestic economic reconstruction and political consolidation. Such a regime would presumably pull the remaining Iranian troups out of Oman (if it has not already done so). It would perhaps try to settle the Iranian disputes with the Sheikh of Sharjah over the Gulf island of Abu Musa and with the Sheikh of Ra's al-Khaymeh over the two Tunbs.

If so, the atmosphere for regional cooperation in the Gulf area would certainly improve. The Shah's overbearing manner often alienated Iran's neighbors, and the decline in Iranian assertiveness (as well as military power) could contribute to better relations and a fully shared perception of the external threat. The dramatic

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change already evident in Iran's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict would also ease past tensions between the Arab states of the Gulf and Iran over the Shah's favorable policy toward Israel. The new regime's embrace of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), however, would not necessarily endear it to all Arab states, including some in the Gulf area. In fact, if the new regime should push its association with the PLO too far it might indeed alienate several leading Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as long as they have "moderate" regimes.

At worst, the new regime could turn outward virulently. If the Shah's Gulf policy was inspired by the glories of ancient Persia, the new regime's might be influenced by the golden age of Islam. Pan-Shi'ism would embitter Iran's relations with not only the anti-Shi'i Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, but also the Sunni Baathist minority of Iraq who dominate the Iraqi Shi'i majority. Any outward thrust by a new Iranian regime would surely sour Iran's relations with its major Gulf neighbors.

In either case the importance of Iran for the future security of the Persian Gulf would continue. Under the best-case scenario, the Gulf states and Iran might finally be able to develop a sense of common obligation to maintain their security against external threats and internal subversion and coups, and Iran's cooperation would be of critical importance. However, should Iran prefer to stay out of any collective security arrangement, there would be no reason for the Arab states of the Gulf to abandon past efforts toward the adoption of common security arrangements that would stand them in good stead even if Iran's security concerns were confined to the defense of its own territory and maritime interests.

V

The United States should not only encourage local initiatives toward security arrangements and be prepared to assist the regional states to achieve their own common security goals, but should also try to persuade other advanced industrial countries in OECD to join in common efforts to develop both economic and security ties with a prospective group of Gulf states if they choose to invite Western support. The United States, as contrasted with its NATO allies, is much less dependent on Persian Gulf oil. The Strait of Hormuz is potentially a global chokepoint largely because of the great dependence of Western Europe and Japan on Persian Gulf oil. (The socialist world's dependence on Gulf oil is relatively

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minimal at the present time, although it may well increase in the near future.) There is no convincing reason why the United States should try to go it alone in forging economic and security ties with a prospective group of regional states in the Persian Gulf. But there are all sorts of good reasons for doing so in cooperation with some other oil-consuming nations of the Western world.

Existing economic and military ties with the Gulf states, of course, already involve the OECD governments and corporations. This is partly due to the common interest of the Gulf states in diversifying the sources of their technology imports despite a general preference for American know-how. The European Community as a whole is a significant market for the Gulf states because of geographic proximity and the lesser cost of transportation, as well as traditional patterns of trade. As has been revealed in Euro-Arab and European-Iranian dialogues, this market would be of the greatest interest to Iran and Saudi Arabia for the future export of their petrochemicals. Western Europe has also been an important source of military equipment for the Gulf states. This is again the result of their determination to diversify their sources of arms, despite a general preference for American military equipment, especially sophisticated weapons.

Second, although an American near-monopoly of arms supplies to the Gulf states would help our balance-of-payments deficit, the long-term cost is too great. Our excessive military sales to Iran became a major target of religious and political opposition to the Shah's regime not only because of the perceived economic and social harm involved, but also because they symbolized the military and political commitment of the United States to the survival of an unpopular regime. A prudent future arms sales policy would have a better chance of success if the Gulf states understood that despite their preference for American arms, the United States and its allies were committed to spreading the sale of military equipment among themselves. Such a common Western arms policy might reduce the pressure on Washington from the Gulf states for excessive amounts of American arms.

Third, and finally, increased bilateral partnerships between the United States and individual Gulf states that seem bound to result under Secretary Brown's new security formula would tend to entail even greater American omnipresence in the Gulf region, whereas the Iranian revolution has shown that this should be all the more avoided. Excessive presence of nationals from any one nation would inevitably become unpalatable to indigenous populations, not only as a perceived infringement on their political

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independence, but also an imagined affront to their cultural and religious values.

VI

In sum, a comprehensive economic and security partnership between a group of Gulf and OECD countries along the lines suggested in this essay would in the long run better contribute to the processes of regional order as well as peacemaking in the Middle East than would the security formula of Secretary Brown. Since the chances of regional cooperation are far greater in the Persian Gulf sub-area than in the Arab-Israeli zone of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf model of indigenous security arrangements could be expanded subsequently to include the other interested states, including Israel, when the Arab-Israeli conflict is satisfactorily resolved.[3]

Moreover, comprehensive security cooperation among a group of Gulf and OECD states would place the United States in a better position to pursue the larger long-term goal of establishing "rules of the game" between the superpowers in the Middle East. Without the threat of the Soviet hand on the economic throat of the Western industrial democracies and Japan at the Strait of Hormuz, the United States would eventually be able to enter into negotiations with Moscow from a position of strength. These would be aimed at the threefold objective of mutual reduction of arms supplies to the Middle East, mutual limitations on naval deployment and use of base facilities in areas adjacent to the Gulf, and mutual acceptance of restraints on direct and indirect intervention in local conflicts in and around the Persian Gulf.

In the foreseeable future, however, the vital interests of the industrial democracies and those of the Gulf states, which are basically compatible, must be protected by means of any combination of skillful multilateral and alliance diplomacy that the realities of the situation permit. The challenge to American leadership is unmistakeably clear. The courage and resourcefulness with which it is met today will make a significant difference to world peace and prosperity to the end of the century.

[3] I argued before the Iranian revolution that American policymakers should not compartmentalize the Middle Eastern problems into those of the Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf sub-areas as if they are separable, since the problem of order-building is universal in the entire Middle East. See R. K. Ramazani, *Beyond the Arab-Israeli Settlement: New Directions for U.S. Policy in the Middle East,* Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977.

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Robert Stobaugh
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AFTER THE SECOND SHOCK: PRAGMATIC ENERGY STRATEGIES

Almost exactly five years after the first oil shock, the second began. The parts of the puzzle are arranged quite differently this time around, but the two central pieces are the same. The upheaval in Iran has meant an interruption of supply and a loss to world production already as great as that from the 1973 embargo; the tight world oil market which had been predicted, just last fall, only for the mid-1980s or beyond is already upon us. And, as a direct result, the OPEC countries—which in December 1978 had already announced a substantial price rise during 1979—are further increasing prices.

It is, of course, too soon to say whether this second shock will be as great an earthquake as that of 1973–74. But it has certainly dramatized anew how great is the insecurity that results from the United States depending to the present degree on the Middle Eastern producers. It also reminds us again how it is the "accidents," which cannot be put into an economist's equation, that reshape the market.

Within the United States, this second shock should bring to an end what had become an increasingly powerful tendency to pronounce the energy crisis a thing of the past, to discount the possibility of a second shock and instead to project scenarios depicting a glut of oil on the world market. In particular, it spotlights the steady rise in American oil imports, from 25 percent of consumption in 1971 to the current level of about nine million barrels per day (mb/d)—almost half of U.S. oil consumption. Here is the key contradiction of U.S. energy policy—that while

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Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin are co-editors of *Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School* (to be published in 1979 by Random House) with I. C. Bupp, Mel Horwitch, Sergio Koreisha, M. A. Maidique, and Frank Schuller. Professor of Business Administration at the Business School, Robert Stobaugh is director of the Project. Daniel Yergin is a Lecturer at the Kennedy School at Harvard and directs the International Energy Seminar at the Center for International Affairs. This article reflects the main conclusions of the *Energy Future Report,* and is based on the six-year research program that lies behind that study.

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the declared goal has been to hold steady or decrease oil imports, they have kept rising. This increase has been watched with dismay by other Western nations, who see this growth accentuating trends that pose fundamental threats to their well-being. Their stands and actions on other issues, such as nuclear weapons proliferation and the dollar, are directly related to their perception of America's inability to control imports.

This second oil shock, combined with the depreciation of the dollar, has again made clear the urgent need to move away from heavy reliance on foreign oil. But general perception of the danger hardly means any consensus about how to do this. Intense emotions and suspicions abound on the energy issue—not surprisingly, since very large stakes and a great deal of money are involved.

But the intensity of the debate goes beyond self-interest. Powerful romanticisms compete. On one side are those who have a vision of the national life decentralized in many spheres through the mechanism of the energy crisis, to the point where it becomes a post-industrial pastoral society. Even more powerful has been another kind of romanticism, what might be called an industrial romanticism, a belief that conventional production by itself can be a savior, that it is possible to return to an era of ever-increasing production rates. As a member of the Texas Railroad Commission has put it, "This country did not conserve its way to greatness. It produced itself to greatness."

Both kinds of romanticism becloud a comprehension of the alternatives to imported oil. What is required is a pragmatic investigation of the potentials of the various alternatives—an analysis based in the real world of political and institutional constraints in contemporary America, not within the disembodied world of econometric models and technological forecasts that ignore the realities of American society.

Such a pragmatic undertaking, which looks at each energy source from the bottom up, leads to conclusions that run quite contrary to the credo of the industrial romantics. That is, the conventional sources—domestic oil and natural gas, coal and nuclear power—do not hold out an alternative to increased imports of oil. This is not to say that the United States must remain beholden to enormous oil imports, for genuine alternatives do exist—conservation efforts and, over time, solar energy sources. Contrary to the romanticism of the post-industrial pastoralists, the wide diffusion of these efforts and sources will, while making possible a transition from imported oil, hardly revolutionize our social order. Yet, given a fair chance, they are the alternative to

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a dependence whose dangers have now been forcefully communicated once again.

II

Let us start by examining briefly just how politically precarious the supply of foreign oil is, and the economic and other costs of growing dependence.

If oil were distributed evenly throughout the world, the problems would be much less. But two facts summarize the world oil picture as it is: the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries dominates the international petroleum market; and Saudi Arabia dominates OPEC. Neither of these is likely to change at any time in the foreseeable future.

True, producing areas outside of OPEC will be important exporters. The combined North Sea production of Britain and Norway, which was about 1.5 million barrels per day at the end of 1978, might rise to four mb/d during the 1980s. Beyond that, Mexico and possibly the People's Republic of China represent, at least over the next decade, the only likely sources of significant new supplies for the world oil market outside of OPEC. But the current euphoria about Mexico is not justified, for Mexican leaders have made clear that exports will be limited to the pace required by domestic development rather than by the size of its oil reserves or the pressure of foreign demand. Moreover, Mexico's *proven* reserves are only a small fraction of the heady numbers recently tossed about. We believe that Mexican oil exports are unlikely to be higher than 2.5 mb/d in 1985—less than four percent of expected world demand. And by that time the oil exports of China will not exceed one or two mb/d. These amounts are hardly large enough to challenge Saudi Arabia's dominance.[1]

Saudi Arabia is favored by a unique conjunction of huge

[1] Our conclusion about the world oil outlook derives from a review of the best-known studies selected from the 81 published studies of which we are aware and from confidential studies by some of the leading consulting firms. For a good summary of the best-known studies, see *Energy: An Uncertain Future,* prepared by Herman Franssen at the request of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, publication no. 95-157, December 1978, Washington: GPO, 1978. For Mexico, see Congressional Research Service, *Mexico's Oil and Gas Policy: an Analysis,* Washington: GPO, December 1978. For a summary of Mexico's attitude, see *The New York Times,* January 6, 1979, p. 25. Also see "Mexico: The Premier Oil Discovery in the Western Hemisphere," *Science,* December 22, 1978, pp. 1261–65. For a more optimistic view than ours, see estimates by Energy Secretary Schlesinger and the CIA reported in *Newsweek,* January 15, 1979, pp. 64–65; and "Mexico—Potential Petroleum Giant," *National Economic Research Associates,* Washington, D.C., September 15, 1978. For China, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Oil Production Prospects,* Washington: Library of Congress 1977, p. 11.

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reserves, extraordinary ease of exploitation, and a population so tiny (four to six million people) that domestic revenue needs at current prices have no practical effect on the level of oil production. Saudi Arabia is the largest producer in OPEC with 30 percent of total production and 34 percent of total reserves. Thus it carries the brunt of adjustment within OPEC, at various times closing the valve to keep prices from falling, and opening the valve to keep prices from rising. During the first stages of the current Iranian crisis, it opened the valve all the way, thus preventing panic from gripping the international petroleum market.

How stable is the country on which the world has become so dependent? Too little is known about internal relations in Saudi Arabia to make any solid predictions. What is obvious, however, is that a pre-modern social structure, based upon kinship, has been catapulted into the modern age. No one, not even members of the royal family, can guess how successfully the present system will adjust to the new world—or for how long. No one who has assimilated the lessons of Iran can confidently assess what the corrosive effects of instant wealth will be, and how suddenly they will bubble to the surface. And Saudi Arabia is surrounded by rivals and enemies—Iran, not only unstable but with a rising influence of Shi'a Islam, antithetic to the Sunni Islam of Saudi Arabia; South Yemen, with a Marxist government aided by Cuban and Soviet military elements; Iraq, with a Soviet military presence. Thus, at the very least, the United States and the other Western countries are depending on a regime in a highly unstable environment to provide the leading part of their imported oil and to stabilize the world oil market.

Even if a regime closely tied to the West stays in power, it is an open question how much oil Saudi Arabia will choose to make available in the future. The high production rates frequently mentioned—such as 15–20 mb/d in the late 1980s—seem increasingly improbable. The disappointing progress and prospects of the economic development programs so far of individual OPEC nations, including Saudi Arabia, raise serious questions about the economic viability of such activities. Cutbacks in their pace are almost inevitable, and sooner or later there may be a wave of disenchantment, frustration, and resentment that will create widespread turmoil in producing countries, as it has in Iran.[2]

[2] See Walter J. Levy, "The Years that the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978, pp. 287–305.

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In any event, the prospect of steadily higher oil prices is now a virtual certainty. At the end of 1978, OPEC oil cost an average of $14.50 a barrel delivered to U.S. refineries. The increases projected under the December 1978 OPEC decision would themselves mean a price of over $16 per delivered barrel by the end of 1979. But in fact, depending in part on the speed at which Iranian production is returned to service, subsequent increases already under way seem likely to bring the average delivered price to $18–$20 per barrel by the end of the year. In short, during 1979 alone, higher prices may cause the present nine mb/d of U.S. imports to cost $10 billion per year more than in 1978, a direct charge to the U.S. balance of payments just at the time when it is under acute pressure and when improvement had been hoped for.

If one looks into the future, and assumes a level of U.S. oil imports rising gradually to 14 mb/d by the late 1980s, the price picture becomes so uncertain as to be very hard to quantify. However, in the area of direct costs alone, two conclusions seem clear. First, any increase in U.S. oil imports will tend to be accompanied by an increase in the import levels of the other major industrialized countries. For reasons that are in part political, in part psychological, and in part economic, U.S. oil import levels directly affect the imports of the other industrialized nations, as a recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has indicated.

And, second, with oil demand thus increasing, the pressures on the producing countries would be bound to mean price increases substantially above what would otherwise take place. If one assumes that on existing long-term trends, prices would "normally" increase only at rates keeping pace with inflation, then a rudimentary guess would be that the "abnormal" real price increases related to a 14 mb/d U.S. oil import level would exceed these rates by perhaps 30–40 percent by the late 1980s.[3]

The result, applied to a U.S. import level rising from nine mb/d to 14 mb/d by the late 1980s, would produce additional U.S. costs of some $60 billion *yearly* (in 1978 dollars) in the late 1980s—the equivalent of $30–$35 a barrel for each of the extra five mb/d of imports.

Broadly speaking, a gradual increase in prices, on the scale suggested, would result in relatively low indirect economic losses—

[3] These estimates, with sources and underlying assumptions, including elasticities, are discussed at length in Chapter 2 of our *Energy Future Report.*

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perhaps only a fraction of the $60-billion estimated annual increase in direct outflows. But a *rapid* increase in oil prices could create indirect economic losses considerably greater than those of the direct outflows and lasting for a number of years—as happened after 1973–74.[4]

Finally, to these direct and indirect costs must be added serious social and political risks. The impact on inflation could make the problem almost unmanageable without draconian measures. And, as has often been pointed out, continued high U.S. oil imports are an important contribution to political tensions within the Western community. As a recent headline in *The Economist* put it: "Will American Oil Greed Doom the World?" The other industrial nations, who are also our allies in political and security matters, are far more dependent than we on imported oil; as the price of oil is bid up by what appears to them to be the pressure of continuing high American imports, the tensions within the Western alliance could become almost impossible to handle—and at the very least would make concerted action on other fronts far more difficult to obtain.

And, finally, as U.S. imports increase, U.S. foreign policy is bound to become more subject to the influence of the oil-exporting countries, with possible disastrous effects on our relationships with key friends and allies.

The general nature of these effects should need no further underlining. We have seen each of them in operation in the aftermath of 1973–74. Today and in future years their impact would be at least as serious as it has been in the last five years.

In short, having just enacted the first installment of an energy policy, the United States now confronts the need for a much more significant effort. Where can the energy sources be found to stop the growth of oil imports, and what should be the stress in that new energy program?

[4] The principal indirect costs would be the impact on inflation and on the U.S. balance of payments, as well as the impact on GNP itself. A rapid rise in the price of imported oil makes it extraordinarily difficult to adjust economic policy to offset the large and sudden contraction of purchasing power, and for that reason is bound to have much graver effects than a more gradual price increase. Some analyses of the overall economic impact of the 1973–74 rise in oil prices suggest that indirect U.S. economic loss easily exceeded $100 billion. See, e.g., Edward R. Fried and Charles L. Schultz, eds., *Higher Oil Prices and the World Economy*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975, and J.R.B. Associates, "Estimation of the Short-Term Macroeconomic Impacts of Energy Price Changes on the U.S. Economy," mimeograph report prepared for the U.S. Government and Brookhaven National Laboratory, McLean, Va., June 1978. For a lucid article on the problems of managing the economy, see Lester C. Thurow, "Economics 1977," *Daedalus*, Fall 1977, pp. 79–94.

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Let us start by summarizing briefly the present U.S. energy balance and the "conventional" forecast for the state of that balance in the late 1980s, and then examine, one by one, the realistic likelihood of increases in major present energy sources.

III

Table I, below, shows the 1977 energy balance of the United States in terms of oil equivalents along with a "conventional program" for the late 1980s derived from recent projections by the U.S. Department of Energy. The latter is, of course, only an approximation, involving a whole series of underlying assumptions concerning the overall economic growth rate as well as the feasible rates of production of different energy sources. For imported oil, the "conventional program" shows estimated levels of 14 mb/d, the figure we have just been using in the preceding section. Obviously, this could vary in a range of, say, 12–16 mb/d—but the figure of 14 mb/d gives a good picture of where we are headed under existing policies.

TABLE I

U.S. ENERGY SUPPLY

ACTUAL 1977 AND CONVENTIONAL PROGRAM FOR LATE 1980s

(in millions of barrels daily of oil equivalent)

	Actual 1977	*Conventional Program Late 1980s*
Domestic (excluding U.S. Exports)		
Oil	10	10
Natural Gas	9	9
Coal	7	12
Nuclear	1	3
Subtotal, "traditional"	27	34
Solar, including hydro	1	2
TOTAL DOMESTIC	28	36
Imports		
Oil	9	14
Gas	*	1
Subtotal	9	15
TOTAL	37	51
Extra Conservation	—	3
GRAND TOTAL	37	54

* slightly less than 0.5 mbd.

SOURCES: Energy Information Administration, *Annual Report to Congress, Vol. III—1977*, Washington: Superintendent of Documents, April 1978, pp. 5, 23, 51, 145, and *Vol. II*, pp. 28, 119, 206, 216, 229. Also Department of Energy (DOE), news release on National Energy Act, October 20, 1978; nuclear estimate from recent discussions with DOE officials. The "Conventional Program" is based on the "middle demand, medium supply" scenario of the Department of Energy (*Annual Report, Vol. II*), adjusted for the impact of the National Energy Act and more recent nuclear estimates.

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The most obvious way to change this picture would be to turn back the clock to the early 1960s, when the United States produced 80 percent of the petroleum it consumed—in other words, to reduce the need for foreign oil by increasing the production of domestic oil. Is this possible?

As shown in Table I, domestic oil production is the largest domestic source of energy, now accounting for 10 mb/d and predicted to hold at about this level. (For this purpose, "oil" includes natural gas in liquid form.)

In the arguments and debates of the last six years, three different domestic oil "solutions" can be identified. The oil companies urge the first two—stimulation of conventional production through deregulation of oil prices and speedy granting of offshore oil licenses; and incentives to produce more oil by unconventional means, such as enhanced recovery and the extraction of shale oil. Opponents of the oil industry offer the third solution—breaking up the big companies.

The elimination of price controls, it is said, would help in two ways: first, controlled prices have substantially constrained oil exploration, and second, price controls have been created and administered in a way that generates great uncertainty. The latter is certainly true. The whole jerry-built structure—"old" oil, "new new" oil, "stripper" oil, altogether some 17 categories in recent legislation—has fostered a confusing and expensive bureaucratic monster.

It is, of course, impossible to determine the extent to which either price controls or the way they are administered have held back exploration or production. By any measure, the rewards for finding new oil have increased substantially since 1973—even the regulated price of newly found oil has more than tripled compared with an approximate doubling of drilling costs. And the number of total wells drilled increased by 69 percent between 1973 and 1977. Yet the quantity of new reserves added has been less each year than in 1973 and has fallen far short of annual production.[5] In the aggregate, U.S. proven reserves of oil have fallen from 35.5 billion barrels in 1973 to 28.5 billion barrels at the end of 1978, the lowest level since 1952.

[5] The conclusion on drilling costs holds for both wells and footage. Footage drilled also increased substantially. Recent additions to reserves have been far below those added annually for at least two decades before 1973. U.S. proven reserves and production of oil both peaked in 1970, when reserves of crude oil reached 39.0 billion barrels (with the addition of Prudhoe Bay). See the most recent annual report of the Energy Information Administration, *Annual Report to Congress Vol III-1977,* Washington: GPO, May 1978 (cited hereafter as *Annual Report*); *Monthly Energy Review,* January 1979; American Petroleum Institute statistics; and *Oil and Gas Journal,* December 25, 1978, p. 103.

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It is now widely accepted that in the late 1980s, even with higher real prices, only about five million barrels a day—instead of the current 10 mb/d—are likely to come from reserves that were known to exist in 1978, including Alaska, through the use of conventional recovery methods. And on the basis of experience with the accelerated exploration since 1973, a reasonable judgment is that no more than four mb/d of oil can be expected from new fields found between now and then.[6]

Indeed, this may be a high estimate: the prospects for finding a big field onshore or offshore in the Gulf of Mexico are quite small because these territories have already been intensively searched. (It must be recalled that over two million wells have been drilled in the United States—four times as many as in all the rest of the non-communist world combined.) New territories, especially the outer Continental Shelf and Alaskan North Slope, are the main hopes for finding a big field. But so far drilling off the East Coast has been disappointing. Most basically, even without the kind of environmental constraints that delayed Alaskan development, finding and developing a major new field in inhospitable areas can take the better part of a decade.

What about new sources from unconventional means? A large quantity of oil—more than half—is left behind in conventional recovery methods. For years, oil companies have been developing increasingly sophisticated methods for extracting a portion of this oil, and not surprisingly, the 1973–74 OPEC price hikes boosted interest in the effort. (The new methods for enhanced recovery ordinarily involve the injection of a chemical compound or heat into an oil field.) Unfortunately, years are needed to determine the effectiveness of any given method for any single field. Hence, enhanced recovery is still more promise than reality. The best current estimates, both in government and in the industry, indicate that an additional one million barrels daily is the most that can be expected in the late 1980s through enhanced recovery methods.[7]

Another potential unconventional source is oil-bearing shale rock. In Colorado, in the early part of the twentieth century, vast

[6] For examples to support this and the next paragraph, see discussions in *Energy: An Uncertain Future*, cited in footnote 1 above, especially the chart on p. 239.

[7] Even this increase in production from enhanced recovery would require higher oil prices. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, *Enhanced Oil Recovery Potential in the United States*, Washington: GPO, 1978, pp. 7, 19. See also National Petroleum Council, *Enhanced Oil Recovery*, Washington: NPC, 1976.

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shale-oil deposits were discovered. These reserves still dwarf known reserves in conventional oil fields, but the problem has always been to get the oil out. As the price of oil has risen, so has the estimated cost of producing oil from shale. The best current estimate puts this cost in the range of $16–$28 per barrel.[8]

Even if existing shale processes were to prove profitable, with or without a government subsidy, their capital and time requirements are great: a production level of 100,000 barrels a day would require over a billion dollars and a decade for development. Furthermore, under present technology, water requirements are potentially very large, which would generate opposition from farmers and ranchers. Nor are environmentalists happy about a process that breaks some shale rock into fine particles that float into the sky—while the shale rock that remains expands to a volume greater than it previously occupied, which necessitates filling in some canyons. The so-called *in situ* process, in which most of the rock is burned underground, involves less environmental damage, but has not been fully tested. One must conclude that shale oil still is unlikely to make any contribution to the national energy supply by the late 1980s and very little by the year 2000.

Taking into account both known and newly found oil fields as well as enhanced recovery, our best judgment is that total U.S. oil output in the late 1980s will approximate 10 mb/d, about the same as current production. But even this is quite speculative and perhaps on the optimistic side. To maintain that production level would require the finding of almost four billion barrels annually; but there has been only one year in the last 30 in which more than three billion barrels of reserves have been found.[9]

[8] The $16–$28 represents estimates from 1977 and early 1978 adjusted by us for inflation to early 1979. Dr. Armand Hammer of Occidental Petroleum has stated that his company, which is developing an *in situ* process, would earn a 15 percent return on Occidental's investment based on the U.S. price paid for OPEC oil in early 1978 ($14.50 per barrel, or about $16 in early 1979 dollars). Some other companies think that Dr. Hammer's estimates of required price are too low—Cities Service and Continental Oil, for example. The latter estimates Occidental's costs at $16–$26 a barrel. See *Business Week*, January 30, 1978, p. 55. A recent Rand study indicates required prices of $23 to $29 per barrel for surface retorting. Edward W. Merrow, *Constraints on the Commercialization of Shale Oil* (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, September 1978), p. vii. For earlier estimates of the production costs of shale oil, see Federal Energy Administration, *Project Independence, Potential Future Role of Oil Shale: Prospects and Constraints,* Washington: GPO, 1974.

[9] This conclusion does not imply that oil supply is insensitive to price, for without substantially higher prices, oil output would decline because of normal annual depletion. Earlier projections indicated much higher domestic production rates, but more recent estimates approximate 10 mb/d. See, e.g., 1978 Shell and 1978 Exxon estimates in *Energy: An Uncertain Future,* cited in footnote 1, pp. 229, 239. See p. 58 of the same report for data on reserves.

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As for the third proposal, breaking up the companies, such divestiture ("dismemberment," as the companies call it), could take one of two forms. One would be a horizontal break-up, in which oil companies were required to sell off non-oil activities such as coal. No one argues that horizontal divestiture would increase oil supply, and the available evidence suggests that it would be harmful to the coal industry by depriving it of needed capital, technology, and management. The other is vertical divestiture, which typically would involve breaking up each of the largest dozen or so oil firms into three separate companies—the first restricted to oil exploration and production; the second, to pipelines; and the third, to refining and marketing.

Would vertical divestiture increase the supply of domestically produced oil? This question has traditionally been argued in economic terms, seeking to measure the trade-off between increased competition and decreased efficiency. Numerous studies have been conducted on vertical divestiture. A careful review of them leads us to the conclusion that economic analyses do not yet enable one to determine whether breaking up the companies would result in any meaningful changes in either competition or efficiency. What *is* clear is that there is no evidence that divestiture would lead to greater domestic supplies of oil.[10] The consequences to the consumer might be on the order of a tank of gasoline a year, but whether a tank richer or a tank poorer cannot be determined.

Thus, we are left with the conclusion that there is no domestic oil solution to the problem of increasing U.S. oil imports—no way that production from American oil wells can narrow the gap of nine million barrels daily between what the United States produces and what it consumes. In fact, higher oil prices will be required to maintain production at current levels.

IV

The 20 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas that Americans consumed in 1978—the equivalent of nine million barrels per day of oil—accounted for about one-quarter of the energy used by the

[10] This is our conclusion after an extensive study of available literature, which is quite large. For samples of work tending to support divestiture, see Paul Davidson's and Walter Measday's chapter in David J. Teece, ed., *R&D in Energy*, Stanford: Institute for Energy Studies, 1977. For work tending not to support divestiture, see other chapters in Teece's book plus Edward J. Mitchell, ed., *Vertical Integration and Vertical Divestiture in the Oil Industry*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

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country. Unlike oil, natural gas has remained for the most part a domestically produced fuel, with only five percent imported. But in recent years, in spite of dramatically higher prices for new gas and increased exploration and development, the rate of discovery of additional natural gas reserves within the United States has been only at the rate of approximately ten tcf—although within the last year producers have offered increased quantities of gas to the interstate market, creating an impression of plenty. Proven reserves of gas, which began to decline in 1967 and in the next decade dropped by 30 percent, were estimated in 1978 to sustain only ten years of consumption at the consumption rate of 20 tcf per year.[11]

Prices are perhaps even more central to the natural gas controversy than they are to the oil controversy: the most contentious part of the framing of the 1978 National Energy Act was the battle over natural gas pricing. At base, it was a controversy over whether pricing should be according to cost of production or value to consumer, a contest among regions of the country, and a debate over how to distribute the $400 billion that OPEC price increases added to the value of domestic U.S. gas reserves since late 1973.[12] No one could wish to replay the battle, and we mention it only as it relates to the vexing question whether natural gas offers a realistic alternative to growing imports of foreign oil.

The pricing issue naturally leads into the baffling question of supply: How much gas do we have and at what price? Economists typically estimate the supply that would be forthcoming at various price levels. Geologists, on the other hand, typically ignore price and relate supply to the size of recoverable reserves. Within both groups of experts, there is deep disagreement.

Some economists believe that supply is not very responsive to price; others state the opposite. In 1976, for example, the General Accounting Office declared that no additional reserves would be discovered at prices above $1.75 per thousand cubic feet (mcf). At the same time, a task force within the Energy Research and Development Administration estimated that a rise in the price of

[11] This section on natural gas is based primarily on the work of I. C. Bupp and Frank Schuller in our *Energy Future Report*; data on reserves, production, exploration and development are from the sources cited above in footnote 5.

[12] This estimate is based on economic values of natural gas at world energy prices rather than the value with prices controlled by law or long-term contracts. U.S. proven reserves of natural gas were the equivalent of 44 billion barrels of crude oil at the end of 1973, and the OPEC price rises of 1973–74 increased world oil prices, in round numbers, by about $10 a barrel (in 1978 dollars). Our estimate of $400 billion has not been corrected by discounting future cash flows to obtain present value, nor does it consider enlargement of reserves. Similarly, the value of oil reserves also increased by about $400 billion.

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natural gas from $1.75 to $2.50 per mcf would increase U.S. recoverable reserves by 20 percent. The differences among geological estimates as to the size of prospective gas reserves are at least as large. Estimates of undiscovered recoverable natural gas resources by the U.S. Geological Survey range from 322 to 655 tcf, which if added to already proven reserves would produce a total gas supply in the range of 525 to 850 tcf.[13]

The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, of course, was intended to "resolve" the problem of price. The compromise ends the separation between the free market for intrastate gas and the regulated market for interstate gas. Newly found gas sold in the intrastate market is temporarily brought under the umbrella of interstate regulation. But, at the same time, the ceiling price of all newly found gas, in both interstate and intrastate markets, will be allowed to rise and eventually be deregulated completely.

In general, the compromise as passed could have three possible outcomes. First, the prospect of higher prices might stimulate exploration and lead to the discovery of new reservoirs that would support consumption significantly in excess of the current 20 tcf per year. In that case, new electric generating plants might even be permitted to use natural gas. This seems, on the available evidence, to be the least likely outcome, but it is possible. Second, and only slightly more likely, is that higher prices could fail to stimulate more than the current 10 tcf of new discoveries per year.

The third and most likely outcome is that annual discoveries will range between 10 tcf and 25 tcf per year. Within that range, a figure closer to 10 tcf means further restrictions on the industrial use of gas as boiler fuel and as feedstock, plus stern enforcement of mandates to convert existing gas-fired industrial and electric utility boilers to coal. A figure closer to the upper end of the range, 25 tcf, means little change in present use patterns.

The outcome is, of course, uncertain. But we would emphasize that the nation would be unwise to plan on the upper levels.

[13] See Energy Research and Development Administration, *Market Oriented Program Planning Study—I*, Washington: GPO, 1976. Early 1979 prices for new gas approximated $2.00/mcf. In 1974, two MIT economists, Paul W. MacAvoy and Robert S. Pindyck, constructed an econometric model that predicted that if the government stopped controlling the wellhead price of interstate gas, domestic discoveries would climb to 33 tcf per year by 1980 at a price of $1.00/mcf (At the time of their estimate, the national average of controlled prices for new discoveries was $0.54/mcf.) MacAvoy and Pindyck, *Price Controls and the Natural Gas Shortage*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975, p. 57. This estimate now seems implausible. For the limitations of energy models generally, see the Appendix to our *Energy Future Report*.

The estimates of 332 to 655 tcf are from *Energy: An Uncertain Future*, cited in footnote 1 above, p. 59. Earlier estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey and the CIA also showed a very wide range. A summary of 1975 estimates appears in the *U.S. Geological Survey Circular, 725*, 1975. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985*, Washington, April 1977.

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Indeed, a recent study by the Congressional Research Service concluded that even with gradual deregulation of natural gas and a drawdown of gas reserves below the normal reserve-to-production ratio, "maintaining a production level through the middle 1980s close to the current rate of output will be very difficult." And recent Shell and Exxon projections show natural gas production in 1990 at about two-thirds of present levels.[14]

Gas proponents point to other possible ways to supplement supplies, notably synthetic gas (SNG) from coal. Although several oil companies and gas pipeline firms have announced that they would construct commercial plants for this purpose, as yet none have been built. Inflation, high and uncertain operating and construction costs, and environmental concerns have contributed to the delayed construction.

True, additional imports of gas are possible, with the preferred transportation method being pipelines. Since the early 1970s, such imports from Canada have been providing about five percent of the total natural gas used in the United States, but they are unlikely to exceed that level. As yet the United States has imported only meager amounts of Mexican gas. Negotiations for much greater amounts broke down in 1977 over the price, but have been resumed after the Carter visit in February. Although the Mexicans have announced plans to use all their gas internally, many observers expect the United States eventually to import up to one tcf yearly, still only about five percent of current natural gas consumption in the United States.[15]

Of course, natural gas can also be imported from more distant points, in the form of liquefied natural gas. A small project began operation in 1974 and two larger ones in 1978, all based on Algerian gas, bringing U.S. LNG import capacity to the equivalent of about 0.4 tcf of natural gas—two percent of U.S. gas consumption. An additional ten projects for LNG importation

[14] *Energy: An Uncertain Future*, pp. 59, 229, 240. There remains the question of supplies of natural gas from unconventional sources. These would include gas in porous sandstone below 15,000 feet; geopressurized brine; and sedimentary rock with low porosity, such as Devonian shale and coal. Although limited experience does not allow projections to be made with confidence, the latest government studies and experienced observers concur that gas from these four sources is unlikely to make an important contribution to U.S. energy supply any time in the foreseeable future. Certainly it would not be prudent to plan on large quantities being forthcoming. See U.S. Department of Commerce, *Natural Gas from Unconventional Geologic Sources*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1976, Section IV.

[15] For Canada, see *Annual Report, Volume III*, p. 51: *Annual Report, Volume II*, Projections of Energy Supply and Demand and their Impact, pp. 161–71. An unpublished report from Stanford Research Institute, December 1978, contains estimates consistent with our conclusions for Canada and Mexico. Also, for Mexico, see Congressional Research Service, *Supplemental Natural Gas Sources: Factors and Policy Issues*, A Report Prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, p. 11.

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were being planned and if all of these projects were to come to fruition, LNG imports in 1990 would still only constitute 12 percent of the current consumption of natural gas. In December 1978, the Department of Energy denied applications for two large LNG import projects, signaling the Carter Administration's present reluctance to see LNG imports increase beyond their current modest levels. New LNG projects face controversy, a result of three severe obstacles—cost, sharp disagreement in the scientific community about safety, and dependence on OPEC sources.[16]

The uncertainties surrounding feasible levels of natural gas production in the next 8–10 years are greater than in the case of oil. While higher levels are conceivable, we believe that it would be very unwise to plan that natural gas production will exceed the present level, the equivalent of nine mb/d of oil. Indeed it will be a challenge to find enough new reserves to maintain production at current levels.

V

While domestic oil and natural gas are constrained by geology, the other two conventional domestic sources—coal and nuclear power—are constrained by political issues. The political conflict has been about the side effects involved in providing and using these energy sources, that is, the externalities, or costs, indirectly borne by the members of society at large rather than paid for directly in cash by the consumers of the energy.

Coal is today the most important of the two, providing 18 percent of U.S. energy, or the equivalent of seven mb/d of oil. And the Carter Administration's National Energy Plan calls for an increase in coal supply between 1976 and 1985 that would provide the equivalent of an added 6.5 mb/d of oil. As we are frequently reminded, coal is America's most abundant fossil fuel, comprising, by some estimates, 90 percent of total energy reserves in the United States. Reasonable estimates about recoverable reserves vary widely—from 150 to 440 billion tons. Even reserves at the lowest estimates, however, could assure ample supplies for at least a century at high consumption rates.[17]

[16] The most authoritative study that we have seen is U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas*, Washington: GPO, 1977. Our account of the LNG situation draws heavily on this source. Also see Edward K. Fariday, *LNG Review: 1977*, Energy Economics Research Limited, 1978.

[17] This section on coal is based primarily on Mel Horwitch's work in our *Energy Future Report*. For information on reserves, see U.S. Federal Energy Administration, *Fuel Task Force Report on Coal: Project Independence*, Washington: GPO, November 1974; 1977 *Keystone Coal Industry Manual*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1977.

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Great hopes were expressed after the oil embargo for domestic coal as an alternative to imported oil. Moreover, the financial, managerial and technological capabilities of the coal industry have been significantly strengthened by the entrance of oil firms, natural resource firms and other large companies. But the experience of the last five years makes it appear very doubtful whether significantly higher production and consumption levels can be achieved at least in the next decade.[18] For external costs, in the forms of environmental and health problems, are rung up at every step in coal's journey from the mine along the railroad to the boiler where it is burned—in particular acid drainage from mines, the disruption of life in Western communities by enormous trains hauling coal, and when it is burned, the release of sulphur dioxide and a host of other pollutants. Perhaps most serious of all, in the long run, may be the (unknown) consequences for future generations of increasing the temperature of the atmosphere by producing carbon dioxide.

Some of these problems can be dealt with, for example, through the installation of scrubbers by utilities (to remove sulphur dioxide), the building of overpasses over railroad tracks, and the return of strip-mined land to its original contour and condition. But inevitably there has been controversy over costs, their allocation, and regulatory requirements. The problems are not trivial, and their clear resolution is not yet politically in sight.

But even if these problems were resolved, coal would still confront deep-seated problems of what might be called a "systemic" nature. There has been a continuous decline in productivity since 1969, variously attributed to mine safety regulations and to social conditions and labor strife in the eastern coal fields, where most of the nation's coal now comes from. And the full development of Western coal would require a massive new program to expand rail facilities.

Thus, a circular chain of uncertainty exists. Environmental issues, government end-use policy, and prospective electricity demand make utilities reluctant to shift to coal, which delays openings of new mines and new transportation, which in turn makes utilities wonder whether the coal would be available if they were to shift to it. There is so much uncertainty on all points that

[18] For recent general assessments, see National Electric Reliability Council, *8th Annual Review*, August 1978; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, *Status of Coal Supply Contracts*; General Accounting Office, *U.S. Coal Development—Promises, Uncertainties*, EM-77-43, September 22, 1977; Balaji Chakravarthy, "Adapting to Change in the Coal Industry: A Managerial Perspective," Doctor of Business Administration dissertation, Harvard Business School, 1978; Congressional Research Service, *Natural Energy Transportation: Issues and Problems*, Vol. 3, March 1978.

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development is moving much more slowly than was anticipated two years ago.

But what about gasification or liquefaction? These are certainly the long-term routes for coal to go, but the costs are quite high. As already noted, technology heretofore not widely used promises an additional source of domestic gas—synthetic gas (SNG), manufactured from coal. Pilot plants, established in the 1960s to prove technical and economic feasibility of the process, showed it to be uneconomical at then-current natural gas prices; the best current guess would suggest costs at least at the equivalent of $20–$30 per barrel of oil. And the cost of producing oil from coal is $30 or more a barrel. Despite frequent assertions of optimism, neither gasification nor liquefaction—the latter important because of the security need to have a supply of domestic liquids during crises and interruptions—seems likely to make an important contribution until the next century.[19]

The United States has the coal. But its very abundance has misled people, for the existence of huge reserves does not mean that the United States will automatically be in a position to reverse the long decline in coal's share of U.S. energy. Most likely, there will be a slow growth in production and consumption, but hardly of the kind to provide an alternative to the pressing problem of imported oil.

All told, our best judgment is that it is unlikely that coal production will increase between 1976 and 1985 by an amount greater than the oil equivalent of three million barrels daily, rather than the 6.5 million barrels daily shown in the Administration's National Energy Plan. By the late 1980s, we estimate that coal could be providing four mb/d more than at present, as compared to the additional five mb/d projected in the "conventional program" shown in Table I.[20] It may be argued that these

[19] Roger Detman (C. F. Braun and Co.), "Preliminary Economic Comparison of Six Processes for Pipeline Gas from Coal," Presentation to the Eighth Synthetic Pipeline Gas Symposium, Chicago, Illinois, October 18–20, 1976; William F. Henderson, Jr., "Prospects for the Commercialization of High BTU Coal Gasification," R02294, Santa Monica (Ca.): Rand Corporation, 1978; Earl T. Hayes, "Energy Resources Available to the United States, 1985 to 2000," *Science*, January 19, 1979, p. 238; and *Chemical Week*, November 8, 1978, p. 36.

[20] As shown in Table I, recent estimates by the Department of Energy indicate substantially lower coal production than President Carter's goal. Many observers do not share our outlook. A series of models analyzed in 1978 by the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University generally supported the conclusion that President Carter's goal of doubling annual coal production from 685 million tons in 1977 to 1.2 billion tons by 1985 could be met. (U.S. consumption is slightly lower because of exports.) The models, however, specifically did not consider some of the factors that we think will prove to be the critical barriers, including, in the language of the report, "uncertainties about such issues as air pollution controls, coal mine reclamation, other mining regulations (including leasing and permit policy for Western coal), pricing regulations . . . the availability of the capital, labor, materials, equipment, land, and water resources needed . . . [and] declines in underground mining productivity." Energy Modeling Forum, *Coal in Transition: 1980–2000*, Stanford University, July 1978, EMF Report 2, Vol. 1, p. v.

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are "static" estimates—that a really concerted national effort would achieve at least the Administration's target. However, if one examines only the extent of investment required in all stages of the system—mines, railroads, and power plants—one is driven to conclude that a dramatic increase in coal in this time frame is unlikely. And the nature of the adjustments required in our society is great indeed under any circumstances.

VI

The common response of all industrial nations in the immediate aftermath of the embargo was to renew a commitment to nuclear power. President Nixon's Project Independence, in late 1974, projected that up to 40 percent of America's electricity could be generated by atomic power by the late 1980s.

Projections of nuclear energy in terms of what was technically possible were one thing. But the reality—involving questions of safety, escalating costs, and issues of weapons proliferation—transformed nuclear decision-making from a narrow technological matter into a major political question. Delay after delay resulted from endless litigation, hearings, and vociferous demonstrations. The result has been a continuing stalemate.[21]

True, nuclear power, with an existing capacity of 50 gigawatts (GW), is now generating about 12 percent of the nation's electricity—supplying, in the total energy picture, the equivalent of 1.25 mb/d of oil. And another 145 GW is either in the advanced planning stage, on order, or under construction. If all of these plants are built on or near schedule, the United States would have a total of about 195 GW of operating nuclear capacity by the early 1990s, which would be generating perhaps a quarter or more of the nation's electricity.

But even this modest growth—only one-half of what had been officially projected less than five years ago—can by no means be considered a sure thing. The argument over nuclear power involves a set of external costs even more controversial than coal's. Advocates of nuclear power, who maintain that further nuclear development is essential to the well-being of the nation, have lost ground in a widening debate. Doubts raised concerning safety have delayed completion and forced added safety precautions, both of which contributed to a rapid and still-unchecked rise in costs that led to a second major controversy: Does it cost more, the same, or less to generate electricity from nuclear power than

[21] This section is based primarily on the work of I. C. Bupp in our *Energy Future Report.* Also, see I. C. Bupp and J. C. Derian, *Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved,* New York: Basic Books, 1978.

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from coal? The question is difficult enough to answer when only the direct costs carried by the utility are considered. It is virtually impossible to answer when an effort is made to measure the relative external costs of coal and nuclear.

This change over a decade has had a profound effect on the key decision-makers—the utility executives who decide whether to order or not order. Some highly publicized episodes, such as Seabrook in New Hampshire and the recent orders placed by Commonwealth Edison, might leave the impression that utilities are fully committed. On the contrary, less than half a dozen reactors were purchased in the years 1975–79, compared to 34 in 1973 alone.[22] And many that were ordered before 1974, some even partially built, have been canceled or deferred to such an extent that cancellations have been exceeding new orders.

Today, the issue of spent fuel disposal looms as an even greater obstacle than questions of reactor safety or environmental impact. In the 1960s and early 1970s, government and industry planners assumed that the spent fuel would be reprocessed, to recover still-usable fissionable material from useless and dangerous waste materials, as soon as enough reactors were in operation to support the large-scale facilities for economical reprocessing. Both the government and the nuclear industry postponed important technical decisions about the treatment and disposal of the waste materials pending the start of large-scale reprocessing.

But in response to concerns about nuclear proliferation, the Ford and Carter Administrations placed a moratorium on the development of reprocessing and the breeder reactor. This moratorium highlighted an acute operating problem.

The spent fuel has been piling up in storage areas that consist of specially designed pools of water at nuclear power plant sites, many of which will be filled by 1985, and several by 1983. As these plants exhaust storage capacity, their owners will be forced either to transfer spent fuel to other locations or to build and license additional storage capacity—or to shut the plants down altogether.[23]

One expedient would be to transport spent fuel to one or more "Away from Reactor" pools (AFR), which could be comparatively

[22] Alvin M. Weinberg, "Energy Policy and Energy Projections: The Case of a Nuclear Moratorium," Address to the Atomic Industrial Forum Conference on United States Energy Policy, Washington, D.C., January 1977; and industry trade journals.

[23] For further detail on this and succeeding paragraphs, see Alan Jakimo and Irvin C. Bupp, "Nuclear Waste Disposal: Not in My Backyard," *Technology Review*, March/April 1978. We have also used unpublished data from the Office of Nuclear Policy, Department of Energy.

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cheap to build and could safely store spent fuel for many years. A dozen or so such facilities, each about the size of an average industrial warehouse, would accommodate all the spent fuel that is likely to be produced for the rest of the century. But AFRs pose a considerable "not in my backyard" political problem. By early 1978 at least seven state legislatures had imposed various prohibitions on the construction or expansion of local nuclear waste storage facilities or on transport of radioactive waste into the state, and there were many indications that others would follow suit.

In this political environment, and in order to find a more long-lasting solution, U.S. government officials turned their attention in 1978 to waste isolation pilot plants (WIPPs), an idea conceived some years earlier as part of a government program for ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes. But here too there is serious uncertainty. The U.S. approach has envisaged that such ultimate disposal would use salt caverns several hundred meters beneath the earth's surface, but an interagency review committee, set up by President Carter, has recently found that such underground salt formations are by no means unanimously accepted by the scientific community as the best method for disposing of nuclear wastes—indeed, there is a substantial body of opinion that holds that they are not even very desirable.[24]

Obviously, a waste disposal procedure is necessary, if for no other reason than to handle waste already generated (most of it actually from past weapons-directed production). But it will be most difficult to find a method that will be generally acceptable to concerned parties, including a significant number of nuclear critics. Unless government and industry leaders start to work now with nuclear critics, existing plants will begin to run out of spent-fuel storage within four years. The federal government will then face a very difficult choice: shutting down the plants or riding roughshod over the nuclear critics. And without a consensus on waste policy, including the certainty of a satisfactory method for ultimate waste disposal, there can be no end to the nuclear power stalemate.

[24] Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology, "Isolation of Radioactive Wastes in Geological Repositories: Status of Scientific and Technological Knowledge," a working paper prepared for the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management, July 3, 1978. See also U.S. Department of Energy, Directorate of Energy Research, "Report of Task Force for Review of Nuclear Waste Management," DOE/ER-0004/D, February 1978; and Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Report of the Subgroup on Alternative Technology Strategies," Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management, August 7, 1978. See also: Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Alternative Technology Strategies for the Isolation of Nuclear Wastes: Report of Subgroup One," September 8, 1978.

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In the face of these difficulties, the best that can be hoped during the next dozen years is that nuclear energy may add a million and a half barrels a day of oil equivalent to the million and a quarter barrels a day it provides now. Such a production level would require the continued operation of all existing nuclear capacity, plus the completion and operation of all new capacity currently under construction or on order.

That, we stress, is a very bullish scenario. Indeed, we regard the nuclear outlook as very uncertain, and believe that the energy generated by nuclear power could actually undergo an absolute decline within ten years.

This pessimistic conclusion for the late 1980s does not mean for a moment that the United States should not increase its effort both to remove present technical obstacles to the expansion of existing light-water reactor use and to develop better forms of nuclear energy production. Answers may be found to the weapons proliferation risks of current breeder reactor designs, and in the span of 15–25 years fusion power may have proved itself at least experimentally. But for the balance of this century it would clearly be unwise to rely on nuclear energy to make any substantial contribution to the problem of reducing dependence on imported oil.

VII

Except for those who believe in an electrified world using fusion power, there is general agreement that eventually a transition will have to be made from oil, gas, coal and uranium to what is called solar energy. The term "solar" covers many diverse sources, their common thread being that they are all renewable, depend ultimately on the sun, and, in the case of burnable materials, have come into existence on the earth "recently," in the last century or so (in contrast to fossil fuels).

At the present time, all forms of solar energy account for only one million barrels per day of oil equivalent in the U.S. energy balance—and this only if one includes hydroelectric power under this heading.[25] And in the conventional forecast for the late 1980s, this amount is predicted only to double, to a two mb/d level.

Especially under the Carter Administration, the amounts allo-

[25] This section is based primarily on work by M. A. Maidique in our *Energy Future Report.* The one mb/d estimate of oil equivalent excludes some wood burning, because of inadequate data. For general background on active systems, see Bruce Anderson, *Solar Energy: Fundamentals in Building Design,* New York: McGraw Hill, 1977, Parts III, IV, V. For details, see *Solar Energy, Domestic Policy Review,* Domestic Policy Review Integration Group, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1978. See also Fred S. Dubin, "Solar Energy Design for Existing Buildings," *ASHRAE Journal,* November 1975.

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cated by the government to solar energy research and development have increased substantially, as have the attention and effort by private companies. But the policy direction of the government's research effort is open to serious question, and private solar industry remains in the difficult first phase that characterizes the initial diffusion of innovation.

Far too much of the present research program is directed at "big solar"—expensive high-technology projects that mimic the space and nuclear programs. There are two prominent examples. One is the "power tower" which would use acres of mirrors to focus light in order to heat water to boiling; it accounts for a fifth of the government's entire solar research and development budget. The other is the orbiting satellite, which would beam the sun's energy back to earth, and whose supporters have attempted to obtain large-scale funding.

While the various forms of big solar differ in many ways among themselves, they have certain important features in common: they fit in well with the traditional mode of federal budgeting for technological development; they are highly uncertain as to their practicality; they are likely to be very expensive, with current cost estimates highly speculative; and they may well encounter severe environmental problems. Unfortunately, federal solar policy favors these programs at the expense of "small solar"—the decentralized forms of renewable energy that can deliver a sizable contribution in this century.

Of these the foremost are those related to space and hot water heating, and the consumption of "biomass"—organic matter, primarily from plants—for all forms of burning.

In terms of quantitative contribution, solar space and hot water heating can make its greatest impact, in the next decade at least, through the so-called active systems, which involve mechanical moving parts. The most common form today is the solar panel designed to catch and concentrate the sun's rays, to heat air, water, or some other medium flowing through pipes, and to convey the heat, with the aid of fans or pumps, to where it is needed.

The potential for active solar heating is vast because it is well suited to most new residential and commercial buildings and to about one-third of the nation's 55 million existing dwellings. It had formerly been thought that it would take decades for passive solar heating—designing buildings to take advantage of the environment—to make a major impact, because of the slowness with which the building stock turns over. But recent evidence indicates

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that passive solar heating can also be effectively retrofitted onto existing structures, on a substantial scale and in a much shorter time.

In 1975, one could still have only speculated about the possibilities for a solar heating industry. Today it is a vibrant, growing industry. Sales, including installation, increased tenfold in three years, from $25 million in 1975 to $260 million in 1977. The development of the industry and the market potential permit one to be increasingly optimistic about solar energy.[26]

But yet, in absolute terms, the industry remains small and fragmented. The key problem is to help the diffusion of innovation occur at a more rapid rate, and this requires mechanisms to help overcome a series of economic and institutional obstacles.

The most important is the question of payback, how fast a building owner will recover his investment. Research seems to indicate that about a five-year payback is required. Currently, solar heating has about a 12-year payback. But, of course, that is measured against other energy sources that are sold to consumers at prices heavily subsidized (by price controls) and some of which bear heavy externalities of the sort we have noted earlier.

Other major obstacles include building codes, financing, "the right to sunlight," quality control, distribution, and the relationship to utilities. That last is a most important consideration. Some proponents of solar power are making a serious error in trying to keep utilities out of solar energy, instead of encouraging them to enter the business of "delivering" solar energy by taking the responsibility for installing and financing (perhaps owning) solar units. Wide diffusion of solar heating will have a major impact on the utilities, and if they feel threatened and so oppose it, then large-scale implementation of solar could be delayed for a long time.

The other major near-term renewable source is biomass—organic matter from plants and animals. Biomass can be burned, or it can be converted into a gas or liquid fuel. Biomass means, for instance, that municipal solid waste can be converted from a major disposal problem into a significant energy source, rivaling the present contribution of nuclear power. But the main source of biomass energy in the near term will probably be wood, forest wastes and other plant products. That potential can be augmented

[26] Market estimates are from Sheldon H. Butt, President, Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), Keynote Address, SEIA Convention, Phoenix, Arizona, February 1978; Federal Energy Administration, *Solar Collector Manufacturing Activity Report, July through December 1975*, March 1976. We have also drawn on interviews with solar suppliers and installers, and with government officials.

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through the development of fast-growing energy crops. The equivalent of three mb/d of oil might be obtained from burning forest wastes and wood without relying on sophisticated forest management techniques and new tree species, but such a high level will take many years, perhaps several decades.[27]

Rapid expansion of the use of solar energy requires, at this stage, major additional support from government, along lines to be discussed in a later section of this article. If such support were forthcoming, we believe that it would be reasonable to project by the late 1980s a supply from solar sources equivalent to four mb/d of oil, roughly twice the current Department of Energy forecast.

This projection does not assume any dramatic technological breakthroughs becoming available on a production basis during this time frame. The most obvious such possibility has to do with photovoltaics, that is, small cells of silicon that convert sunlight directly into electricity. We omit photovoltaics not because we are skeptical, for we are not, but rather to underline the potential of existing technologies that do not require a major breakthrough. Photovoltaics may well be on the edge of such a breakthrough. They are made through the same processes used to manufacture semiconductors and integrated circuits. The early photovoltaic cells used to power orbiting satellites worked satisfactorily, but were also extraordinarily expensive. Although costs have since dropped to less than one-half of one percent of initial levels, a major refinement of cells is still required to make photovoltaics competitive with commercial fuels. This is a reasonable prospect, however, very much in line with what happened to semiconductors. And that, obviously, could radically transform the energy supply picture in the United States.[28]

VIII

To sum up our argument to this point, the prospect for major increases in domestic energy supplies from the four conventional sources—oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy—is bleak. Today, domestic production from these four sources accounts for the equivalent of 27 million barrels of oil per day. Over a period of ten years or so, that 27 mb/d could perhaps be stretched to 32 mb/d,

[27] Alan N. Poole and Robert H. Williams, "Flower Power," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* May 1976; John R. Benemann, *Biofuels: A Survey,* Special Report (EN-746-SR), Palo Alto (Ca.): Electric Power Research Institute, June 1978. On wood pellets, see Allen C. Hammond, "Photosynthetic Solar Energy: Rediscovery Biomass Fuels," *Science,* August 19, 1977.

[28] See Bruce Chalmers, "The Photovoltaic Generation of Electricity," *Scientific American,* November 1976; John C. C. Fan, "Solar Cells: Plugging Into the Sun," *Technology Review,* August-September 1978.

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and supplemented by an additional four mb/d from solar-related sources. But during that period, according to the current forecasts of the Department of Energy, consumption requirements could rise, as we saw in Table I, to the equivalent of 51 mb/d of oil by the late 1980s, even on the Department's assumption that by then we shall have achieved a saving, through conservation measures additional to those in use in early 1978, estimated at the equivalent of three mb/d of oil. The need for imported oil would still be 14 mb/d, a level we believe to be untenable for the economic and political reasons outlined in Section II above.

Today, Americans are conservation-conscious to a degree that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. A great many Americans are aware that the United States now uses much more energy per capita and per unit of GNP than other advanced industrial countries that enjoy as high an average standard of living.[29] And considerable progress has been made on a few fronts: the increased gasoline mileage of new automobile production—now slated to rise to an average of 27.5 miles per gallon by 1985—may in itself be saving two mb/d by the late 1980s, as compared to what consumption levels would be if the gasoline mileage of new cars had stayed at pre-1974 levels.[30] But since automobiles will continue to be central to American life, there is a need for post-1985 performance standards that will allow automakers to find flexible ways to reach a higher goal of perhaps 50 miles per gallon.

But it is also true that on many major fronts we have hardly begun to practice serious conservation. In American industry, the range for further energy savings remains very broad—from better housekeeping to recovery of waste heat and materials, to major technological innovation. Altogether, according to one recent study, it may be possible to reduce industrial energy use in economically justifiable ways by more than a third through familiar conservation methods, without any breakthrough.[31]

One of the major methods is cogeneration, the combined production of heat and power. Today there are two independent energy delivery systems in the United States. One is composed of

[29] See Joel Darmstadter, Joy Dunkerley and Jack Alterman, *How Industrial Societies Use Energy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977.

[30] See U.S. Federal Task Force, *Motor Vehicle Goals Beyond 1980*, Washington: Energy Resources Council, 1976; Richard John, Philip Coonley, Robert Ricci and Bruce Rubinger "Mandated Fuel Economy Standards as a Strategy for Improving Motor Vehicles Fuel Economy," paper presented at the Symposium on Technology, Government, and the Future of the Automobile Industry, Harvard Business School, October 19, 1978.

[31] G. N. Hatsopoulos, E. P. Gyftopolous, R. W. Sant, and R. F. Widmer, "Capital Investment to Save Energy," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1978.

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utilities, in which electricity is centrally produced, and steam is released as waste into the air or lakes and rivers. In the second system, companies generate their own steam for heating and industrial processes. Almost half of all energy consumed by industry is used to produce steam. Cogeneration integrates these two systems at industrial sites, using only about half as much energy as is needed to produce the steam and electricity separately. There is nothing fancy about the technology. It is quite common in Europe and used to be in the United States. Today, however, major institutional barriers stand in its way—such as how electricity generated by an industrial firm can be incorporated into the regulated utility system.

For, while there are notable examples of effective energy saving in U.S. industry, the overall record could be improved considerably. One of the most thorough independent analyses has come to the conclusion that five out of the eight most energy-intensive industries actually increased their energy use per unit of output since the embargo.[32]

There are many reasons for the relatively slow pace of energy saving. One is the confusion over energy prices and uncertainty about whether there is an energy problem. Many firms have discovered that energy prices do not affect market share or profit margin because they can be passed on to consumers. The regulatory system impedes cogeneration. Many executives are confused by the twists and turns of government policy. One of the principal obstacles, it now appears, is the high rate of return that many firms demand for conservation investments—30 percent after taxes—or in some cases twice that required for strategic investments. The rather small tax credits in the National Energy Act are insufficient to overcome this critical obstacle, which is probably retarding industrial energy conservation more than anything else. A more stimulative policy that encourages investment could be very effective.

The same kind of broad potential exists in the building sector. Almost 40 percent of American energy consumption goes for space heating, hot water, air conditioning, and lighting in homes, commercial structures, and factories. Prior to 1973, energy consumption had been a subject increasingly neglected in buildings: in New York City, for instance, the sealed, glass office buildings put up in the late 1960s used twice as much energy per square foot as those put up in the late 1940s. Since 1973, "energy-conscious

[32] John Myers and Leonard Nakamura, *Saving Energy in Manufacturing: The Post-Embargo Record,* Cambridge: Ballinger, 1978, pp. 7–9, 28.

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design" has begun to work its way into the repertoire of architects and construction companies. For instance, whereas office buildings of the early 1970s might have used 400,000 BTUs per square foot, new buildings are going up that use 55,000 to 65,000 BTUs per square foot.[33] But, even with the push of new standards, the effects of energy-conscious design will take a decade or more to be felt, as the building stock turns over very slowly.

The real opportunity in the building sector is "retrofit"—changes in equipment and structure that "button up" buildings, that is, improve thermal and lighting efficiency. The possibilities are considerable. IBM, for instance, which set out in 1973 to reduce energy consumption by ten percent in 34 major locations around the country, was surprised to discover that it actually cut its energy consumption by 39 percent by 1977. "Nothing very technical or profound" was required.[34]

Real-world experience proves that major savings are also possible in the residential sector. Studies across the country indicate that 25 to 50 percent reductions in energy use in the American housing stock are possible with relatively simple efforts.[35] And a five-year study of a New Jersey town by researchers from Princeton University showed that a 67 percent reduction in annual energy consumption for space heating in residences was possible with a relatively simple package. "With patience, groups of small and tiny fixes can be put together into large assemblies that overall can produce impressive results," they concluded. "It does not appear to be impossible, in fact, that under present technology and economic conditions, space heat in houses could be a minor rather than a major consumer of fuel."[36]

[33] See Richard Stein, *Architecture and Energy,* New York: Doubleday, 1977, pp. 60–61; Claire Stegman, "Not Bad, But Still Not Good Enough," *Think,* October–November 1976; *Energy Conservation,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Feburary 2–April 13, 1976, Washington: GPO, 1977, pp. 67–74; *Energy Conservation Act of 1976,* Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, May 6, 1979, Washington: GPO, 1976, p. 182.

[34] *Ibid.* The IBM experience is described in its 1977 Annual Report, p. 33.

[35] W. R. Godwin "Energy Conservation," *National Journal,* April 3, 1976, p. 456; General Accounting Office, *National Standards Need for Residential Energy Conservation,* June 20, 1975; *Monthly Energy Review,* March 1976, pp. 4–6; George A. Tsongas, *Home Energy Conservation Demonstration Project,* Final Report for Chevron USA, August 1977. For example, a utility in Washington State found that $200 retrofits cut energy use in 14,000 homes by over 20 percent. Altogether, the utility's program stimulated directly and indirectly 56,000 retrofits—freeing gas for 16,500 new homes without any new supply. "What all of that meant," said the utility's president, "was that we had been sitting atop a new gas field for years, and didn't recognize it." Donald C. Navarre, "Conservation and Utility Marketing," mimeographed paper for Washington National Gas.

[36] Robert Socolow, ed., *Saving Energy in the Home: Princeton's Experiments at Twin Rivers,* Cambridge: Ballinger, 1978, pp. 63–64, 100. This study also found significant behavioral

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All this suggests a major realm of possibility. Retrofit is occurring in the United States, but at a much slower rate than is possible or desirable. The main reason is the lack of stimulative government programs. Until 1978, the United States had no major national retrofit programs, despite the fact that the United States has one of the most inefficient housing stocks. The problem is that the American building stock is highly decentralized. Homeowners are very poorly informed, have only limited access to capital, and do not know whom to trust. Strong positive incentives are needed. The National Energy Act contains minor inducements, but the required level of encouragement has been missing.

This sector analysis demonstrates the wide flexibility possible for energy use in the United States. Its extent was underlined in the recent report of a panel on energy futures assembled by the National Academy of Science, which looked at four different plausible and carefully constructed scenarios for future energy demand in the United States. The results were extraordinary—that in the year 2010 "very similar conditions of habitat, transportation, and other amenities could be provided" in the United States using twice the energy consumed today, *or alternatively using almost 20 percent less than used today.* And this is with continuing economic and population growth. The fundamental conclusion is "that there is much more flexibility toward reducing energy demand than has been assumed in the past."[37]

How much, then, might a really intensive conservation effort reduce the predicted level of energy demand in the United States, by the late 1980s, of roughly 51 million barrels per day in oil equivalent? Our best guess is that if the government, Congress as well as the executive branch, were to approve and get behind realistic programs of subsidies and incentives, the result could be savings on the order of eight million barrels per day of oil equivalent, which would be five mb/d more than the results of increased conservation now forecast by the Department of Energy

differences. The energy consumption in one home was double that in a neighboring townhouse that was structurally identical.

[37] The results are summarized in: Demand and Conservation Panel of the [NAS] Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, "U.S. Energy Demand: Some Low Energy Futures," *Science*, April 14, 1978, pp. 142–52. The four scenarios projected total primary energy consumption in 2010 at the oil equivalent of 27, 35, 44 or 64 mb/d compared with consumption in 1975 of 33 mb/d. Price assumptions were a quadrupling in real terms of 1975 prices in the first two scenarios, a doubling in the third, and unchanged in the last. The panel stressed the important conceptual point that energy conservation is, in effect, a source of energy: "A major slowdown of demand growth can be achieved simultaneously with significant economic growth by substituting technological sophistication for energy consumption." In other words, after capitalizing on the relatively simple steps that can save considerable energy, conservation technologies can compete with supply technologies for the energy "services" market.

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(Table I), reducing total energy consumption to 46 mb/d of oil equivalent.

We are confident that such further savings in energy consumption in the United States can be achieved without affecting predicted levels of economic growth. Indeed, mounting evidence strongly suggests that energy conservation is itself a form of productive investment, yielding much more rapid and substantial real changes in the energy balance of the nation than almost any given investment in energy production. Furthermore, it can actually stimulate employment, innovation and solidly based economic growth.[38]

But "conservation energy" is not so simple to recover as it might seem. Unfortunately, it is a diffuse source, and it has no clear constituency in the way that oil, gas, coal and nuclear do. Public policy must be its champion, and many different strategies will be needed. If we had decades, then the market alone, working through gradual rises in prices, would be sufficient. But the decades are not there. For conservation to make the kind of contribution it should in the relevant time span, there must be found an adroit mixture of signals—of price, regulation, incentives and information. Only in that way can conservation actions become as economically attractive to individual decision-makers as they are to the society at large.

The American system is particularly responsive to incentives, and that is where public policy has been particularly loath to intrude. Up to now, the failure of public policy has been its inability to assess the true prices and true risks of conventional alternatives, and its consequent inability to measure against them the costs of incentives that will promote conservation.

IX

Table II, opposite, shows the results of the balanced program we believe should be pursued to meet U.S. energy needs in the late 1980s without increasing the amount of oil we import. This is not an "either-or" program. On the contrary, it presupposes

[38] See, for example, *Creating Jobs Through Energy Policy,* Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., March 15–16, 1978, pp. 28–39; Fred Dubin, "Analysis of Energy Usage on Long Island from 1975 to 1995: The Opportunities to Reduce Peak Electrical Demands and Energy Consumption by Energy Conservation, Solar Energy, Wind Energy, and Total Energy System," Dubin, Mindel, Blum Associates, New York, October 31, 1975. See also the published Report of the 55th American Assembly, *Improving Energy Efficiency: The Role of Public Policy,* New York: American Assembly, November 2–5, 1978; a volume of detailed studies used at the Assembly will be published in mid-April 1979, John Sawhill, ed., *Energy Conservation and Public Policy,* New York: Prentice-Hall.

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every reasonable effort to increase domestic supplies of conventional fuels, including:

1. The leasing of offshore oil and gas properties, under strict environmental regulations, and in a manner to promote rapid development.
2. Decontrol of *newly found* oil and gas, and of oil obtained by using enhanced recovery methods to produce oil left behind after normal recovery methods have been used.
3. Government assistance for technologies that could provide new supplies—such as coal gasification and liquefaction, and extraction of shale oil.
4. A major attempt by the government to find an acceptable method to dispose of spent fuel from nuclear reactors.

Unless measures such as these are pursued, there might be very little, if any, increase above the 27 million barrels a day of oil equivalent from the four traditional sources. Indeed, there could be an absolute decline, potentially making the United States far more dependent on imported oil than current forecasts indicate. But whether the four domestic sources increase somewhat, remain constant or decline, the broad choice before the United States is the same—increased dependence on imported oil, or a transition

TABLE II

U.S. ENERGY SUPPLY
BALANCED PROGRAM FOR LATE 1980s

(in millions of barrels daily of oil equivalent)

	Actual 1977	*Conventional Program Late 1980s*	***Balanced Program Late 1980s***
Domestic (excluding U.S. Exports)			
Oil	10	10	**10**
Natural Gas	9	9	**9**
Coal	7	12	**11**
Nuclear	1	3	**2**
Subtotal, "traditional"	27	34	**32**
Solar, including hydro	1	2	**4**
TOTAL DOMESTIC	28	36	**36**
Imports			
Oil	9	14	**9**
Gas	*	1	**1**
Subtotal	9	15	**10**
TOTAL	37	51	**46**
Extra Conservation	—	3	**8**
GRAND TOTAL	37	54	**54**

SOURCE: Authors' estimates for the Balanced Program. The other two columns are from Table I and are included for purposes of comparison.

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to a more balanced energy system in which conservation and solar energy play large roles.

The attentive reader may, at this point, be bothered by what seems a paradox of our argument. On the one hand, we say that conservation and solar energy are the most effective alternatives to imported oil. Yet, on the other, the thrust of our argument is to point out that they suffer from the least momentum and the weakest advocacy. Do not the very difficulties faced by conservation and solar, some may say, undercut our argument?

The answer lies in clarifying the handicaps under which conservation and solar energy labor. To begin with, they run against the force of habit, the familiar patterns of energy production that have been associated with the great period of postwar economic growth. Second, conservation and solar do not now have a fair chance in the market to compete with imported oil and other traditional sources. The subsidies caused by price controls that encourage consumers to use oil, gas and electricity run into tens of billions of dollars yearly.[39] Moreover, many of the conventional sources carry potentially great external costs that are not reflected in prices. Indeed, these costs tend to be seriously underestimated. Studies, for instance, often equate the health costs of pollution with lost wages plus medical expenses. Presumably, in such a formulation, it "costs" society very little for a non-working wife to contract lung cancer from air pollution if she dies quickly, so that large medical bills are avoided.[40]

Third, conservation and solar lack the constituency of the conventional sources. A solar constituency is beginning to develop, but it is still quite small, and is often disregarded as a fringe element. Conservation has virtually no constituency. As the former assistant Federal Energy Administrator for conservation observed: "The oil companies and utilities are busy talking up how much they need to produce. But no one's out there wholesaling conservation by the ton and barrel."[41]

[39] In addition, some analysts estimate that conventional domestic energy sources have already received subsidies greater than $120 billion, and that producers are continuing to receive subsidies. Battelle Memorial Institute, *An Analysis of Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate Energy Production,* Springfield (Va.): National Technical Information Service, March 1978.

[40] Some studies have attempted to overcome this error by giving all housewives the value of a domestic servant or using time-motion studies to price housewives' services as though person-hours from the labor force were purchased as a replacement. Psychic values, pain, and suffering are omitted. See Barbara S. Cooper and Dorothy P. Rice, "The Cost of Illness Revisited," Social Security Administration, DHEW Publication No. (55A) 76-11703, reprinted from the *Social Security Bulletin,* February 1976, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

[41] Remarks by Roger Sant to the Conference Board, Federal Energy Administration release, September 30, 1975.

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Fourth, conventional energy sources generally depend upon centralized production by highly competent firms. In the past, it has proved much easier to generate electricity in a central power plant, and then distribute it over wires to the population. Large firms will continue to play an important role in energy production. But conservation and solar energy involve much more decision-making and action at the point of end-use of energy. They involve a move away from a producer-dominated system to a more balanced one, in which consumers play an important, rather than passive, role as well. But that, in turn, means that energy decision-making becomes highly decentralized, involving millions and millions of actors, often poorly informed, without easy access to capital or to the requisite skills, and for whom energy is only one of a myriad of concerns, rather than the central organizational focus. To reach these actors, indeed, represents a problem, but the California experience with financial incentives for solar installations indicates that it is possible. What is needed are government policies that reflect an adroit blend of pricing, incentives, regulations, and information.[42]

An ever-more-regulated system is not the answer to the problems posed by energy. But if the market is to resolve the problems, its distortions must be corrected so that all energy sources, including conservation and solar, will be able to compete on an equal footing. Without a transition to a more balanced energy program, the market system itself in the years ahead will inevitably become increasingly constrained by regulation and disruption. Although both incentives and sanctions have a role to play in the process of equilibration, the emphasis should be placed on incentives. The carrot makes for better politics and more acceptable change than does the stick.

The last point is crucial, because a politically acceptable program that can make a significant contribution to a solution of the energy problem is better than one that might theoretically solve it altogether but which has no chance of being adopted.

We do not claim to know the exact appropriate level of subsidy for conservation and solar energy. The fact that the true costs of imported oil are potentially at least three times its current U.S. market price suggests an offsetting subsidy of two-thirds of the cost of implementing conservation and solar energy. We do not, however, recommend this large a subsidy, for we acknowledge

[42] The enactment in California of a tax credit of 55 percent for solar installations caused a boom in the solar industry in that state, as discussed in our *Energy Future Report*.

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readily that our calculations are only crude approximations. Furthermore, for the most part we would think somewhat lower subsidies would probably be sufficient to encourage a substantial increase in investment in conservation and solar energy. We suggest, as rough guides, conservation subsidies of 40 to 50 percent and solar subsidies up to 60 percent, with the higher solar subsidies being justified because of the need—and value to society—of encouraging the diffusion of technology not widely used.

Are we not talking about a great deal of money? How to pay for this kind of program, especially at a time when budget-cutting has become a preoccupation in Washington? Most oil and gas executives realize that a windfall tax on part of the profits that result from deregulation of old oil is inevitable. We would propose that the windfall tax be specificially assigned to financing—primarily by tax credits, but also by grants and loans—conservation and solar energy, which are the two most promising alternatives to oil. And, as the windfall tax might be self-extinguishing as we move to a free market for domestic oil and gas, so these credits might be self-extinguishing over a period of ten years—an important feature because it has often proved difficult in the past to stop programs once launched. Our proposal would thus respond to two of the most urgent problems in U.S. energy policy—the stimulation of conservation and solar energy, and the need to gradually free all oil prices, not just those of new oil.[43]

As it is today, the system of price regulation of oil is highly irrational. And, if our analysis about the impact of larger rather than smaller oil imports is correct, then an irrational American pricing system could be one of the main causes of much higher oil prices in the years ahead, with all that will do to the Western economies. It makes no sense for the United States to be as integrated as it is into the world oil market—as by far the largest consumer of OPEC oil—and yet have a pricing system that is insulated from the market.

Our proposal would respond to another need, a political need, if the nation is ever to resolve its energy difficulties. It would help

[43] In our *Energy Future Report*, although we call for considerably larger financial incentives than those contained in the National Energy Act of 1978 (providing for tax credits of up to 15 percent for conservation, with a $300 limit, and 15–30 percent for solar installation, with a $2200 limit), the taxes collected by the government from the windfall would sustain the general range of tax credits (or other incentives) likely to be given for conservation and solar energy under our recommendations. Note that the rationalization of gas prices, so that consumers paid market value, would also require the deregulation of old gas, which would presumably also be accompanied by some kind of windfall tax on the profits.

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to bridge the gap between contending parties in the bitter American energy debate. The various interest groups—oil and gas producers, advocates of conservation and solar, even environmentalists and consumerists—are secret allies, though, to understate the matter, not all by any means would recognize this truth. Oil and gas producers are convinced that they need higher prices in order to maintain production. Advocates of conservation and solar energy should recognize that they need higher prices to make their programs more attractive. Consumerists need somewhat higher prices now to help protect the public against the awesomely high prices that could eventuate if the United States does end up importing 14 million barrels a day of oil. It is not merely rhetoric, but absolute necessity, to find some ways to make this alliance clear to the various participants. Our proposal reconciles their interests.

Moreover, we wish to stress the need for greater understanding among normally warring parties. For instance, public interest groups must understand the substantial and complex difficulties faced by utilities as they try to adapt to the new energy era. Utilities should be partners in the promotion of conservation and solar energy. The exclusion of utilities from the conservation business in the 1978 National Energy Act was, in this connection, not some minor mistake, but a major blunder, creating a very significant and totally unnecessary barrier to the exploitation of conservation possibilities.

X

In sum, the government must lead, for the only thing that is going to happen "automatically" in the years immediately ahead is an ever greater stream of imported oil. But government leadership does not mean government management. Rather, it means correcting market defects in a way to create more jobs and more business opportunities for both large established companies and small new firms with a stake in conservation and solar energy.

The balanced program we suggest seems politically more workable than other proposals. Of course, there is an important variation that some would offer as at least theoretically possible. That would be to take our principle of the "fair chance" and also apply it to conventional domestic resources by giving financial incentives to producers of domestic energy: oil, gas, coal, and nuclear power. But we have serious doubts that this program would be politically

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acceptable.[44] For some time, the government has not even allowed finders of new oil and gas to obtain world prices. To obtain a large premium *over* world prices would seem completely impossible, at least for many years to come. It must be recognized that many people question whether even world prices, much less a financial incentive in addition to world prices, would be justified by the incremental domestic energy forthcoming. This is especially the case, given the lack of success in keeping U.S. oil and gas reserves from declining even after the dramatic price jumps that have occurred since 1973, and given the environmental costs and resultant political barriers associated with coal and nuclear power. Furthermore, analyses—albeit of a preliminary nature—suggest that even without considering external costs, conservation and solar energy are cheaper for at least an additional ten mb/d of oil equivalent than are conventional energy sources.[45]

There are many who do not wish to face this reality. They would still say that if the financial incentives proposed here for conservation and solar energy were also given to producers of conventional sources, then the pay-off would be as good or even better. We would reply that substantial effort has already gone into conventional production. Conservation and solar energy are, on the other hand, largely untested possibilities, and yet the effort required to exploit them seems doable and economic, and also less socially disruptive than trying to force too much from conventional sources.

The matter can be expressed thusly: our conventional energy production—oil, gas, coal, and nuclear—may be thought of as an already well-explored producing region. We favor continuing and augmenting production in that terrain. No reader should mistake our commitment there. But, in terms of allocating resources and effort for further major increments of energy, the evidence strongly indicates that the nation would be better served by concentrating its exploratory and development "drilling" in the highly promising but still largely untested acreage of conservation and solar energy.

[44] A variation of this alternative would call for a tariff sufficiently large on imported oil to allow all domestic energy prices to rise substantially above world levels and to raise the price of electricity to a level equivalent to replacement costs. We do not believe that this is a politically viable alternative.

[45] For conservation, see Roger Sant, "A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential to Adjust Capital Stock to Higher Energy Using Efficiencies," (mimeographed) presented to the Annual National Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., February 14, 1978; and for conservation and solar energy, see Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, in our *Energy Future Report.*

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What we propose here would represent the beginning of a realistic transition for the United States away from ever-growing and ever more dangerous dependence on foreign oil. No other nation has so great an impact on the entire international energy system. It is time for the United States to come to terms with the realities of the energy problem, not with romanticism, but in a pragmatic and reasonable way—and not out of altruism, but for the most pressing reasons of self-interest.

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Laurence H. Silberman

TOWARD PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

This article challenges the notion that it is appropriate for Foreign Service officers to routinely occupy senior policymaking positions in the State Department. As a recent "political" ambassador who has also served at a senior level in domestic departments of our government, I confess that I ended my ambassadorial stint with less than friendly feelings toward the Foreign Service as a whole. Since then, reflecting as dispassionately as possible on my own observations and looking with some care into past history, I have concluded that the frictions that have arisen almost continuously between the Service and successive Presidents (and their political appointees) have their roots deep in the system of appointments itself—and that they lend themselves to constructive remedies.

The practice of having Foreign Service officers in senior State Department positions goes back a long way; in the minds of many it has attained the status of an accepted convention. I believe it is time to reject that convention, not only because it is fundamentally inconsistent with American democratic theory, but also because—perhaps more directly relevant to those interested in the substance of foreign policy—for the last 50 years the Foreign Service's quite natural desire to preserve and expand these job opportunities has caused or exacerbated unfortunate clashes with presidential authority over the conduct of foreign policy. As Professor James Q. Wilson of Harvard has recently observed, indispensable to a full understanding of any government department's policy-formulating process is an appreciation of that department's formal and informal incentive system.[1] So long as the Foreign Service sees itself in competition with political appointees for senior positions,

[1] James Q. Wilson, *The Investigators*, New York: Basic Books, 1978, *passim.*

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it will instinctively resist presidential direction of the substance of foreign policy. In resisting the legitimacy of political appointments essential to presidential control, it inevitably rejects as well the legitimacy of political direction.

Indisputably, the Foreign Service has much to offer in the fashioning and implementation of foreign policy, but the troublesome friction to which I refer has often led Presidents and their appointees to reject the Service's views out of hand. It is time, I submit, to call a halt to this long struggle. Accordingly, in my conclusion I suggest a legislative modus vivendi, one which takes account of the need to maintain, indeed improve, the Foreign Service's morale.

II

Perhaps it is because Foreign Service officers (and many of their journalistic champions) have relatively little experience with the American government as a whole that they are unaware of how anomalous is their claim to policymaking positions.

Senior political posts in the executive branch of the U.S. government, those presumed to carry policymaking functions, are almost invariably presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation. For the most part, they are designated as executive appointments at levels from one through four: level one is reserved to the Cabinet (and the Special Trade Representative); level two is typically a deputy secretary (but also includes the Directors of the CIA and FBI); level three embraces the under secretaries and level four the assistant secretaries. Men and women who fill these jobs are normally thought of as part of the President's team; indeed, they are extensions of the presidency.

Among the world democracies, the United States uniquely functions with so many political appointments at senior levels of government. But the United States' tripartite governmental structure is also unique. The parliamentary democracies fuse legislative and executive powers; the civil service in those countries, therefore, looks only to one political authority. By contrast, in the United States both a presidential sun and a congressional moon exert a gravitational pull on the Civil Service. Since our chief executive must compete with legislative authority for the allegiance, or even the attention, of the Civil Service, it follows that he needs a considerable number of senior executives in the departments who are closely tied to his political fortunes. Even these ties do not guarantee him bureaucratic support, but they ensure an irreducible minimum of influence.

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In all the executive departments save State, these executive-level appointments almost invariably go to supporters of the President—persons who share his political goals, or at least are drawn from the President's political party. To be sure, occasionally a civil servant will be selected for political appointment but, in that event, he or she is assumed to have abandoned the neutrality of the career service and does not return to career status when the administration leaves office.

The State Department is structured like other executive departments with a secretary, deputy secretary, four under secretaries, and over a dozen assistant-secretary-level positions. In addition, however, there are more than 150 ambassadorships, all presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation and carrying an executive-level ranking—depending on the importance and size of the embassy—from two through five. The more important ambassadorships, then, have equivalent rank to the deputy or under secretary posts since an ambassador, in theory, personally represents the President of the United States in his assigned country. According to strict protocol, the American ambassador outranks even the Secretary of State at his embassy (a protocol nicety that few ambassadors have dared assert). As a direct representative of the President, an ambassador is not restricted to communications with the State Department. Some have even advanced personal views or positions espoused by other departments that ran counter to State's wishes—unless instructed otherwise by the President. It is not unknown, for that matter, for Presidents to direct ambassadors on certain sensitive matters without even informing the State Department.

Over the years, however, the majority of these embassies and a goodly proportion of the senior posts in Washington have been occupied by career Foreign Service officers who maintain their career status while in these positions. Accepted Washington wisdom, as disseminated by the diplomatic press corps, holds that these appointments should normally go to Foreign Service officers. Career status has, in the State Department, been deemed synonymous with merit. Political appointments are implicitly regarded as non-meritorious. During the presidential campaign of 1976, for example, C. L. Sulzberger, the venerable if predictably conventional foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, paused in a little town outside of Plains, Georgia to write a column in which he described the importance of a presidential candidate committing himself to appoint Foreign Service officers to ambassadorships. After his subsequent meeting with Jimmy Carter, he breath-

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lessly reported that, sure enough, the Democratic candidate was determined to make "merit" appointments to foreign policy positions. After the election, as we all saw, Jimmy Carter did not completely accept the congruence of career status and merit. He did appoint fewer political ambassadors but, in contrast to the Ford-Kissinger Administration, President Carter took more care to ensure that his assistant and under secretaries were drawn from political circles that shared the President's foreign policy philosophy.

III

The Foreign Service has persistently argued for a congressionally imposed limit on the number or percentage of non-career appointments to ambassadorships and has grumbled at what it regards as excessive appointments of non-careerists to comparable positions in Washington. A necessary corollary to the Service's position has been its explicit assumption that foreign policy—unlike all other responsibilities of government—is not appropriately a subject for political difference. As Fred Iklé recently put it, the Foreign Service has a direct career interest in defending the cliché that "politics stops at the water's edge."[2]

George Kennan, perhaps the leading apostle of foreign policy careerism (some say elitism), argues that our political parties play no important role in the long-term formulation of foreign policy because in the United States, unlike Europe, they are not ideological. He sees them as purely pragmatic groupings of various constituencies without ideological content. When politicians challenge the Foreign Service's conduct of policy, they are, according to Kennan, responding merely to "highly organized lobbies and interest groups."[3]

The ultra-careerist must thus denigrate the impact of politics on foreign policy, for if it were to be conceded that our political parties do represent alternative philosophies of foreign policy, it would also have to be conceded, consistent with democratic theory, that the successful party is entitled to place its adherents in senior State Department positions to carry out its philosophy.

Kennan and his supporters, I submit, fundamentally misunderstand our political system. American political parties can indeed be seen as competitive constituency groupings, but these have always been bound together in significant degree by an ideological

[2] "Beyond the Water's Edge: Responsible Partisanship in Foreign Policy." *Common Sense*, Summer 1978.

[3] "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," *Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 1977, pp. 148–57

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glue of varying viscosity—using "ideology" simply to mean a reasonably coherent set of ideas about the relationship between government and its citizens. Our great geographical and cultural diversity, as virtually every first-year college student is taught, has caused a certain degree of ideological overlapping. Still, for almost 50 years the Republican Party, or at least its central core, has differed with the Democrats over the fundamental issue of the desirability, equity, even morality of coercive redistribution of wealth and income, and the corollary question of the growth of governmental power.

Moreover—and this point is crucial—domestic ideological differences have always been, in part, reflected in the differing foreign policy approaches of the Democratic and Republican Parties. Surely the restrained enthusiasm with which conservative Republicans view delegations of authority to the United Nations is ideologically connected to Republican distrust of domestic governmental growth, and the greater receptiveness with which most liberal Democrats examine the developing nations' demand for a New International Economic Order is related to their espousal of domestic economic redistribution. For most liberal Democrats, "narrowing the gap" in world income by direct transfers of wealth follows ineluctably from their domestic political objective of similarly "narrowing the income gap" among Americans. Domestic liberals—and most are Democrats—are almost as prone to believe that world order can be achieved through supranational planning as they are to believe that we should move toward greater governmental planning domestically. Conservatives, by contrast, in both domestic and foreign policy, tend to distrust rationalistic schemes and give greater deference to the natural growth of domestic and international structures. These differences, between liberal and conservative, go back to Rousseau and Burke.

True, domestic ethnic, religious and racial lobbies have always exerted political influence on American foreign policy. In recent years U.S. policy toward disputes in the Aegean, the Middle East and southern Africa has been so shaped. Still, these issues are not without ideological content. Most American blacks, for instance, are aligned with the Democratic Party, which party, particularly President Carter's wing, has seemed much less troubled by black African nationalism with a Marxist flavor than have Republicans. This, in turn, is clearly related to the present Administration's overall effort to reduce the anti-communist character of American foreign policy.

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Although both parties share a strong distaste for totalitarianism, Republicans are naturally, on the whole, more distrustful and fearful of totalitarianism on the Left and Democrats more apprehensive of its rightist counterpart. That is surely why Roosevelt's foreign policy in the 1930s was more aggressively anti-fascist than many Republicans thought prudent. And why Republican views for years have been, on the whole, more aggressively anti-communist.

Admittedly, there are important foreign policy differences within both parties. The 1976 Reagan challenge to President Ford was most successfully rooted in foreign policy disagreements centered on the Ford-Kissinger policy of détente. In that respect there are similarities between conservative Republicans and the Jackson-Moynihan-Nunn wing of the Democratic Party. That these kinds of issues are often disputed intra-party as well as inter-party does not at all detract from the proposition that our political process properly accommodates foreign policy debates or that they normally have an ideological content. Senator Jackson, like Governor Reagan, lost his primary fight for nomination and, therefore, as much as some of us might regret it, President Carter was certainly on sound democratic (note the small "d") grounds in rigorously excluding Jackson Democrats, as well as orthodox Republicans, from significant foreign policy positions. They manifestly would not fit.

I do not mean to suggest that American foreign policy will or should shift 180 degrees as administrations change. In the first place, the great strength of American democracy is the relatively narrow degree of ideological differences between our political parties with respect to *either* domestic or foreign issues. What we virtually all agree upon—our shared premises—is greater than that which divides us. Therefore, philosophic changes in foreign policy orientations, while significant, will not be fundamental—not sea changes.

Second, the United States does have relatively permanent economic and strategic interests that no administration, regardless of ideology, can ignore. To be sure, which of those interests are vital is very much a political question because vital interests are those a nation is willing to take substantial risks to preserve or advance. Thus, different administrations may well be willing to assume greater political, economic and even military costs, on the margin, to protect different objectives. Put another way, the political process sets priorities on national interests; Vietnam was in that manner continually downgraded from vital to borderline to irrel-

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evant. No computer or group of wise men can objectively divine the outer boundaries of vital interests, because in a democracy the people as a whole must determine the acceptable cost-benefit ratio of actions that preserve or advance foreign policy goals. Still, the central core of our policy, or any nation's policy, will always be shaped by objective factors. Not surprisingly, then, as time passes, we see that at least certain of President Carter's policies have begun to conform to those of the preceding Administration. Take, for example, the abandonment of the Turkish arms embargo or the President's "Camp David" change in Middle East policy.

Some scholars argue that ideology should play little or no role in the conduct of foreign policy, but it is hard to take that position seriously. Can one imagine American policy in this century uninfluenced by antipathy to or a healthy fear of fascism and communism? Nonetheless, how much weight ideology should be given when fashioning policy toward other nations is surely questionable. As Bayless Manning put it, since the beginning of the Republic pragmatism and ideology, held in uneasy balance, have been twin themes of our foreign policy.[4] Sometimes an administration has emphasized ideological factors over pragmatic ones, for example, Woodrow Wilson's self-determination, John Foster Dulles' anti-communism, and Jimmy Carter's human rights. At other times, as most recently with Kissinger's Realpolitik, pragmatism seems to dominate.

I suggest that a long-term aim of our policy is to keep these considerations, ideology and pragmatism, in appropriate balance. No magic formula, however, will permanently achieve that equation. The best means to keep these factors in balance, and the one most appropriate to our system of government, is partisan public debate. Inevitably, the administration in power will emphasize one or the other factor and the party out of power will duly criticize the administration for overemphasis—just as the Democrats attacked Dulles for excessive moralizing and Kissinger for too little attention to moral concerns. The political process ensures that the balance can never be tipped too far in one direction.

In that fashion, I would argue, partisan political debate over foreign policy serves long-run stability rather than instability. The democratic process is often thought to jeopardize professionally devised foreign policy continuity; in fact, it ensures a deeper continuity which eludes totalitarian states. The key theoretical

[4] Bayless Manning, "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 271–284.

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proposition, then, of the careerists' argument for their own dominance of senior foreign policy positions—that domestic politics is the appropriate process for the resolution of domestic economic and social issues, but *not* for foreign policy questions—is plainly and demonstrably wrong.

IV

Still, political theory aside, the question of expertise remains. Foreign Service spokesmen maintain that the conduct (and fashioning) of foreign policy is inherently subtler and more sophisticated than other facets of governmental responsibility. The stakes, moreover, are much higher—particularly in a thermonuclear world. American democracy, it is argued, has no practical choice but to delegate to its Foreign Service greater responsibility than is granted to the domestic Civil Service. George Kennan assumes this delegation when he describes the Foreign Service officer as an anomaly not belonging to "that great body of *lower-level* servicing personnel known as the civil service" but rather somewhere between the ordinary civil servant and the political appointee.[5]

The grade, rank and pay of Foreign Service officers, however, is comparable to that of Civil Service officers—except when the former are serving in those executive-level presidential appointments described earlier—so Congress has not explicitly made the delegation Kennan assumes.[6] In fact, the Foreign Service was created through executive orders of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft and the Rogers Act of 1924 to bring our diplomatic personnel up to the professional standards of the Civil Service.

But should the Foreign Service be regarded as superior to the Civil Service? Is the substance of foreign policy so uniquely challenging as to compel acceptance of a Foreign Service policy-making role?

To answer No, to reject this claim, it is not necessary to denigrate the complexities of foreign affairs. It is only necessary to observe that other aspects of governmental responsibilities are no less complex. I would go further, however. The average American has a sounder instinctive grasp of the basic dynamics of foreign policy

[5] Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 151 (emphasis added). Surely, this unwarranted assumption of the superiority of the Foreign Service over the Civil Service owes much to the "aristocratic" social origins of Foreign Service officers of the 1920s and 1930s (and the pretensions of some others whose backgrounds were more modest). See Martin Weil, *A Pretty Good Club,* New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. That is not to say that today's Foreign Service is drawn primarily from the same social circles, but the sense of superiority remains—in search of a justifying rationale.

[6] The last step of an FSO-1's pay schedule is equivalent to a GS-18. There is a handful of career ministers who carry the grade of executive level five; there are also, however, a number of executive level five positions in the domestic departments filled by civil servants.

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than he does of domestic macroeconomics (the management of which is, after all, the most important domestic responsibility of the government). Common sense—the sum of personal experiences—will take one farther in the realm of foreign policy than in macroeconomics. Even children playing together begin to learn lessons about the balance of power—to prevent one from dominating others—but they manifestly do not learn the way people behave economically in the aggregate. As George Will laments, much of domestic democratic government consists of futile efforts to reverse economic laws—laws, I would add, that are rooted in human nature.

The Foreign Service contends that the actual conduct of day-to-day relations between countries—as opposed to the administration of domestic departments—requires of those who do this business special expertise that *only* professionals with a lifetime of training gain; expertise both in the process of diplomacy itself and in profound knowledge of the nature of other societies. The military is a favorite analogy used to buttress this argument. We do not appoint politicians to senior military commands because we recognize the need for that special expertise which only the careerist can provide; the same reasoning, it is argued, should govern appointments to the senior foreign policy commands. On close examination, this analogy disintegrates. Civilian or political control of the military is well established in the United States. Consequently, the Assistant Secretaries of the Defense Department and of the services are invariably drawn from the ranks of civilians, and the military are almost never given political authority (the exception would be temporary wartime or postwar occupation of enemy territory).[7]

To be sure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff report directly to the President in his role as Commander in Chief. This is obviously of more practical significance in war than in peace. But war and planning for war are a good deal more specialized and outside the experience of most politicians than the conduct of diplomacy. (For that matter, it is equally outside the experience of the Foreign Service, which surely is one of the reasons why, when George Kennan recently called for a special conclave of experts to redefine Soviet capabilities and intentions, he excluded any consideration of the Soviet military buildup.)

Drawing once again upon James Q. Wilson, if one wishes to

[7] Ironically, the State Department argues, usually successfully, that military serving in foreign countries should be subordinate to ambassadors, for the latter carry *political* authority as the direct representatives of the President.

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determine whether political appointees bring any desired attitudes or skills to the conduct of foreign policy, one should look carefully at the actual tasks performed both abroad and at home. What is it that diplomats actually do? Are there comparative advantages and disadvantages as between typical careerists and non-careerists with respect to requisite skills and experiences?

The Foreign Service is divided into four categories or "cones": political, economic, consular, and administrative. Political officers—from whose ranks the lion's share of ambassadors is drawn—are responsible, when abroad, for analyzing and reporting political trends and events in their assigned country. Economic officers, similarly, report on economic affairs, but when serving as commercial attachés or when supervising them, they are also responsible for searching out business opportunities for American firms, then helping these firms take advantage of those opportunities. Consular officers are charged with aiding Americans who run afoul of host country laws and also are responsible for the often vexing administration abroad of U.S. immigration laws. Administrative officers provide support services for the embassy, much as do administrative officers in the Civil Service.

All four groups must also represent American interests to the host country in their respective spheres. The job of an embassy, then, including the various attachés who work for other governmental departments (agricultural, military, legal, etc.) is partly to report to our own government on events in that country and partly to represent the American government and American interests there.

To do this job, officers need background and knowledge of the host country—including usually the host country's language as well as broad training in political theory, economics and history. They also, however, need an even more profound understanding of our own country, its governmental and political processes, and the nature of national objectives and interests. One who represents the United States obviously must understand it but in addition—and this is insufficiently appreciated—to report well on events in an assigned country, one must have an analytical framework which assigns relevance, and relevance depends on American interests. That assuredly does not mean that reporting should be filtered through an ideological prism which would distort the truth, but it does mean that there are all sorts of truths, and some are of more compelling interest than others.

The Foreign Service ambassador will often (but by no means always) have a deeper knowledge of the country to which he or

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she is assigned than a non-careerist, but the non-careerist often has a comparative advantage in understanding the United States, particularly if he or she comes to a post with a broad background in government, economics or scholarship.

Career officers typically complain that politicians and political appointees do not sufficiently appreciate "the world as it is." In a sense that is true. The Foreign Service will more accurately reflect trends and values prevailing outside the United States than the non-careerists. But, I believe, the converse is also true: the Service will less accurately reflect counterpart trends and values dominant within the United States. The Foreign Service in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s was significantly more sympathetic to dominant trends in Western Europe during that time, including what we have come to see as misguided ideas of accommodation with fascism, than was the Roosevelt Administration.[8] Today, I would argue that the Foreign Service is more willing to accommodate Marxist trends around the world than are many politicians or the American people as a whole. Essentially that is why Daniel Patrick Moynihan as U.N. Ambassador was so popular with the American public but so repugnant to our professionals.

To some extent the world, to the Foreign Service, is divided up into the sum total of ambassadorial posts. The resulting distortion is analogous to the political distortion at the United Nations (one dictator/one vote). Thus, Foreign Service partiality to the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli dispute over the last 30 years does not have its roots (as some critics have suggested) in undue deference to Arab oil power, nearly so much as in the fact that there are over a score of Arab capitals—which means there are that many embassies and that many ambassadorial slots in Arab nations.

Foreign Service officers necessarily tend to specialize in certain areas of the world; the burdens of language training alone ensure this. For self-advancement, an officer must be hospitably received in the country or countries in which he specializes. Moreover, once posted in a country, good reporting requires sources of information, particularly among influential or governing elites. Inevitably, therefore, a Foreign Service officer has a tendency toward what is referred to in the State Department as "clientism," a term which suggests overemphasizing the interests of a foreign country (as defined by the governing elite) vis-à-vis the broader interests of the United States. "Good relations" between the host country and the United States (often at our expense) become an

[8] See Weil, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 94–102 and 119–28.

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end in themselves without sufficient regard to U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests.[9] Some political appointees, admittedly, are subject to the same tendency, but since political appointees have other career options they are likely to be less susceptible to the germ.

The Foreign Service officer has a natural tendency toward caution; one advances in the Foreign Service by not making mistakes. It follows, then, that risk is to be avoided. One kind of avoidable risk involves too sharp a presentation of options. Just as a diplomat must often seek to paper over disputes between his own country and his assigned country, he learns to blur American foreign policy options for presentation to policymakers. Thus the State Department's nickname, "the Fudge Factory."

The other kind of risk typically eschewed by career officers is too vigorous a defense of American interests because such behavior can lead to relative unpopularity with the nation or group of nations in which the officer specializes—particularly if that group of nations shares a common ideology. For instance, two political appointees of Roosevelt in the 1930s, Claude G. Bowers to Spain and William E. Dodd to Germany, were far more outspoken in defending American values and ideology in the face of fascist attacks than the prevailing views within the career service or, in the case of Dodd, his career-service successor.[10]

At bottom, a good diplomat, like a good politician, domestic bureaucrat, businessman, lawyer or administrator, is one who exercises good judgment. The Foreign Service does attract, on the whole, the ablest men and women who enter government. But I would contend that it is relatively rare for Foreign Service officers in their first ten or 15 years to exercise responsibility equivalent to that available to a talented young person in the domestic Civil Service or, even more pronouncedly, outside government. Good judgment comes from the opportunity to exercise responsibility—even the opportunity to make mistakes. The Foreign Service is one of America's most rigidly hierarchical organizations. The most insignificant question must be passed up through the apparat, layer after layer. This is particularly so in Washington but true also in most embassies. Such an operational climate does not

[9] See "Clientitis, Corpulence and Cloning at State—The Symptomatology of a Sick Department," John Krizay, *Policy Review*, Spring 1978, pp. 39–55.

[10] Both Dodd and Bowers are discussed in the anecdotal but useful gallery of ambassadorial portraits by E. Wilder Spaulding, *Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary*, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961, pp. 170–77. For a more considered comparison of Dodd and his successor, Hugh Wilson, see Arnold A. Offner, *American Appeasement*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 206–16. How much of Hitler's well-known view of the weakness of Western democracies arose from his perception of Western professional diplomats?

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produce sufficient opportunities for junior officers to assume responsibility and, therefore, to develop seasoned judgment.

All of these considerations lead me to believe we would have a far better Foreign Service if we could provide incentives for Foreign Service officers to spend significant periods in domestic agencies where real responsibility can be offered earlier. The present personnel practice of the State Department discourages this. One-year stints on the Hill or with domestic agencies are not uncommon. But three or four years at the Treasury Department or Interior will actually injure the Foreign Service officer's career chances. By comparison, great newspapers will often assign journalists, whose function closely parallels certain tasks of the diplomat, alternately to domestic and foreign assignments. Indeed, the best foreign correspondents and columnists are those whose interests and experience include domestic affairs.

West European countries, in the main, rigorously segregate their foreign services from their domestic departments—and from political appointees as well. That should hardly be a persuasive precedent, however, since many of those countries are still burdened with an ancient tradition that demands aristocratic pedigrees (or reasonable contemporary facsimiles in the form of university degrees) from career diplomats. The communist states and many developing countries, on the other hand, often transfer diplomats back to responsible jobs in domestic affairs. This practice ensures that ambassadors are more well rounded and, not incidentally in my view, more aggressive in pursuit of national interests when serving abroad. That Japan, for instance, draws heavily upon its economic ministries for diplomats may be related to its persistent and successful pursuit of foreign markets.

It is sometimes observed—Harold Nicolson, the British counterpart to George Kennan, said it patronizingly—that career diplomats are trained to patience, whereas amateurs often blunder by seeking to accomplish too much during their relatively short tenure. There is a good deal of truth to that, but the other side of the coin is that the Foreign Service officer is often slow to see the importance of change, and "the essence of good foreign policy is constant re-examination."[11] For this reason, I believe we need both careerists and non-careerists among our diplomats.

V

What, it may be asked, does all of this have to do with the stuff of foreign policy? Does it really make much difference whether

[11] David Halberstam, *The Best and The Brightest*, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 121.

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our ambassadors and assistant secretaries are drawn from the career Foreign Service or from outside those ranks—and in what proportion? Is this just an unseemly squabble between two classes of jobseekers without relevance to the broad compelling issues of foreign policy? On the contrary, in my view the tension between political authority and careerists has had, and continues to have, an unfortunate impact on the shaping and articulation of these issues.

Consider the recurring frustration American Presidents express concerning their relative inability to control and direct the State Department. One need not agree with Daniel Yergin's revisionist theory of the cold war set forth in his recent *A Shattered Peace* to recognize that he chronicles a sad story of guerrilla warfare between the professional Foreign Service and the Roosevelt Administration. The story is amplified by Martin Weil's more recent *A Pretty Good Club.* Since the 1920s, the constant theme of the Foreign Service has been resistance to political appointees and that, in turn, has led to presidential hostility and various techniques to circumvent the Foreign Service. President Nixon's use of the National Security Council to fashion and implement his Soviet and China initiatives—because he distrusted the Foreign Service—parallels Roosevelt's efforts to conduct foreign policy, as Weil and Yergin recount, using various confidants outside the State Department. The Foreign Service did its best to sabotage Roosevelt's efforts to negotiate terms for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933; thereafter, he wisely did not trust his State Department.[12] Nixon, it seems, distrusted State even more than the domestic bureaucracies. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all, at one point or another, expressed the same exasperation with the State Department and sought to circumvent its institutional hostility.[13]

Now, of course, Presidents have been known to complain about unresponsiveness in other executive branch bureaucracies as well, but the State Department has been in a class by itself. If one thinks hard about this, it seems extraordinary. Other bureaucracies present difficulties for presidential direction because of their symbiotic relationship with domestic constituencies and congres-

[12] Weil, *op.cit.*, pp. 69–71.

[13] Dulles seems to have largely ignored the great bulk of the Foreign Service during Eisenhower's presidency, without too great a resistance since the Service was still terrorized by its searing experience with McCarthyism. See Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, Boston and Toronto: Atlantic Little, Brown, 1973, *passim.* By President Kennedy's time, the Service seems to have regained its urge to resist. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, pp. 451–61.

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sional committees and staffs—often referred to as "iron triangles." But as the Foreign Service so often complains, it has no supporting domestic constituency and, therefore, less of an institutional ally within the Congress. One would expect that the State Department would be the department most responsive to presidential will rather than the least. The answer to this paradox lies, I believe, in the resentment, unique in our government, that Foreign Service officers feel for political appointees in the State Department. This resentment inevitably leads Foreign Service officers toward resistance to any political direction of foreign policy—even presidential.

Of course, disputes between the Foreign Service and political authority are always couched in policy terms, but the root cause, I believe, is often found in the Foreign Service's natural fear of diminishing job opportunities and a concomitant wish to expand these. It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce attention career officers pay to the number of political appointments (like the unemployment rate, the absolute number is less "politically" significant than the rate and direction of change), or the resistance new political appointees encounter. I dare say this is less a reflection on the Foreign Service than it is an observation on human nature; any group of people would surely behave the same. One should keep in mind that promotion in the Foreign Service is more difficult than in the Civil Service; the personnel structure is more like a pyramid. So long as every political appointment is seen as a direct threat to the Foreign Service officer's career advancement, his or her attitude vis-à-vis both the appointee and the authority represented is inevitably negatively affected.

The most troublesome aspect of this phenomenon is that the bureaucratic struggle it causes takes on a life of its own. Since the career Foreign Service officer rejects the *legitimacy* of politically appointed ambassadors or assistant secretaries, it necessarily tends to reject whatever new ideas or perspectives those men or women bring to their posts. For instance, the previously mentioned Ambassadors Dodd and Bowers saw the dangers of European Fascism and Nazism with a good deal more clarity than the professional Foreign Service. But the views of both men were rejected and both were criticized for their efforts to defend American values under fascist attack. In turn, the President's appointees, if they are not beaten into submission by the obdurate hostility of the Foreign Service, tend to reject its expertise. A whole administration can thereby turn a deaf ear to legitimate concerns of conscientious Foreign Service officers.

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Patrick Hurley's experience is, in this respect, instructive. As our Ambassador to China during the crucial period of the Chinese civil war, he is often accused of ignoring—indeed, of persecuting—the old China hands, that corps of excellent Foreign Service China experts who consistently warned U.S. policymakers of the likely communist triumph in China. But what is not often noted is that Hurley, by the time he arrived in China as Special Envoy in 1944, had experienced several years of Foreign Service coolness or even hostility. He had undertaken several wartime missions for President Roosevelt and, in particular, after a sojourn in Iran as Roosevelt's Special Envoy, his recommendations for postwar U.S. policy toward that country—of which Roosevelt approved—had been buried by the State Department's hierarchy. To be sure, Hurley was a man of severe limitations, but the persistent hostility of the Foreign Service surely contributed to his inability to draw upon its expertise.[14]

Perhaps no one in recent years has more directly confronted the Foreign Service than Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whose views expressed both in his famous *Commentary* article "The United States In Opposition" and during his term as Ambassador to the United Nations so fundamentally challenged conventional wisdom as to the appropriate tactics the United States should employ vis-à-vis the Third World (as well as the "socialist" bloc). The implacable hostility he aroused in our own Foreign Service against a "politician" obscured the validity of Moynihan's analysis even for some officers who privately conceded much of his thesis. Andrew Young's more recent performance has generated similar if more muted disdain among the professionals. Moynihan and Young represent virtually polar philosophic extremes with respect to most foreign policy issues facing the United States; both have been, concerning the appropriate strategy and tactics the United States should employ vis-à-vis dictatorial Marxism, marginally further to their end of the pole than the administrations they have served. But both were appointed Ambassadors to the United Nations because of their views and not despite them, by administrations that wished these articulate men to help fashion the indispensable ideological component to foreign policy. Both, therefore, were entitled to the Foreign Service's full support rather

[14] For a dispassionate view of Hurley's encounters with the Foreign Service concerning Iran and later in China, see Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp. 124–33, and Chapters VI–XI. A sharply critical view of Hurley in China will be found in Theodore H. White, *In Search of History*, New York: Harper & Row, 1978, pp. 197–205.

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than the back-alley muggings which have characterized their respective tenures.[15]

Ostensibly it is their style to which the Foreign Service has most objected; neither man was sufficiently discreet to satisfy the requirements of career diplomacy (admittedly both made gaffes)—but the truth of the matter is that both sharply articulated fundamental policy issues so that the American people could see them. That is terribly threatening to the Foreign Service officer because it allows for political resolution of these issues.

The career Foreign Service officer will, and indeed should, exercise a cautious drag on political swings in foreign policy direction. Any government bureaucracy will do the same, since it has an intellectual and psychological investment in past policy. Particularly is this important in foreign affairs, since other nations, too, have investments in these policies. Capricious turns of the foreign policy wheel will inevitably undermine U.S. credibility. But the Foreign Service's challenge to the *legitimacy* of senior political appointees in the State Department does not serve a policy interest because it does not actually focus on policy. More, it extends beyond advice regarding fashioning of policy to constitute obstruction of the implementation of policy. And this, in a vicious circle, tends to generate within political authority a disposition to disregard completely whatever the Foreign Service has to contribute.

No one seems to have understood the difficulties in dealing with the Foreign Service better than Henry Kissinger. As National Security Adviser he deftly outmaneuvered the whole State Department including the senior political appointees, and as Secretary of State he exercised astonishingly successful control over most issues of foreign policy. He did so not by "managing" the State Department; middle- and lower level officials often were blissfully uninformed concerning Kissinger's strategy and tactics even in their areas of substantive responsibility. And when informed or partially informed, they were frequently shockingly open in their opposition, particularly in the early stages of his tenure as Secretary.[16] But Kissinger so centralized decision-making and personally so dominated the important cable traffic as to ensure his own direction of key policy movements. Naturally some

[15] For Moynihan's story see *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978. His *Commentary* article appeared in March 1975, pp. 31-44.

[16] Foreign Service morale at any point seems always to be worse than it was in the past but, as is true of any department, a strong Secretary with a coherent strategic view improves career morale in due course even when there is widespread disagreement with that Secretary's views. This appears to have been true in Mr. Kissinger's case.

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matters, like the Cyprus crisis of 1974, fell between the cracks, but Kissinger's energy and range were absolutely astonishing. To aid him—for not even Kissinger could do everything alone—he promoted into senior presidential appointments relatively young and capable Foreign Service officers who because of their junior status would be unusually loyal to the Secretary.

Most of these young men, however, had little attachment or loyalty to the Republican Administration or to the President. In fact, the majority were at least nominal Democrats, which of course accentuated their calculated dependence on Kissinger personally. As a result, the foreign policy of the United States appeared—and indeed was—the child of the Secretary of State without structural links to the Administration or the Republican Party. When, as was inevitable, foreign policy came under attack in the presidential campaign of 1976, both Reagan first, and Carter second, effectively denigrated President Ford's leadership by pointing to Henry Kissinger's dominant role. The senior appointees in the State Department were not then conspicuous, even in private, in their defense of the President. They may, as some have noted, have been busy with transition plans, but even if they had been willing to respond vigorously to the political attacks, as careerists they would not have been credible or effective.[17]

So even though Kissinger dominated the State Department's product to a degree not seen before, and probably not to be seen again, his technique did not lead to political—that is to say, presidential—control over foreign policy. Unless a President can command the political loyalty of all of his senior department appointees, political control is impossible.

VI

Three competing interests, then, are involved here. First, democratic control of foreign policy requires political presidential appointments in the State Department just as is the case with all other government departments. Second, the debilitating friction between administrations and the Foreign Service must be reduced. Third, spokesmen for the Foreign Service are right to concern us all with maintaining the morale of the Service. If a career officer cannot look forward to the day he or she is appointed an ambassador, we will not continue to attract top-grade talent into the Foreign Service. That consideration has led Service spokesmen to urge Congress to limit by statute the number or percentage of

[17] The tradition precluding State, Defense and Justice appointees from political campaigning does not and should not prevent their response to political criticism directed at policies or activities of their departments.

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non-career ambassadorial appointments. The Constitution, in my view, however, will not tolerate such legislative limitations on the presidential appointment power.[18]

These three conflicting policy interests—to encourage political control, to reduce competitive friction and to ensure a fixed percentage of ambassadorships for Foreign Service officers—can be accommodated. I propose a law that would convert all but a set number of ambassadorships, say 15 or 20, into appointments of the Secretary of State.[19] Incumbents would be limited to career officers and would carry their Foreign Service grade (normally at the top or close to it), but *not* an executive-level rank commensurate with senior presidential appointments. Of course, this would change the ostensible nature of these ambassadorships; they would no longer be seen as policymaking positions. But the truth of the matter is that few ambassadorships today are in practice real policymaking positions. As has been remarked too often, advances in transportation and communications have erased much discretion that ambassadors were once called upon to exercise. For the same reason, it is more a fiction than fact to describe most ambassadors as personal representatives of the President—they usually take directions drafted by an assistant secretary or below. No purpose is served in perpetuating the fiction.

[18] Congress has, over the years, sought to fashion legislative limits on the President's appointive discretion by specifying characteristics of those to be appointed to particular posts. When applied to executive branch appointments, this practice is constitutionally dubious; the more discretion is restricted, the more dubious the practice. Cf. Meyers v. U.S., 272 US 52: "We see no conflict between [congressional power to prescribe qualifications for office] and [presidental power] of appointment and removal provided, of course, that the qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation." The Senate could, as has been suggested, resolve or otherwise declare that it would not confirm more than a fixed number or percentage of political ambassadors. That approach strikes me as an unseemly circumvention of the Constitution.

[19] Under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, *all* Foreign Service officers like military officers are presidentially appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate—to a class or grade, rather than to a specific post (22 USC 906). The Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 specifies that "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States" shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It also provides, however, that "Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." "Inferior officers," as used here, is not a pejorative, but simply means officers who can be appointed by constitutionally recognized officers. Although the issue has never been squarely decided, and occasionally courts have referred to inferior officers as those not specifically mentioned in that clause (see U.S. v. Germaine, 99 US 508, 510) it seems more likely that ambassadors, public ministers and consuls would be regarded as inferior to the Secretary of State if appointed by the Secretary. Attorney General Cushing implied just that in an opinion (7 OP AG 186, at p. 217). He pointed out that "the term ambassadors and other public ministers comprehends all officers having diplomatic functions whatever their title or designation" (page 211). It is therefore quite unlikely that the Constitution intended that no diplomatic officer could be considered an "inferior officer." In any event, because Foreign Service officers are presidentially appointed and confirmed for all promotions, it is clearly not constitutionally required that they be nominated and confirmed to each ambassadorial job assignment, as is statutorily required today (22 USC 901).

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To be sure, some ambassadorships to countries whose relationships with the United States are of overriding importance are of a different order. Usually in those cases, a web of political, cultural, economic and military connections makes appropriate an American envoy who actually is the personal representative of the President rather than merely of the State Department. Fifteen or 20 ambassadorships would, therefore, be reserved for presidential appointments confirmed by the Senate, and could be used by the President as he wishes for those countries he and the Secretary regard as falling within that category. These need not be assigned to the largest nations; one can visualize a particularly sensitive negotiation, like that over the Panama Canal, which could require an ambassador-at-large or an ambassador to a small country drawn from this pool.

Some may contend that those nations to which a political appointment is not sent will object to an implied downgrading of their importance. The United States and all other nations, it will be recalled, were, for similar reasons, driven to convert all legations into embassies (ministers to ambassadors). But my proposal treats all titles the same; it is only grades and political status that vary among embassies. Grades already vary among ambassadors today, depending on the size and importance of embassies, and as to political status, the Foreign Service claims that most nations prefer a career officer (which is not necessarily true) so the issue cannot be argued both ways.

A careful examination of presidential appointments in the Department should also be made with an eye to converting any that should not be regarded as truly policy-level positions into career appointments of the Secretary. The rest, particularly assistant secretaries and above, like the small group of political ambassadors, will be the President's men and women.[20] This doesn't mean that Foreign Service officers would be ineligible for appointment to these positions; that, too, might be an unconstitutional abridgement of the President's appointment power. But—and it is a very big but—the law should require any Foreign Service officer who accepts such an appointment immediately to resign from the Service with no right of return. On those rare occasions in the past when a civil servant accepted a presidential appoint-

[20] A limited number of political appointments below the rank of presidential appointment would be necessary as immediate staff to presidential appointees, corresponding to the "Schedule C" or NEA appointments in other departments. These are now generally treated as Foreign Service Reserve appointments, but I would suggest a separate category to avoid needless friction. Perhaps one top administrative post could be reserved for a careerist who would then be recognized as the senior serving Foreign Service officer, but I do not see this post as carrying a line policy role like the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

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ment, that has been the practice in other departments[21] and it should be the rule in the State Department. Once having accepted a presidential appointment, a career officer should have committed his or her fortunes and loyalty to that President's administration. If the appointee has the right to return subsequently to the Service, either that commitment and the resulting presidential confidence will be undermined, or else subsequent administrations would be disadvantaged.

Some will certainly argue that it will be too difficult for either party to recruit able non-careerists for all senior posts—particularly toward the end of an administration. For that matter it is never easy to attract the very best political appointees into government in any department, but it can be done with sufficient effort. Surely the talent pool of those interested and experienced in foreign affairs throughout the nation is no smaller than that from which presidential appointees are drawn for other departments. It may not always be possible to find appointees with actual diplomatic experience any more than those coming into other departments have experience in the actual tasks performed by those departments. But it is not undesirable, in my view, that some political appointees bring different perspectives formed through varying experiences.

Others will contend that the conditions I would impose on Foreign Service officers who wish to accept a presidential appointment are draconian and will therefore effectively prevent careerists from serving in such positions. Admittedly, I do not mean to make it easy for ex-careerists to dominate policymaking positions; I would rather see the pool of other experienced political appointees in both parties expand. Nonetheless, a careerist who accepts a presidential appointment and is thereby forced to resign from the Foreign Service will hardly be unemployable when the appointing administration leaves office. We are, after all, discussing very senior appointments and the private market for such people is strong and will get even stronger. Moreover, depending on one's age, there is no reason to believe that such a person's diplomatic career would be finished upon the expiration of the appointing administration. Some, like the late David Bruce, might be ap-

[21] Unfortunately, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, effective this July, provides otherwise. Mr. Campbell of the Civil Service Commission believes, contrary to the thrust of this article, that civil servants should have the opportunity to serve in political appointments and still maintain Civil Service reemployment rights. I strongly doubt, however, given the tradition in the domestic departments, that many civil servants will be offered presidential appointments (other than such posts as Assistant Secretary for Administration), or that after receiving them, they would invoke the new right to return to Civil Service status. If they do, succeeding administrations would surely bury them.

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pointed in successive administrations; others would surely reappear when their party returned to office. In any event, it is probably advisable to consider some modification of the Foreign Service retirement scheme to ensure a greater measure of financial security for persons in this category.

If this proposal were made law, what benefits would flow from its implementation? Foreign policy formulation would thereafter be generally recognized as the responsibility of political authority and, at least conceptually, would be distinguished from foreign policy execution. The latter responsibility, clearly subordinated to the former, would be the task of the careerist. A clear line of demarcation between political appointments and career jobs would, both at home and abroad, substantially lessen that institutional friction between the Foreign Service and the presidency which has negatively affected the conduct of American foreign policy.

The Foreign Service would have gained a great deal, however: a fixed number or percentage of ambassadorships—the vast majority, at that—would be reserved to the careerist. What is crucial here is not so much the particular number, but that there be a fixed number. Certainty as to the number of political appointments would substantially relieve the quite natural career anxieties of Foreign Service officers; future political appointments would not thereafter be seen as the institutional threat they presently constitute. Furthermore, with only a relatively few ambassadorships to appoint—at senior levels—any President would be a good deal less likely to give those appointments to men and women whose primary qualification is financial campaign contributions.

Most important, as Presidents gained greater confidence in their ability to control the Foreign Service, they would have less incentive to circumvent the State Department. The undoubted expertise in that Department, therefore, would be more effectively employed.

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Jonathan B. Bingham
Victor C. Johnson

A RATIONAL APPROACH TO EXPORT CONTROLS

Last year, America's foreign trade deficit reached alarming new levels. Responding, President Carter announced in September a multifaceted program to encourage U.S. exports, and 15 members of the House of Representatives formed an Export Task Force to pursue the same objective. But also last year the President and Congress imposed various new limitations on exports, and 70 members of the House introduced a "Technology Transfer Ban Act," calling for broad prohibitions on exports to communist countries. In 1979, the Congress will have to reconcile these conflicting tendencies as it legislates an extension to the Export Administration Act, the principal authority for controls on civilian exports, which expires September 30.

Unfortunately, the political context in which Congress will face this task may not be conducive to dispassionate and objective analysis. Alarmists in Congress and the executive branch have seized upon the national uneasiness over Soviet actions in Africa, and the national revulsion over the treatment of Soviet dissidents, to subject the entire concept of East-West trade to the most serious attack it has faced in the last 15 years at least. The President's announcement last December 15 of the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China has excited passions ranging from euphoria over the trade possibilities, to eagerness to play the China card against the Soviet Union, to charges of selling out our friends on Taiwan. As this article goes to press, events in Iran and Afghanistan threaten to damage the climate further.

In this emotional atmosphere, it will be extremely difficult to maintain a focus on the tough but crucial questions of export control policy as it applies to the communist countries. To what degree is it possible for the United States to influence the growth of Soviet military capabilities by means of export controls? Since

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any trade has some potential for contributing to Soviet military capabilities (Khrushchev is said to have remarked that the United States should embargo buttons because they are used to hold up Soviet soldiers' pants), where do we draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable risk? How can we fashion an export control system that protects the national interest, without overburdening the bureaucracy that would implement the controls with either impossible judgments or unmanageable paperwork? How can we impose export controls without unnecessarily frustrating U.S. exports and losing business to other countries, including some of our closest allies?

These questions fall under the traditional heading of "national security controls"—dealing almost wholly with the export of products and advanced technology which might increase the military capabilities of communist countries. But, in addition, the Export Administration Act provides expressly for "foreign policy controls," designed to further the foreign policy of the United States, which may apply to any form of exports to any destination. Today the application of such controls is steadily growing, both through the denial of export licenses for individual items and through broader embargoes. Can these be handled wisely and with reasonable consistency?

And, finally, there are the cases where security and foreign policy interact and become hard to separate. Should we seek to exert economic pressure on the Soviet Union through the selective control of exports, specifically in areas relating to oil production? And how can we keep trade and export policy toward the U.S.S.R. and China in tune with the overall policy of balance defined by President Carter and Secretary of State Vance?

In addressing these questions, this article will stick mainly to the context of the Export Administration Act, proposing key guidelines for its revision. Such an approach necessarily omits detailed discussion of many other laws affecting exports—such as restraints on the Export-Import Bank, conditions attached to authorizations for economic aid and military aid and sales, and the special case of nuclear exports, which fall under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Each of these laws does indeed involve some form of export control based on foreign policy concerns, but the issues are inevitably more diffuse.[1]

[1] For the same reason, we omit discussion of legal provisions of a regulatory nature, which, though not designed to curb or restrain exports, are regarded by many American exporting businesses as significant restraints and burdens. Examples would be the laws affecting bribes

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The core of the problem of formal export controls continues to lie in East-West security problems and in the major foreign policy problems raised within the Export Administration Act.

II

In these days of difficulties in our relations with the Soviet Union, there are those who argue that the United States has no policy for controlling the transfer of strategic technology to the East, and that the policy we should have is one of "don't sell them anything." Both propositions are wrong.

The Export Administration Act makes it the policy of the United States "to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other nation or group of nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States." To give effect to that policy, the act authorizes the President to control the export of "any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data or any other information."

The reason U.S. policy is as stated in the Export Administration Act, and not one of "don't sell them anything," is that we tried the latter policy before, and it failed. For 20 years, under the Export Control Act of 1949, it was this country's policy to deny the Soviets any trade that would contribute to either their military or their economic potential. Since countries presumably trade *because* it improves their economic potential, this indeed came close to being a prescription for not selling the Soviets anything. This policy was abandoned when Congress passed the Export Administration Act and President Nixon signed it into law in 1969.

There were essentially three reasons for changing from a policy of economic denial to a more narrow strategic embargo. Usually, only one is mentioned today by critics of U.S.-Soviet trade: that we hoped by liberalizing trade to involve the Soviet Union in a "web of interdependence" with the West, and to promote détente. There is room for debate over the success of that strategy.

But there were two further reasons independent of the first. One was that our policy of maintaining a broad trade embargo on the Soviet Union clearly had not significantly retarded Soviet eco-

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overseas, antitrust laws, and environmental review requirements. The Export Administration Amendments of 1977 prohibiting American businesses from cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel or any similar boycott—while their effect on exports has in fact been minimal—are regarded by some businesses in the same light. For a brief summary discussion of export restrictions in this broader sense, see Marina v.N. Whitman, "A Year of Travail: The United States and the International Economy," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1978,* pp. 550–53.

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nomic growth or inhibited Soviet foreign policy. The other, related to the first, was that our allies had refused to go along with a broad embargo, and were simply selling the Soviets what we refused to sell, thereby taking business away from U.S. companies. Given this experience, it seemed prudent to relax the embargo policy, and to seek the benefits of trade with the Soviet Union to the extent that such trade would not damage the national security. It is interesting that Congress took this initiative even at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations were strained, in the aftermath of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

III

While our policy is reasonably clear, the effectiveness with which it is being carried out is justly the subject of considerable debate. In determining what reforms are necessary, we must consider the validity of some of the often-repeated criticisms of our export licensing system.

Some observers argue that U.S. controls on exports to the Soviet Union, particularly of advanced technology items such as computers and machine tools, are too loose, so that we are in effect helping the Soviets build up their technological—and consequently their military—capacity to the detriment of our national security. Others, particularly the advanced technology industries, feel the controls are too strict. They argue that we attempt to control too much obsolete technology which is generally available elsewhere and that, when we attempt to control what other technology producers are unwilling to control, we merely lose business to other countries without affecting what the Soviets can acquire.

In the authors' view, the question of whether this country's export controls for national security purposes are too tight or too loose is the wrong question. They can be both. This was the conclusion of a 1976 study by a Defense Department task force, commonly referred to as the Bucy Report after the chairman of the task force, J. Fred Bucy, President of Texas Instruments. The Bucy Report concluded that we control too many end products, but do not control the export of design and manufacturing technology as effectively as we should.

The essential recommendations of the Bucy Report were three. First, export controls should focus on "critical technologies" that "transfer vital design and manufacturing know-how most effectively." According to the report, these critical technologies include: (1) "Arrays of design and manufacturing information that include

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detailed 'how-to' instructions on design and manufacturing processes"; (2) " 'Keystone' manufacturing, inspection, or automatic test equipment"; and (3) "products accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance information." Second, since no technology can be protected forever, it should be recognized that the purpose of the controls is to protect key "strategic U.S. lead times" in critical technology areas. Third, export controls should focus on "active transfer mechanisms"—such as turnkey factories, licenses that involve an extensive teaching effort, joint ventures, technical exchange agreements, and training programs.[2]

The Bucy Report has led to intensive efforts in the Defense Department to define critical technologies and active transfer mechanisms in operational terms which would be useful in guiding export control policy. The results of these efforts are scheduled to be available early in 1979.

We will not know whether the Bucy Report provides a real basis for a rational system of export controls until we learn whether its key terms can be adequately defined. Still, the report was a useful one in that it emphasized the need to focus our resources on controlling what we have determined to be critical technology. Implementation of the Bucy Report may entail new forms of control on technology transfer. But it should also entail a significant reduction in controls on products. Proposals simply to add more controls to the existing ones would actually damage the national security, in our judgment, further encumbering the licensing bureaucracy with paperwork and distracting it from its essential task.

It is sometimes argued that, if a Soviet capability is supported by technology or products of U.S. origin, U.S. licensing decisions must be to blame—that the licensing system itself is too "leaky." The presumption that U.S. export licensing actions can by themselves control the flow of technology and its products to the Soviet Union is a vanity and a delusion we would do well to dispense with. The fact is that the Soviets usually have access to technology and products comparable to those licensed for export by this country—whether from their own sources, from their East European allies, or from other Free World sources. Where this alternative access can be had quickly, there is no way the United States can stop acquisition of the products by the Soviet Union.

[2] *An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DOD Perspective.* A Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, February 4, 1976.

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In that case, there is no national security reason not to export the same thing. When we do, it is not valid to argue that the export *causes* the capabilities.

Where, however, the United States possesses a key strategic lead time—i.e., where the Soviets can obtain the technology or products from alternative sources only after a considerable delay—then the government's practice is to deny the license. Witnesses at hearings conducted in 1976 by the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, although representing different points of view, were agreed that it is impossible to prevent Soviet acquisition of technology over time, but that it may be possible—and worthwhile—to delay such acquisition. By the time the Soviets do acquire it, the United States may have moved on to a new generation of technology.

Another criticism of U.S. policy and practice with respect to controls is that exports to the U.S.S.R. are often permitted when the items in question could conceivably be put to military use. The whole system of national security controls is indeed—almost by definition—one for controlling the export of products with both civilian and military uses (or, in the jargon, "dual-use items"): if there were no potential military use, the question of control would not arise. But, as a matter of policy and practice, the United States does not license the export to the Soviet Union of products with important military uses without satisfying itself that the risk of diversion from the authorized civilian end use to a military use is small—on the basis of a combined judgment of the probability that diversion would be detected and of its consequences if it should take place.[3]

A classic example of a dual-use product is the computer. Because the same machine can be used for many purposes, computers confront our government with the most troublesome export-licensing decisions and have given rise to elaborate "safeguards" against diversion, which form part of the sales agreement. For example, safeguards may include a procedure whereby the exporting company programs the computer in such a way that the company can monitor its output and detect any diversion; if diversion occurs, spare parts can be withheld so that the computer

[3] The Department of Defense maintains a list of criteria employed by the Department to make this judgment. They are: (1) Is the item appropriate (in quantity, quality, demonstrable need, design, etc.) to the stated civil end use? (2) Is there any evidence that the stated end-user is engaged in military or military support activities to which this item could be applied? (3) How difficult would it be to divert this item to military purposes? (4) Could such diversion be carried out without detection? (5) Is there evidence of a serious deficiency in the military sector which this item, if diverted, would fill? (6) Is technology of military significance, which is not already available, extractable from this item?

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quickly becomes inoperable. As another safeguard, permanent residence by an American technician, or periodic on-site inspection, may be required.

It may also be noted that the Soviets have good reason not to divert U.S. exports to military use in violation of the terms of the sale. Few diversions would entail benefits great enough to balance the loss of regular access to U.S. technology that would surely follow detection of any major diversion. The greater the benefits of diversion to the Soviets, the more stringent would be U.S.-imposed safeguards, and hence the higher the risk of detection. Granting export licenses in such cases is not to rely on Soviet good faith, but rather to consider what the Soviets would regard as in their own self-interest.

Ultimately, however, the important point to recognize is that there is no strategically impregnable export-licensing decision; there are only acceptable risks. The question about a computer (or any other dual-use product) is not whether it *could* be used for military purposes. The answer to that question is always, by definition, yes. The question is, by exporting that computer, do we run an acceptable risk? No amount of information we could possibly acquire would enable us to be absolutely certain that diversion would not take place.

One suspects that those who would place an absolute ban on the export of dual-use items to the Soviets do so in an attempt to escape from this uncomfortably uncertain game. But there is no escape. Other countries stand ready to sell what we do not, and the risk is the same whether the export that produces it comes from the United States, Western Europe or Japan. By refusing to export, we do not eliminate uncertainty; we only opt out of the game.

Because of the various concerns about the national security implications for the United States of technology transfers to the East, proposals occasionally surface in Congress for some kind of congressional veto of export-licensing decisions. Sometimes these take the form of an effort to void in advance a particular sale that members fear might otherwise be consummated. Sponsors of these efforts usually try to make it appear that, were it not for their vigilance, the executive branch would sell the national security down the river. This happened in 1977, for example, when a "Dear Colleague" letter was circulated to all members of the House alleging that the Commerce Department was about to license the sale of an advanced Cyber-76 computer to the Soviet Union. Investigation by the Subcommittee on International Eco-

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nomic Policy and Trade, however, uncovered no inclination on the part of any responsible executive branch official to license the sale. The license was eventually denied on its merits, not because of congressional pressure. The congressional opponents of the sale mistook administrative due process, under which that particular application was granted the same review as any other, for an intention to export the computer.

Proposals also surface for a general congressional veto authority over license approvals with respect to communist countries. (Interestingly, no one has come up with a proposal for congressional reversal of license *denials*.) Proposals of this kind are misguided. The Commerce Department reviews thousands of such applications every year, granting most, rejecting some. All but the most routine applications are subjected to exhaustive review. Under the law, no export with potential military significance can go forward without the concurrence of the Department of Defense, unless the President himself overrules the Department. As a practical matter, any one of several agencies is able to block an export to a communist country.

It is difficult to see what Congress could add to the review process, especially since Congress lacks both the time and the expertise necessary to review these thousands of highly technical applications. The practical effect (and, one is tempted to say, the purpose) of injecting Congress into the day-to-day licensing process would be to politicize and further encumber a process that already has great difficulty producing technically sound decisions efficiently.

Trying to second-guess specific licensing decisions is the wrong way for Congress to go. If we really want rational decisions, what we need to do is work to increase the rationality of the process that produces those decisions, rather than further burdening an already glacially slow process with congressional override provisions.

IV

If the 96th Congress is to improve the export-licensing process, it must deal with three underlying and related problems: the inefficiency of the process, the presumption of license denial that is built into it, and the existence of an entrenched bureaucracy making export-licensing decisions which is not accountable to those most affected.

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The current process is so unwieldy one wonders that it produces any decisions at all. The Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration expects to receive some 70,000 license applications in 1979. That works out to nearly 300 per working day. Backlogs are increasing as licensing officials slowly lose the battle with the paper. Too many commodities are subject to control, right down to microprocessors, which are generally available throughout the Western world and which a Soviet embassy official could purchase for $15 from Radio Shack and carry out of the country in his pocket. Too many agencies must sign off on too many licensing decisions, and there are no effective limits on how much time they can take to reach a determination. Indeed, the system is so structured that there is a built-in incentive for those who oppose exports to the East to use delay as a tactic. So long as an application is in the bottom of a bureaucrat's in-box, nothing can happen. There are no effective procedures for forcing a decision. The result is that too many applications, rather than being dealt with rationally, simply languish in the bureaucracy until the customer cancels the order and gives it to one of our foreign competitors.

The basic factor that accounts for the number of export license applications is the presumption of denial that underlies the system, harking back to the tradition of the broad embargo policy of the cold war years. Indeed, the government's legal premise is that it retains theoretical control over *all* exports, that all exports are expressly prohibited unless licensed.

As a practical matter, the licensing requirement applied from the start to all technology exports to communist destinations. This is a broad category (as it is construed), and the burden of proof is on potential exporters to show that commodities should be taken off the control list because of obsolescence or foreign availability. Once an item is on the list, it stays there until someone successfully makes a case for taking it off. Meanwhile, new products and technological advances are controlled as they are developed, so the scope of the controls constantly increases. Until the Bucy Report, never since 1949 had the government started a "zero-based" effort, in effect, to throw away the old list and construct a new one based on up-to-date conceptions of strategic significance.

It seems bizarre that, in a supposedly free enterprise society, exports of civilian goods could be governed by a doctrine which asserts that they are prohibited unless approved. This doctrine may be justified in the case of so-called Munitions List items: arms, ammunition, implements of war, and related technical data.

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But with respect to categories of civilian products, the burden of proof should be reversed. A businessman should be presumed to have the right to export a particular type of civilian product to a particular destination unless the government intervenes and determines that for some overriding reason of public policy that type of export should be controlled. The burden of proof should be on the government. This issue is of more than theoretical significance, because only if we reverse the presumption of denial will we be able to achieve a system lean enough to function effectively and efficiently.

Finally, this cumbersome and biased system is at the mercy of a licensing bureaucracy that has been in place for 30 years and has evidenced great difficulty in changing its approach to technology transfer issues. This bureaucracy has become accustomed to functioning in near-total secrecy without having to account for its decisions. Rarely is a meaningful explanation for a denial or a delay provided to the exporter. Unless he happens to be well connected in Washington, a prospective exporter seldom has an opportunity to sit down with licensing officials, present his case, rebut their arguments, and make sure they understand the equipment in question. Procedural safeguards such as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply to the export-licensing process. A great deal of secrecy prevails; it is difficult even for committees of Congress, let alone the exporter, to find out the status of an application or, if it was denied, the reason for the denial.

There may be cases where secrecy is justified, but in general it is part of our democratic faith that the government produces better decisions if it is forced to justify those decisions publicly, and if it is in some sense accountable to those who are principally affected by those decisions. Accountability will lead to more rational licensing decisions, whether those decisions be approvals or denials.

V

As we have noted, our ability to control technology transfers to the East is limited by the availability of alternative technology from non-U.S. producers in the free world. Both the Export Administration Act of 1969 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act) stipulate that this country, in its efforts to control exports, should work in cooperation with other nations, and for 30 years there has been in operation a multilateral Coordinating Committee known by the acronym COCOM. Its

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members are the NATO countries (minus Iceland) plus Japan. This means, of course, that some technology producers, particularly Switzerland and Sweden, do not belong.

COCOM was set up in 1949, at the instigation of the United States, in an attempt to multilateralize what was then a virtual trade embargo of the Soviet Union and its "satellites." However, there is no "COCOM agreement"—no treaty, executive agreement or other constitutive document. COCOM has no enforcement powers over its members. Principally because of domestic political considerations in cooperating countries other than the United States, participation in COCOM is completely informal and, in some cases, not even officially recognized.

COCOM maintains a list of items which, by consent of the parties, are embargoed for export to communist destinations. Under COCOM procedures, items on the list can only be exported if the exporting country submits an "exception request" which is approved by all the parties. Understandings regarding the details of COCOM's operations and procedures are codified as footnotes to the list. All of this—the list, the footnotes, the exception requests, virtually everything having to do with COCOM—is secret. Secrecy is designed not only to protect sensitive national security information, but also, in our judgment, to protect the participating governments from domestic political opposition. Some European governments are sensitive to criticism from the Left for participating with the United States in anti-communist trade controls, and our own government is sensitive to charges that it quietly acquiesces in loose European and Japanese enforcement of the controls.

The secrecy also applies to the criteria, developed more than 20 years ago, that are employed by COCOM for including items on the embargo list. However, these have been characterized in public hearings as including: (1) whether the items constitute weapons or equipment for their production; (2) whether the items incorporate unique technological know-how of military significance; and (3) whether the items represent materials in deficient supply in relation to military potential in the communist countries.

COCOM has not worked very well, and for many of the same reasons that our own licensing system does not. A single case history, developed in 1977 House subcommittee hearings, is revealing.[4]

[4] For a complete account of this case, see *Export Licensing: Foreign Availability of Stretch Forming Presses*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., November 4, 1977, Washington: GPO, 1977.

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In 1976 the Cyril Bath Company, of Cleveland, a manufacturer of machine tools, received an invitation from Avtopromimport, a Soviet import agency, to bid on ten metal-forming presses. Although the end use was not stated, it was clear to the company from the technical specifications that the machines would be used to manufacture aircraft bodies. Cyril Bath submitted bids on all ten machines, but was awarded a contract to supply only one. The Russians told the president of the company that they were ordering the other nine machines from a French company, ACB-Loire, because they already had ACB presses in operation and were satisfied with their performance. ACB subsequently confirmed this. Cyril Bath applied for an export license, which our government denied on the grounds of strategic significance to the Soviet aeronautics industry. Only after a hearing by the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade did the government reverse itself on the grounds of foreign availability from France.

The United States then submitted the case to COCOM as an exception request, where it still sits, more than three years after Cyril Bath's original application! The French at first denied that they were manufacturing any such machinery, then admitted it but maintained that the machines were designed for automotive, not aeronautical, use. Indications are that the French machines have already been shipped, without ever having been brought before COCOM. But COCOM has refused to accede to the U.S. exception request so long as the French do not admit that they are supplying comparable machines.

The Cyril Bath case, while hopefully too extreme to be typical, illustrates the major problems with COCOM. Metal forming is not a new technology, and it is one the Soviets obviously already possess, as evidenced by their ability to manufacture advanced aircraft. The French have apparently decided that they will simply ignore COCOM controls on this technology. The United States has failed to make vigorous representations to the French government. Nor has the United States taken the lead to remove this technology from the COCOM list in recognition of the fact that COCOM is not willing to enforce controls on its export. We simply continue to apply the COCOM controls to ourselves, and let our partners sell. The Soviets get the equipment, the French get the sale, and the United States gets left out.

The basic flaw in the COCOM process is that our allies in Western Europe and Japan have never agreed with our conception of it. Because of the greater dependence of their economies on

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exports, their historic patterns of trade with the East, their tendency to keep trade separate from political considerations, and the failure of fervent anti-communism to take hold in their societies, our allies have always wanted more trade with the East than we have wanted. For 30 years the United States has fought a rearguard action to maintain a broader embargo than our allies have been willing to accept. In the early days of COCOM we had a sanction: the Battle Act required a cutoff of foreign aid to any country refusing to cooperate with U.S. trade controls. So long as Marshall Plan aid was more important to the West European economies than trade with the East, we could secure compliance with a broad embargo. Once this ceased to be the case, we lost much of our leverage.

At our allies' insistence, the embargo was gradually narrowed from an economic to a strategic one—a basic change in criteria finally reflected, as noted above, in our own Export Administration Act of 1969. But our allies remain dissatisfied with the scope of the controls we seek to apply for strategic reasons. They argue that too many technologically obsolete products are on the COCOM list—products that are available in the Soviet Union anyway, and that can therefore safely be sold, to the economic benefit of the West, without damaging our security.

COCOM seems almost designed for evasion. The United States attaches great symbolic importance to the continued existence of COCOM as an expression of Western determination to maintain a common front vis-à-vis the East. Hence, we are prepared to wink at evasions of the controls by our allies because we recognize that too much pressure might cause COCOM to fall apart. Evasion is easy, because each participating country decides for itself whether a given export should be brought before COCOM for approval. And the evidence is that the other parties do not in fact enforce the COCOM controls as strictly as we do, with the result that they get business that we deny ourselves and the Soviets get the equipment anyway. We do not blow the whistle for fear of risking COCOM's collapse.

Reinforcing the mutual suspicions inherent in COCOM is the fact that, because of the inefficiency of our licensing process, our government is unable to deal expeditiously with the exception requests of our COCOM partners. Since they generally do not hold up our requests, they naturally resent it when we do it to them, and suspect that we engage in these delays for our own commercial advantage.

Investigations by the Subcommittee on International Economic

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Policy and Trade indicate that our COCOM partners do agree with the necessity of maintaining controls on the export of truly critical goods and technology to the East—the same general terms used in the Bucy Report. In this situation, the approach the United States should take seems clear. We should agree to negotiate with our allies a significant reduction in the scope of the COCOM list, so that it embodies only those goods and technologies we can all agree are critical to our security. We should reform our own licensing process so that we can respond quickly to their exception requests, and expect them to continue to do the same with ours. In return, we should insist on more vigorous and effective enforcement of the controls that remain. This might entail reconstituting COCOM on a more formal basis, including the creation of enforcement mechanisms.

It cannot be in our interest to seek to continue the COCOM arrangement as it currently functions. We have to be more accommodating to our allies if we expect to gain their cooperation for an effective multilateral export control system. Above all, we must resist proposals for an expansion of U.S. controls. To the extent that such proposals would require the United States to go it alone on export controls, they would be self-defeating and would have the effect of merely giving the trade to our competitors. More important, to the extent that they would require an attempt by the United States to reverse the trend toward a narrowing of the COCOM embargo, and to bludgeon our allies into accepting greater controls, they would have the effect of destroying whatever consensus does exist among the Western countries on controlling strategic exports to the East.

In short, in COCOM, as at home, we must learn to accommodate ourselves to the reality of a world with many technology producers not subject to our control. We must set priorities and concentrate on implementing our objectives efficiently. Only then can we expect greater cooperation from our allies.

VI

The Export Administration Act of 1969 also authorizes the President to apply export controls "to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to fulfill its international responsibilities." This broad authority in fact codifies a power long exercised by the executive branch—often under express congressional authority.

Controls on exports for other than direct national security

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reasons have been used for various purposes: to deny economic benefits to countries deemed hostile or threatening to the United States; to give concrete expression to a sense of moral outrage at the behavior of the would-be importing country; to comply with international obligations; to avoid disturbing relationships with other countries (e.g., to prevent an increase in the military capacity of the target country vis-à-vis an ally or friend of the United States); and—with particular recent emphasis—to discourage human rights violations or, at the least, to avoid facilitating them. Usually these purposes overlap, but often one seems to predominate.

Take first the most sweeping examples—the total embargoes applied during the 1920s and early 1930s against the Soviet Union, and from 1950 until 1971 against the People's Republic of China. Trade embargoes are still in effect against Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea, having been imposed by executive order principally under the emergency powers of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, with supplementary authority provided by other legislation. And in 1978 a law was enacted imposing a trade embargo against Idi Amin's Uganda.

Trade embargoes are typically justified at first as a device to deny resources to an offending regime, both to limit its capabilities and with the ultimate hope of bringing the regime down. However, the fact that embargoes invariably remain in effect long after the regime in question is firmly ensconced in power indicates that the real purpose has become—or always was—the basically symbolic one of dissociating the United States from the regime and expressing disapproval of its behavior. Because embargoes serve these symbolic purposes, both internationally and domestically, it is difficult to lift them without seeming to send an unwanted signal. This alone suggests that trade embargoes are too insensitive to changes in another country's behavior to be a very appropriate tool for influencing that behavior.

Such primarily symbolic action certainly has its place. In retrospect it is shameful that the United States did not impose an embargo on trade with Nazi Germany until after Pearl Harbor. But if we are to take such drastic action, it will be well for us to recognize that to do so may cost us something, in human or economic terms or both, and that there may come a time when we will decide that the benefits—psychological or otherwise—are no longer worth the cost. That was the case with the Soviet Union in 1933 and with mainland China in 1971.

The judgment involved is largely subjective and the considera-

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tions not easily quantified. Thus no one seriously quarrels with the continuing embargo on trade with Cambodia, and the stopping of trade with Uganda was popular in the Congress. But there are many, these authors included, who believe the embargoes against Cuba and Vietnam are not on balance in the interest of the United States.

Our sense of self-righteousness in imposing embargoes ought to be a little diminished when we stop to think that we tend to abandon the moral position when large quantities of potential trade are involved—i.e., when the target of the embargo is a great power. Conversely, we tend to maintain the moral position when the cost is not high.

The case of multilateral, and especially U.N.-decreed, embargoes raises different questions. That against Rhodesia, intially imposed in 1967 and strengthened in 1968, was in conformity with mandatory sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council and accordingly was *required* under the terms of the U.N. Charter. For many Americans sympathetic to the black African point of view, the action was morally sound, including the purpose of bringing down the illegal Smith regime or causing it to surrender. However, it seems clear that the embargo would not have been imposed had it not been for the Security Council's action. Even as it was, the Congress in the Byrd Amendment insisted on exempting chromium imports from the embargo from 1971 to 1977, and in 1978 tacked another amendment on the foreign military aid bill calling for an end to the embargo if the Smith regime took certain steps. Strong efforts will undoubtedly be made to lift or weaken the embargo early in the 96th Congress.

Multilateral embargoes obviously have a greater potential for being effective than do unilateral embargoes, but can prove extremely difficult and costly to sustain domestically. The Rhodesia embargo was imposed by this country pursuant to the decision of an international organization despite the absence of a strong domestic political consensus in favor of the embargo. Clearly the Smith regime finds considerable comfort in divisions within the United States and exploits those divisions to the hilt. And such divisions would surely be compounded if a multilateral embargo against South Africa were to be attempted.

At a very different level is the relatively small category of export controls designed to protect relationships with countries other than the proposed recipient. One such case, where the denial has been hotly protested by the manufacturer, involved the proposed export of machinery to Taiwan which could be used in the

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fabrication of missiles. It is quite obvious that an export license is denied in such cases, not because of any impact the exports would have on U.S. security, but because of the delicate balance involved in our overall China policy.

Another license denial, undertaken for a comparable reason, involved a sale to Libya, by the Oshkosh Truck Company of Wisconsin, of heavy trucks which the Egyptians objected could be used to carry tanks. Until the trucks were about to be shipped, the transaction did not require a validated (i.e., individual) license, but could proceed under what is known as a general license, which is a standing authority to ship a certain class of products. At the last minute, the Administration, responding no doubt to strong representations from the State Department, changed the rules so as to require a license for the trucks, and then denied the license. Understandably, the company appealed for help to Wisconsin's representatives on Capitol Hill. While the decision on the heavy trucks stood, a subsequent sale by the same company of different trucks considered less adaptable to military use was approved.

The main problem with this type of foreign policy control tends to be its unpredictability. Export controls become part of a baffling, constantly changing diplomatic signaling process which leaves exporters angry and confused—especially when the exporter is told that, for vague and unexplained foreign policy reasons, he cannot get a license for a product similar or identical to one he had previously shipped to the same customer in the same country. While large enterprises may be able to bear the costs imposed by this uncertainty, it surely has a dampening effect on the propensity of small businesses to export.

Most government decisions on exports reflecting human rights considerations have involved exports financed by the Export-Import Bank or the bilateral or multilateral foreign aid programs, but in some cases such considerations have been paramount in connection with license denials for strictly commercial exports. For example, in 1978 crime control and detection equipment, previously controlled for export mainly to communist countries, was placed under licensing to all destinations except the NATO countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Also in 1978, following the trials of Aleksandr Ginsburg and Anatoly Shcharansky and the harsh sentences imposed by the Soviet authorities, the President denied a license for the export of a Sperry Univac computer to the Soviet Union for use by TASS, the Soviet news agency. Both of these actions were taken in response to, or at least subsequent to, strong pressure from Capitol Hill.

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The authors have no quarrel in principle with export controls for human rights purposes. However, it must be noted that there is probably no type of foreign policy control that sends businessmen up the wall faster. Besides the unpredictability of the controls (why are they applied to some human rights violators more than others?), businessmen argue that their unilateral nature merely guarantees that the business will go to other countries and the target country will still get the trade.

Most fundamentally, businessmen argue that trade controls are ineffective in changing other countries' behavior. (The Sperry Univac license denial, for example, was not just a protest against an egregious violation of human rights, but also represented a deliberate effort to discourage future such actions by the Soviet Union.) This brings us to the consideration of foreign policy controls that are intended to achieve a change in the behavior of the country affected.

This type of motivation is not often the sole factor in the denial of export licenses, but it may be one of the purposes underlying a particular set of export controls, especially if Export-Import Bank credits or other government assistance is involved. For example, where the law directs that no credits or economic aid other than to benefit the very poor be extended to governments that persistently engage in gross violations of human rights, the underlying implicit purpose is not so much to punish those governments as to persuade them to change their ways. The same purpose clearly underlay the 1974 Stevenson Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act limiting credits to the Soviet Union to a total of $300 million, and the Jackson-Vanik provision of the 1974 Trade Act, which prohibited export credits and most-favored-nation tariff treatment for non-market-economy countries imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right of their citizens to emigrate.

It is not within the scope of this article to argue the effectiveness of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments. It is, however, pertinent to point out that, when we embark on foreign policy controls of this kind, we should try to answer the $64 question: what are the chances of success? The same question should, of course, be asked when the controls in question are broader than export limitations, such as total embargoes on trade, or are of a slightly different type, such as controls on investment. The Congress in 1979 will again be wrestling with proposals of this character: for example, bills to limit trade with countries that harbor international terrorists and to limit investment in South Africa.

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VII

With respect to these various categories of foreign policy controls, are there general principles which should apply and which the Congress should attempt to spell out in the coming legislation extending the Export Administration Act?

The essential point to recognize at the outset is that when we employ export controls for foreign policy purposes, we do so alone. No other COCOM country is willing to go along. Thus, to apply foreign policy controls is to apply unilateral controls. We do not want to argue that the United States should never act unilaterally. But if we do, surely it should be on the basis of the most careful consideration, with full regard for the costs.

We can start with the proposition stated at the beginning of this article: that the United States has a dangerously large trade deficit, and that the encouragement of U.S. exports must be a major national objective. Obvious as this proposition is, it often seems to be forgotten when emotionally based arguments are advanced for limiting, or continuing to limit, a particular kind of trade. The time is past, if it ever existed, when we could think of trade controls as a cost-free way of expressing disapproval of another country.

If exports are in the national interest, as indeed they are, then they should be controlled and limited only for clear and compelling reasons. As we have already suggested in connection with national security controls, the burden of proof should be on the proponents of controls. The presumption should always be that a company has the right to export, and that the U.S. government supports its efforts to export and will intervene against that right only for carefully designed and important reasons of public policy.

This presumption must be recognized particularly when the President or the Congress seeks to impose export controls of a new type or against an importing country not hitherto affected. Where such action is taken by law, then both the Congress and the President are involved and share the responsibility. But when the action proposed to be taken is within the authority of the executive branch, then it seems reasonable to give the Congress the right to veto that action by Concurrent Resolution. This is not at all the same as providing for a congressional veto of all licenses issued, as discussed above. The latter would affect, and interfere with, the efficient execution of a previously defined policy. When a new type of controls is involved, then the Congress should not be excluded from the decision.

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Currently, a major reason that some people in the Administration consider export controls an attractive foreign policy tool is precisely that these controls are available to be used at will, without recourse to Congress. If a congressional veto provision in the law achieves nothing else, it will serve to encourage the executive to proceed cautiously with new export controls and to consult with the appropriate congressional committees before deciding to impose them.

A second general principle, which ought to be accepted without dissent, is that the government should be clear, both in the institution and in the exercise of foreign policy controls, on just what it is seeking to accomplish. If the objective is known, then the appropriate questions are more likely to be asked: What are the chances that the controls will achieve the desired result? At what cost? If they fail to do so, can they be lifted without embarrassment? Can the target country retaliate by denying us something we want? And it would be salutary for the government to be required to answer the following question about every control it proposes to apply: How will we know when the control has succeeded?

Related to the second is a third general principle: so far as possible, the reasons for a particular set of controls or for denying a license under those controls should be made known. No one quarrels with the proposition that the processes of government should in general be open rather than secret. In this case, as in other fields of government regulation, those adversely affected by the controls will be more likely to accept them if they can understand the reason for them. Moreover, in some situations (such as an embargo imposed to express moral outrage), the purpose of the controls will be furthered by publication of the reasons for them.

Inevitably, however, there will be other cases where the reason for certain controls or for the denial of licenses cannot be made explicit, even though the reason may be self-evident. Such a case may arise, for example, where the purpose is to bring about a change in the target country's behavior. In such situations, the target country's pride must be taken into account: the policy change will be easier to achieve if it can be made without loss of face.

Finally, if exports are to be encouraged, the system of controls, both for national security and for foreign policy reasons, should be made as predictable as possible. We recognize that unpredictability can be a diplomatic virtue, but that just points up the

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difficulty of using trade for diplomatic purposes. It is questionable how much is gained by sacrificing the development of stable trade relationships to the vicissitudes of diplomacy. The government should seek to avoid changing the rules in the middle of the game, thereby creating uncertainty in the minds of our exporters as to whether it is worth pursuing foreign markets.

Sometimes surprise is unavoidable; for example, in the Sperry-Univac computer case the sentences of Ginsburg and Shcharansky came after the company had negotiated the sale. But in other situations the U.S. government has simply changed its mind in midstream: this was true of the Oshkosh truck sale to Libya, and of the ban on exports to most countries of crime control and detection equipment, which went into effect before the regulations were even published and had the effect of voiding existing contracts. In both of these cases, the action taken was probably justified, but the timing and the procedure were unfortunate.

There will no doubt always be some unpredictability in the administration of foreign policy controls. And exporters have a responsibility to be more sensitive to situations where it is obvious controls may be applied and not to jump in without careful thought. But the Congress and the executive branch should try in the law and the regulations issued to create as much predictability as possible.

VIII

Many of the questions we have raised about foreign policy controls find practical expression in a major issue confronting the U.S. government: Is it in our interest to seek to slow down the development of Soviet oil production capabilities? The proposal to use export controls on oil production equipment as levers to influence Soviet foreign and domestic policy is principally associated with Samuel P. Huntington, who, while on the staff of the National Security Council, argued publicly for "a new approach of conditioned flexibility in which changes in the scope and character of U.S.-Soviet economic relations are linked to and conditioned by progress in the achievement of U.S. political and security objectives."[5]

While the general proposition has a certain plausibility, Huntington fails to treat adequately certain problems which arise when that proposition is applied to specific issues such as that of oil

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, "Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, p. 67.

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production technology. In this section we will try to explore some of the questions his position raises.

Last year, following the Ginsburg-Shcharansky sentences, the President considered reversing previous approvals of licenses issued in connection with the export by Dresser Industries of a drill bit manufacturing plant to the Soviet Union, but then decided not to do so. He also approved a license for one component of that sale not previously licensed, an electron beam welder. The President did, however, order an expansion of the types of oil production equipment exported to the Soviet Union subject to license, and called for a review by the National Security Council of all applications to export such equipment to the U.S.S.R.

The buzzwords "national security" are often used by those who criticized the President's decision to approve the Dresser sale, and who oppose any similar actions in the future. But it has not been convincingly argued that the exports in question would have had a telling effect on Soviet military capabilities. Indeed, no agency involved in the decision, including the Defense Department, made such a finding. This presumably reflects the Administration's judgment that the technology has no significant military application or is readily available elsewhere—and that the Soviet military establishment in any case faces no shortage of oil. It is clearly not limited by a shortage at the present time, and even in the long run it seems unlikely that the Soviet military-industrial complex, which presumably has first call on oil resources, would be the sector to feel the pinch if the U.S.S.R. suffered an energy shortfall.

What opponents of the Dresser sale really seem to be saying is that the exports should have been barred because of Soviet actions in Africa and the harsh treatment of dissidents, both as a protest and in the hope of influencing that behavior. The moral or practical effectiveness of such action as a protest is difficult to analyze. But if the main purpose is to secure a change in Soviet behavior, then various questions must be answered. For starters: To what extent *can* the United States effectively slow down the development of additional Soviet oil production capacity? What capabilities do the Soviets already possess? What technologies are available from competitors? What are the chances that we can secure the cooperation of those competitors in controlling these technologies?

Objective information with regard to the first three questions is limited. Opponents of trade in this equipment naturally downgrade Soviet capabilities and foreign availability, while propo-

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nents take the opposite view. The answer to the last question, however, seems clear: while there may be some conceivable circumstances in which our allies would join us in controlling trade with the Soviets for political purposes, we should be under no illusion that they will support attempts to link trade in oil production equipment to Soviet dissident trials or Africa policy. They will not. On this issue, the United States stands alone.

One commonly forgotten factor in this debate is thus that, even if U.S. technology is the best in some respects, the Soviets do not face a U.S.-or-nothing situation. Second-best technology is available, and the cost we can inflict on the Soviets for their behavior must be measured as the difference between that technology and what the United States has, not as the difference between what the Soviets already have and what the United States has.

If we determine that we have a lever in our oil production technology, another basic question arises: How badly do the Soviets want this technology, and what political price might they be prepared to pay for it? This question seems particularly ignored in discussions of this issue. There may well be concessions that we can obtain from the Soviets in exchange for this technology, but there are undoubtedly some that we cannot. Huntington's statement that "American oil and gas equipment would continue to flow into the Soviet Union" if "the Soviet Union would appropriately moderate some of its undesirable behavior" is not helpful.[6] Proponents of controls to influence Soviet behavior fail to appreciate that they must define more precisely what changes they are seeking, and then calculate whether the Soviets could logically be expected to make them in exchange for whatever we have determined we can withhold from them. Based on the Soviet Union's long history of willingness to force its people to undergo tremendous sacrifices for the sake of preserving its internal system and foreign policy, the authors are skeptical that the Soviets would be willing to make fundamental changes merely in exchange for access to U.S. oil production technology.

A third set of questions has to do with the effects of a decision to impose export controls on oil production equipment on the likelihood that there will continue to be exports to control and consequently any leverage to exercise. It seems highly unlikely that American firms would continue to pursue the Soviet market if U.S. license applications were subject to denial on the basis of random occurrences in Soviet foreign or domestic policy, and even

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

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less likely that the Soviets would permit themselves to become dependent on a supply of U.S. technology which might be turned off in response to political actions. Yet the argument that we should deny licenses to export oil production equipment for the sake of leverage is based precisely on the assumption that both parties to the transaction will continue to pursue the business no matter what the U.S. government does. If they do not—if both the U.S. sellers and the Soviet buyers take their business elsewhere—there is no more leverage. That is the primary fallacy behind arguments for politically determined export denials: By seeking to gain leverage, you can lose it. If we want leverage, it would seem sensible to seek ways to achieve it that are not self-defeating.

Finally, a decision by the United States aimed at slowing up Soviet energy development would be perceived by the Soviets as a departure from our practice of the past decade of seeking to restrict the export only of products and technologies of more or less direct military significance, and of not seeking to weaken or retard the overall growth of the Soviet economy. The Soviets are certain to react to such a policy change. And if they subsequently see the United States failing to "appropriately moderate some of its undesirable behavior," what price will *they* decide to try to make *us* pay? And what card would we play in response to that? At what point would we move on to even more drastic forms of export controls—e.g., over grain sales—with all their attendant economic and political costs? It is important to look down the road and try to see where all this might lead. That does not necessarily mean that we should reject export controls used for leverage, only that we should be aware of the possible consequences and make sure that we are willing to pay the price. Our desire to show the Russians who is boss is understandable, but hardly a sufficient basis for making what could be dangerous changes in our foreign policy.

Overall, the arguments against using oil equipment controls for the political purposes which Huntington proposes seem to us persuasive. Surely the burden of proof rests on those who would employ such controls to demonstrate better than they have that the controls would be effective.

IX

In conclusion, a brief word on our trade relations with mainland China may be in order, especially in view of President Carter's

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welcome decision to recognize realities and extend full diplomatic recognition to the Peking regime as the government of "China." This action raises many trade issues, most notably whether we should have granted China most-favored-nation treatment either within the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment or some other basis. While that issue falls outside the scope of this article, several export control matters must also be confronted as we work out a new relationship with the People's Republic.

Unfortunately, because of the high degree of secrecy pertaining to export control matters both within the U.S. government and in COCOM, very little of our export control policy toward China is a matter of public record. From 1950 to 1971, as noted above, the United States maintained a trade embargo against mainland China. In the early 1950s, at U.S. insistence, the Western countries applied harsher controls to China than to the Soviet Union, giving rise to a so-called "China differential." A separate organization, CHINCOM, and a longer control list were maintained for China. After the Korean War the China differential became harder for the United States to sell, and it collapsed in 1957 when the British unilaterally abandoned it and the other COCOM members quickly went along. CHINCOM and the separate China list were abandoned.

However, the new policy of what today might be called "even-handedness" soon created new pressures. The doctrine that COCOM members should not export to any communist country any product that would increase the military capabilities of the weakest such country meant that all were treated at the level of the Chinese. Inevitably, as Soviet technological and military capabilities increased, COCOM members argued that they should be able to sell to the U.S.S.R. goods which the Soviets had already demonstrated a capability to produce, even though the same products could not be sold to the Chinese because they would add to China's more limited capabilities. Given what we know about how COCOM operates, one assumes that some informal accommodation was made to this point of view, but secrecy prevails.

However, the argument that because China was so weak anything would contribute to its military capabilities, was turned around in 1975 when the British proposed to license the sale by Rolls Royce, Ltd., of supersonic military aircraft engines and production technology to the People's Republic. While the British arguments on behalf of this sale are not publicly known, they must have argued that, since the engines would contribute to Chinese capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, this would not

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affect Western security. The United States objected to this sale, but the British went ahead anyway.

By the end of 1978, it was clear that, following the British precedent, a "reverse China differential" was being applied. Although the United States was not itself selling arms to China, it was acquiescing in the sale of such arms by West European countries. What role COCOM has been playing in these transactions, if any, is not clear. (Since U.S. controls on oil production equipment for foreign policy purposes are being applied only to the Soviet Union, the differential between our treatment of that country and China for export control purposes is increased.) Earlier in the year there had been open talk by the President's National Security Adviser of "playing the China card" against the Soviet Union, in part by loosening up exports to China while tightening up on those to the Soviets, although one heard less of that by the end of the year. By the time that normalization was announced, the Administration was at pains to emphasize that its policy toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic was one of even-handedness.

Clearly, many things need to be sorted out in our export control policy toward China. From the point of view of our *security*, it would seem that we could sell many military and dual-use items to China which would have the effect of building up Chinese military capabilities without necessarily affecting U.S. security directly. From the point of view of our *foreign policy*, however, it is not clear that we would want to do so.

Our own feeling is that an expansion of trade with China, including trade in advanced technology, is to be encouraged, creating as it would possibilities for significant improvement in the relations between our two countries. However, a policy of using export controls for the explicit purpose of building up China at the expense of the Soviet Union would be dangerous. Those who advocate this approach have apparently not thought deeply enough about whether it really would serve any good purpose for the United States to heighten Soviet fears of the Chinese or increase Soviet apprehensions concerning U.S.-China normalization. Instead, we should be able to communicate to both the U.S.S.R. and China that we are not attempting to increase the threat each poses to the other. Above all, we must remember that the Soviet Union remains the world's only other superpower—the only country in the world capable of destroying us. Maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union must be our paramount objective. While that will not and should not deter us from

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normalizing with the Chinese, it would be foolish in doing so deliberately to insult the Soviets.

x

This discussion of export controls for foreign policy purposes has posed more questions than it has resolved. But bringing some of the problems up for close examination has been one of our main intentions. The U.S. government itself is only tentatively feeling its way with this relatively novel use of export controls.

We believe that the American public as well as our policymakers must keep in mind certain principles: that trade is in itself good for us; that there are limits to our influence; that export controls, like all aspects of foreign policy, must be as open and as accountable as possible; that we have to be clear about our objectives and, in trying to shape a policy, must avoid simple answers; and that our trade policy should be an expression of what is good and not what is vindictive in us. With those guidelines, the Congress, the executive branch, and the American people should be able to evolve an export policy that supports and contributes to a constructive American foreign policy.

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Alberto Ronchey

GUNS AND GRAY MATTER: TERRORISM IN ITALY

The terrorism that is now endemic in Italy evolved gradually, from the ideological extremism of the revolutionary generation of 1968, through the "hot autumn" of labor unrest in the Turin-Milan-Genoa industrial triangle, through the first guerrilla skirmishes in the "piazzas," to the ambushes that, beginning in the middle of the 1970s, marked the birth of a new category of citizens who walk on crutches.

The year 1976 saw the start of a sensational series of "executions," and by 1977 there were twice as many cases of terrorism and lesser guerrilla warfare as there had been the previous year. Finally, in March of 1978 came the Black Thursday Massacre which ended in the sinister imprisonment and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro.

A political terrorist is someone who systematically makes use of killing, wounding, destruction and other means of coercive intimidation in pursuit of political objectives. This is the definition given by Walter Laqueur in his history of terrorism.[1] He traces terrorism back to the ancient Palestinian sect of the *sicarii* (from *sica*, a short sword hidden under the coat). In Jacobin France, the word "terror" was used to refer to an emergency regime called into being by historical necessity. After the ninth of Thermidor, however, it became a term of abuse with criminal implications. It then crossed the Channel to England where the neologism was used by Burke in a celebrated passage: "Thousands of those hell hounds called terrorists. . . . "

Although retaining its criminal connotations, revolutionary or nationalistic terrorism was nevertheless employed in the last century as an *ultima ratio* against local or foreign tyranny in czarist Russia, Ireland, South America and the colonial world. Now, in the aftermath of the youth revolts of 1968, revolutionary terrorism

[1] W. Laqueur, *Terrorism*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977; a similar definition is given by L. Dispot, *La Machine à Terreur*, Paris: Grasset, 1978: *"Un terroriste c'est quelqu'un qui fait de la politique en tuant."*

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has for the first time in history broken out in several Western liberal democracies.

Whenever, in societies governed by a lawfully constituted state, non-identification with the state becomes rejection and rejection becomes terrorist revolt, then a more thorough examination of the theories underlying the phenomenon must be made.

II

What explanations, what attempts at ideological self-justification and legitimacy are to be found in the language used by the terrorists? Even a brief analysis points up their contradictions. The terrorists claim, for example, that there is no difference between liberal democracy, South American-style dictatorship and fascism because, despite a few formal distinctions, all are equally oppressive structures. Yet when arrested, these same terrorists demand the most lenient application of the laws that form the very backbone of the lawfully constituted state which they disavow in their basic premises. They declare war on a state in which capital punishment is not practiced and appeal to the Geneva convention on prisoners of war in defending themselves; for their part, however, they hand down death sentences to servants of the state and kill their own "prisoners of war." One corollary to their basic tenets is that information circulating inside the system is manipulated. At the same time, the main purpose of their action is to capture the attention of the press and the news media in order to publicize their pronouncements or theories. They know perfectly well that no restrictive laws exist by which such publication can be prevented.

At first glance, we seem to be dealing with an ideological schizophrenia that simultaneously enunciates and denies a system of justifications. It would be tempting to conclude that the tormented, lonely, mournful terrorists are completely lacking in ideological motives, that they are simply arrogant elitists who have been seized with a lust for killing and terrorizing. However, such explanations do not adequately explain the phenomenon. Among other things, it remains to be explained why only some Western societies have been affected by this radical repudiation of the state.

In France, for instance, the number of theoretical extremist creeds, unemployed youths and dropouts is far greater than in West Germany. And yet France has been untouched by anything like the German Baader-Meinhof organization, except for local ethnic revolts such as those in Corsica and Brittany. Great Britain

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is untainted by rebellion, apart from the ethno-religious strife in Ulster. Post-Franco Spain has had only Basque separatism to face, just as Canada has its Quebec problem. Outside the short-lived apparition of the Weathermen, the United States has had to deal only with the racial terrorism—already on the wane—of the Black Panthers and the Symbionese Liberation Army. In other parts of the world—Scandinavia, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria—terrorism is non-existent. Among the modern industrialized countries, Italy, Germany and Japan are hosts to systemic revolutionary confrontation not rooted in any nationalist-separatist, racial or ethnoreligious cause. The extent of confrontation varies by country and is directly related to economic and political conditions.

It so happens that these are the three nations that lost the last war. Some "terrorologists" like Karl Dietrich Bracher of the University of Bonn have pointed out other common features: the introduction of democracy only after military defeat, overly rapid changes in "value systems," and the improvisation of ideologies scorning material prosperity in the midst of economic "miracles" (brought to an untimely end by the 1973–74 oil crisis).[2]

There is one other common factor: the three industrialized societies affected by ideological terrorism all lie on the frontiers of the great international blocs.

Another similarity, according to the armed extremists' ideology of cut-and-dried Leninist conceptions of imperialism, is that the rulers of these countries are under the sway of a foreign supergovernment. The terrorists believe the world is actually "supergoverned" by a powerful and mysterious "club"—as they unfailingly reiterate in their attacks against the "Imperialist State of the Multinationals." For example, they are convinced that the Trilateral Commission is the long-range policy planning staff of the giant multinationals; that President Carter was created and imposed on the United States by them; that contemporary imperialism (still defined in Leninist terms or even more often in "the catastrophic terms of the Third International") exercises its power in the world through similar instruments.

III

In Italy, the country most affected by the phenomenon of terrorism, as the Italian sociologist Sabino Acquaviva has observed, the guerrilla warfare of ideological confrontation advances on two fronts, drawing its recruits from among youth. On the one

[2] *Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft*, Hamburg, 1978, pp. 22–23, 37–38.

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hand are the closely knit underground "columns" of the Red Brigades, who, making the factories of northern Italy their initial target, carry out sensational, military-style actions. On the other are the smaller armed factions (with 115 different names to date) and the suburban "autonomous collectives" that are systematically engaged in spreading violence in the form of full-scale guerrilla warfare and, like a "family of moles," daily expand the underground areas under their control. There were 702 terrorist attacks in Italy in 1975, 1,198 in 1976, 2,128 in 1977, and the number is still rising. Although there are only a few hundred underground leaders and militants, their efficiency and the extent to which they can find accomplices, protection and camouflage is quite alarming.

A January 17, 1978 Italian Communist Party (PCI) survey put the number of actual underground guerrillas at 700 to 800 and the extremists living on the fringe of legality—and often armed—at about 10,000. According to an autobiographical account by a member of the Prima Linea faction published in the Italian weekly *Panorama*, the "combatants" number about 3,000, or about the same as the number of Italian partisans who were active between September 1943 and March 1944.

The 1950s had already seen in Italy the rise of forms of terrorism involving explosives, the cult of firearms and paramilitary camps. This terrorism had fascist, nationalist or Nazi origins, and drew its inspiration from the ghosts of Mussolini's Salò Republic and theorists like Julius Evola. It was really an extension of the 1943–45 civil war.[3] During the 1960s and 1970s the basis of the "strategy of tension" was still neo-fascist, but with some infiltration from and perhaps even the complicity of the secret services. Then extreme right-wing terrorism was dealt a series of crippling blows and the far Left gained the upper hand through the Red Brigades, Armed Proletarian Nuclei and the subsequent plethora of revolutionary offshoots.

Fascist terrorism, which mainly made use of explosives, was blind, indiscriminate and impersonal. It had no social foundations or cover. On the other hand, the mainstream of far-Left terrorism, which in Italy can be more accurately defined as an armed resistance movement against democracy, tends rather to use revolvers and submachine guns, to strike at well-chosen symbolic individuals while at the same time exploiting the media. Lesser terrorists have been more inclined to infiltrate street riots and try

[3] See G. Salierno, *Autobiografia di un picchiatore fascista*, Turin: Einaudi, 1976.

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to steer them toward open guerrilla warfare, profiting by the favorable conditions and the social justification offered by the Italian crisis of the 1970s.

The progression of events in 1977 is a good illustration of the social and cultural milieu in which guerrilla warfare grew up. In January the so-called Metropolitan Indians, or "creative nihilists," appeared on the university campuses. In February the Indians, followed closely by neo-Leninist or anarchic groups from the "autonomous" student movement armed with P.38 pistols, defied both the PCI itself and the PCI-led General Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL) when they stormed the platform from which CGIL President Luciano Lama was speaking at the University of Rome. March saw the outbreak of pitched battles in the streets of Rome and even in Bologna, a Communist Party stronghold, where the police had to use armored vehicles to quell the disturbances.

From June on, the civil unrest was paralleled by full-scale guerrilla war. With each passing day the underground groups, organized into "beehive" cells, emptied their pistols into the legs of magistrates, police officers, journalists, local party leaders, factory managers and foremen, at the same time keeping up a steady stream of ritual killings of members of the judiciary, including Francesco Coco, Public Prosecutor of Genoa, and Fulvio Croce, Chairman of the Turin Lawyer's Association. In November, in broad daylight, Carlo Casalegno, deputy editor of the Turin daily *La Stampa*, was shot four times in the face with a Nagant 7.62 pistol. The fourth shot, the *coup de grace*, was fired as he lay on the ground.

Guerrilla terrorism thus succumbed to an urge to commit purely ideological murder, the violent repression of any reasoning alternative, and an obsessive form of class struggle. When people were shot in the legs in intimidation or reprisal, the terrorists were showing that they could restrain and gauge their murderous fanaticism, that they were still capable of calculation and of making distinctions. In other words, it was politicized and even "merciful" in its arbitrariness. When they began to kill high-ranking officials of the state's legal system, they did so because they were carried away by their lust to destroy, at least symbolically, those powers that they could not overthrow. But from the moment they changed their aim and "executed" a journalist, a simple interpreter of a system of thought and judgment, the shadow of a figure who had conferred upon himself an "ideological" power of life or death over others was cast over the scene.

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In the three historical waves of terrorism described by Walter Laqueur, including the most recent which has affected a number of Western countries for the past decade, no such phenomenon had ever occurred before, at least not on such a large scale. Indeed, the terrorist tradition had relatively shallow roots in Italian history, i.e., the murder of King Humbert I and several episodes on the eve of fascism. Nonetheless, the execution of a great political crime was predictable, and was felt to be imminent. It happened on March 16, 1978, with the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, five times premier and candidate for the presidency of the Republic, by a combat group of young terrorists. Their orders were to "carry the attack to the heart of the state." Their tactics, involving the instant killing of the police escort, resembled those used by the Rote Armee Fraktion in the Cologne bloodbath in which the German industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer was kidnapped.

Their strategy, which they pursued through the propaganda appeal of the mass media, had several aims and was resolutely pursued for 54 days, until the hostage was put to death. Their main aim was to eliminate the central figure of the system of mediation on which the delicate balance of Italian politics, including the shaky accords negotiated between Christian Democrats and Communists, depended. They intended to bring the hostage to trial as the symbol of their concept of an "objective enemy," and of themselves as agents duly appointed by history and invested with powers of life and death. They also wanted to negotiate an exchange of prisoners and de facto recognition of their faction as an armed revolutionary party—a Palestine Liberation Organization without a Palestine and with no foreign army occupying the lawfully constituted state.

Above all, they wanted to inflict the greatest possible emotional shock on the political forces in order to split them into ruthless "hawks" and irresponsible "doves," and at the same time cause maximum disorganization of the executive and judiciary apparatus, already harassed by continual attacks. By so doing they hoped to reveal the impotence of the legal institutions and to spread public and private panic, thus paving the way for their plan for the South Americanization of Italy which would make the great "revolutionary civil war" possible.

One essential element of contemporary ideological terrorism, from the Stalinist period down to the occult rituals of present-day guerrillas, is the sacrificial trial, preferably with the adjunct of a confession. For some years now, young terrorists in Italy have consistently subjected their prisoners to trials, and when they

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themselves are captured have subjected their judges to counter-trials. But if they imagined that their prisoner, Aldo Moro, was going to reveal earth-shaking state secrets, they had fallen victim to their own ideology, according to which a secret "state conspiracy" was still afoot. Their hostage could not reveal the conspiratorial plans of a supergovernment, which the extremists believe in because of their own cut-and-dried ideology, but only certain details of under-the-table dealings and episodes of misgovernment that were already common knowledge.

The exchange of prisoners and tacit recognition of the "armed party" were, in any case, rejected by all the constitutional forces on the grounds that this would have led to the collapse of the state; that is, not only to a South Americanization, but perhaps even to a "Lebanonization" of a disintegrating society. As in any true tragedy, two opposing issues were at stake, namely, an individual political figure's "right to live" versus the need to preserve a minimum of security and social cohesion, to which some observers have applied the unsuitable or abstract term of *raison d'état.* It would be perhaps more correct to say the "right of the many to live."

The Italian government was only partially successful in meeting this challenge. It managed to defend a legal principle, but was unable to meet its first and foremost obligation, that of obtaining the hostage's freedom from a terrorist organization that had declared war on a state.

IV

Who are these terrorists and how did they reach this point? In Italy, the spread of the psychological and ideological notion that it is debilitating and repugnant to have any truck with an "enemy" who represents absolute evil can be traced back to the 1960s, and is the result of the emotional echoes of distant conflicts (Vietnam, South America, the Middle East), the cumulative effects of decades of ideological popularization, and the social upheavals wrought by the economic boom and the youth revolts. In the early 1970s, partly because of the existing deadlock between the main political parties and partly because of the failure of every new government, there was a growing awareness of the transition between extremism "of ends" and extremism "of means."[4]

All extremism of ends is based on the assumption that an

[4] G. Piovene, "Otto domande sull'estremismo," *Nuovi Argomenti,* January–March 1973.

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ideology is revealed truth and that, if taken to extremes, it becomes an extreme or absolute truth. Generally speaking, however, in Italy, at least until quite recently, this was merely implicit in the thinking of the traditional left-wing extremist creeds. The worth or grandeur of an aim was not thought to justify every kind of action.

On the other hand, extremism of means, which is not necessarily linked to extremism of ends, consists of direct action with immediate objectives, often of a specific or limited nature. Separatist or nationalistic terrorists or, in Italy, those fascists who have never conceived of any plan for society based on a total revolution in social relations, often pursue ends that are specific and limited in nature.

In the Italian tradition, extremism of ends was more suited to the Left, whereas extremism of means and even the "conceptual necessity" of terrorism were represented in the very symbols of fascism (daggers and skulls) and even recently have produced neo-fascist or neo-Nazi *groupuscules* such as Ordine Nuovo, Ordine Nero, Anno Zero, Fenice, Avanguardia Nazionale and Riscossa.

But how did extremism of means spread to the Left? The galvanizing effect of the media's treatment of distant guerrilla wars and revolutions, the attraction and perhaps the myth of danger after 30 years of peace, the economic crisis in Italy combined with the Leninist or neo-Leninist assertion that, in comparison with the society one has in mind, the existing society cannot be tolerated for even one more day, and that compared with the repressive violence of the state, revolutionary terrorism is merely counter-terrorism, combined to foster the growth of extremism of means in the far Left.

Accounts and reports containing hundreds of biographies are now devoted to the seditious left-wing organizations that have taken over from the neo-fascist "strategy of tension."[5] The Red Brigades got their start mainly among dissident Communists and Catholics of the Metropolitan Collective of Milan.[6] The Communists came from traditional PCI strongholds like Reggio Emilia or Sesto San Giovanni, where the Party's control had been gradually eroded by the steady dimming of conventional revolutionary prospects of seizing power. Important figures like Renato Curcio[7]

[5] See Alessandro Silj, *Mai più senza fucile! (Alle origini dei NAP e delle BR)*, Florence: Vallecchi Editore, 1977; V. Tessandori, *Brigate rosse, imputazione banda armata*, Milan: Garzanti, 1977; Giorgia Bocca, *Il terrorismo italiano, 1970–1978*, Milan: Rizzoli, 1978.

[6] An extreme left-wing organization that sprang up toward the end of the 1960s among workers and revolutionary students.

[7] Renato Curcio was born in 1941 and received a traditional Catholic education. He became

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and, to an even greater extent his wife, Margherita Cagol,[8] had been not only believing but also practicing Catholics up to two years before they became revolutionaries. They then became converts to that post-religious ideology in which absolute values are transferred from transcendental faith to sanctified social conflicts.[9]

These were parallel processes. In the case of the young Communists, while the nature of the PCI was being transformed by revisionism, the virus of revolutionary ideas, previously stored and preserved in the Party as it awaited the dawning of the long-awaited "H" hour, spread in the form of intransigent theories and armed groups. With respect to the Church, a similar path was followed by Catholic groups who, both in Italy and South America, continued to reinterpret the ancient apocalyptic aversion for "the authorities, the rich, the learned, the powerful."

Franco Ferrarotti, a former professor of Red Brigade member Renato Curcio at the Faculty of Sociology at Trento University, has observed: "They accept no distinction . . . between principle and practical action. They are horrified by any talk of the opportune moment." This is what the Communist Giorgio Amendola, describing the contribution made to extremism by Catholic groups, has defined as a "non-historicist conception of the world." The sociologist Francesco Alberoni sees a connection not only between the two parallel rebellions but also between the vicissitudes of the Catholic Church and the PCI, two formerly authoritarian structures that have to a large extent lost their traditional power to impose a "rigorous militancy, a simple faith and the pleasure of obedience" on their followers. Moreover, as the Italian journalist Giorgio Bocca has said, "the need for total and definitive answers, the rejection of doubt, are at the same time Catholic and Communist."

The collapse of the educational system after 1968 had a decisive effect on these processes. Even Renato Curcio, when he enrolled

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a revolutionary during the 1968 student movement while still a student at the University of Trento. He later went on to become one of the founders of the Red Brigades. He is now serving a 31-year jail sentence for forming an armed band to subvert the state and other crimes.

[8] Margherita Cagol was born in 1945 to a Catholic family from Trento and led a normal middle-class life until graduation from the University of Trento where she wrote a thesis on "Training of the Labor Force During the Phases of Capitalistic Development." In 1964 she married Renato Curcio in a church ceremony. In 1975 she commanded an armed group which freed Curcio from the jail in Casale Monferrato, where he was being held following his first arrest. She was killed in a gun battle with police in Monferrato in the same year.

[9] Other Catholics besides Curcio and Cagol were Maurizio Ferrari and Giorgio Semeria. Former card-carrying Communists include Alberto Franceschini, Roberto Ognibene, Prospero Gallinari. Of similar origin were the "Montoneros" of Mario Firmenich and Fernando Vaca Narvaja in Argentina.

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in the Faculty of Sociology at Trento, had received his secondary education at a school for accountants and was thus unlikely to possess that "historicist conception of the world" that Amendola had spoken of. More significant, and also more tragic, is the case of Walter Alasia.

The son of Communist parents living in the "Italian Stalingrad," Sesto San Giovanni, Walter Alasia graduated from ITIS, a rapidly degenerating school in Sesto. Prior to the 1970s, ITIS trained "a few hundred students who found jobs as soon as they received their technical diplomas, who even received job offers by mail at home." Then, as a result of successive waves of ideological extremism and lax administration, the abolition of the roll call in class and the awarding of "political" grades, as well as the persecution of teachers deemed to be repressive and conservative, ITIS became "a shambles, not a school," to use the words of Walter Alasia's mother. Meanwhile, in keeping with the spirit of the times, the PCI weekly *Nuovo Sesto* censured any attempt at disciplinary action. The first action Alasia took part in was the destruction with electric drills of the school's protective railing. Later, around 1974, he probably drifted into the "shadow area" of armed extremism. He was killed on December 15, 1976 by a burst of submachine-gun fire after he had slain two policemen. His name later reappeared in numerous guerrilla bulletins signed by the "Red Brigades, Walter Alasia column."[10]

The strategy of the metropolitan guerrillas, who drew their recruits from the young generation and applied to the cities Carlos Marighella's manual for *focos de guerrilla* among the South American peasants, was worked out in the autumn of 1969, when the adventurous first groups met in Chiavari. The first document signed by the Red Brigades dates back to 1970. The first attacks against the first symbolic "objective enemy" (i.e., industrial capitalism, as, for instance, the Pirelli test track at Lainate) occurred in 1971. The first kidnapping (Macchiarini of Sit-Siemens) took place in 1972, as the following slogan began to circulate: "The vote doesn't work, the rifle does." This was followed by other kidnappings and the first "people's prison" trials. Then, throughout the circuit linking schools, factories, suburbs and prisons, the southern Italian Nuclei Armati Proletari groups and the numerous other minor factions that had sprung up during the extended period of economic collapse joined forces with the Red Brigade guerrillas. For a long time, the Red Brigades were considered by

[10] G. Manzini, *Indagine su un brigatista rosso: La storia di Walter Alasia,* Turin:Einaudi, 1978, pp. 55, 60–61, 84, 88.

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many people as a "masked fascist provocation." However, after the PCI opted for the historic compromise with the Christian Democrats in the autumn of 1973, following the tragic developments in Chile, the guerrilla struggle began to take on the appearance of a religious war within the Left, even though it was the "others" who were being shot at.

The extremists who had gone underground exploited the vast areas of camouflage and protection created by violent unrest in the factories, university riots, politicized prison mutinies, and violence in the outlying urban slum areas. They had agents and informers in factories such as Sit-Siemens, Magneti-Marelli, Breda, Pirelli, Ansaldo, Fiat, Alfa Romeo and Enel. Many political writers and students saw the terrorists as merely "errant comrades." In the September 1977 demonstrations in Bologna at least ten thousand voices shouted "Viva Curcio." In a Rome school, the announcement of an attack against a local Christian Democratic leader was greeted with applause. Nothing like this ever occurred during the exploits of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany. These and other episodes point up the peculiar nature of the Italian phenomenon.

The growth of armed extremist influence seems to be directly related to the PCI's swing toward moderation and compromise with the Christian Democrats. In Moscow in 1969, Party chief Enrico Berlinguer had cited as proof of the combativeness of the workers' movement and of the merits of his own party Italy's astonishingly high strike record.[11] Communist trade union leaders now appeal for them to limit their demands.[12] The PCI was once a Stalinist party. Today it is, albeit discordantly and reluctantly, revisionist, even toward Leninism itself.

It must also be said, however, that quite apart from the PCI's change of policy, armed extremism has been favored by three objective factors. First is the migration into the cities from the countryside over the last three decades, an almost biblical exodus, which took place at a far faster rate than the accompanying industrial growth. The result has been a clash between the uprooted subproletarian masses and the congested cities, the Turin

[11] "After the elections," Berlinguer said at the time, "the workers' struggles reached a high degree of combativeness. In 1968 there were more than 68 million hours of strikes, the highest figure in recent years. But already in the first few months of 1969 there have been more than 44 million hours." *Conferenza internazionale dei partiti comunisti e operai, Mosca 5-17 giugno 1969, Testi e documenti*, Roma:Editori Riuniti, 1969, p. 493.

[12] CGIL Secretary Luciano Lama illustrated the 1978 change of tack by declaring that the idea of wages as an "independent variable" upheld by many in 1969 was "foolishness," that "there would have to be many restraints on wage policy in the next few years," and that "the working hours were among the shortest of the developed industrial countries," *La Repubblica*, January 24, 1978.

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"belts," the Milan "Koreas," the numerous illegal townships that have sprung up on the fringe of the sprawling Rome urban area.

Second, the number of students enrolled at the universities situated in the hearts of the cities has passed the one million mark, three times the number enrolled in British universities. In these social parking lots, which are more crowded than the Fiat factories but provide no wages, except for the *pre-salario* (a kind of pre-dole handout), it has been easy for terrorists to recruit troops for their revolutionary extremism.

The third and more general factor of destabilization has been Italy's "arrested growth" following the 1973 oil crisis. This has been due to changes in the terms of trade, which have been keenly felt by the Italian economy, and also to the clash between the rising expectations of the masses and the limits of the means of production.

V

However, any analysis that hopes to go beyond mere "sociological determinism," the belief that all actions are the product of social conditions, must investigate the psychological and ideological characteristics of armed extremism. In essence, the terrorists have only two ideas in their heads: that "revolution" is an absolute good, and that the "objective enemy" is an absolute evil.

Italy's is the sole ideological culture in Europe to have rejected Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* out of hand, even though Soviet dissident Roy Medvedev warned that, after having read it, few could remain "the same as they were before." Solzhenitsyn was seldom discussed, reviewed or cited by Italian leftist intellectuals but instead simply "removed" with the argument that he was merely a character out of the "old pan-slavic world." Out of concern for the good of the cause and fearing that the faith previously drummed into the generation of 1968 and of Vietnam would be shaken, only a few murmurs of dismay were raised over the "re-education camps" in Vietnam, the massacres of Cambodian peasants and the new Gulag.

Doctrinaire extremism, which in its theoretical inflexibility ignores everything outside itself, does not concern itself with such problems. The very concept of hard facts is downgraded until it is abolished by the interpreters of the idea of revolution. It is thus understandable that extremism of means results in the belief that its Manichaean and militant conception of the struggle between the forces of good and evil is infallible, even to the extent of having to kill in the name of a purpose so lofty as to transcend

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and dominate all common moral criteria. The idea that it was such visions that led to the bloodbath and the plethora of ideologies of the first half of this century, the period of Stalin and Hitler, has yet to be popularized. The history of this period seems to be unknown, or else its lesson is incommunicable.

Cultivating conventional images of the revolutionary epic, a generation was taught to believe in what Raymond Aron has called "historic optimism," while remaining completely ignorant of the true story of the revolutionary wars. That generation believes that revolution is beautiful. It has never seen revolutionary war and it now wants to. It imagines a struggle between the forces of good and evil but explains its defeats as the result of plots by Olympian gods. And finally, while they may have discovered that the present was born in Russia a century ago, and while they may have heard Engels' definition of history as "the cruelest of all ideas, which rides its triumphal carriage over mountains of cadavers," they have not found teachers willing to remind them of Engels' warning that "those who believe that they have made a revolution always discover, afterwards, that they did not know what they wanted and that the revolution they have made has nothing in common with what they wanted to accomplish."

Revolutionary subjectivism is governed by repulsion and intolerance of the kind that Dostoyevsky called "passions of the mind" or "tragedies of conceptual passions." Just as Ché Guevara hoped to repeat through the Bolivian mountains the Long March of the Chinese revolutionaries, so, too, do the Red Brigades believe that the society lying before their "Metropolitan Long March" through the industrial triangle of Milan, Turin and Genoa is not only vulnerable but profoundly weak. It is, in any case, as uninhabitable as the burning house in Bertolt Brecht's parable: "I saw a house. It was on fire. There were people inside. One of them asked, as the flames were singeing his eyelashes, whether by chance it was raining outside, or windy, or if there was another house, and so on. I went on without replying."

The objective of the revolutionary guerrilla strategists is unswervingly declared in every document: a prolonged attack on "the heart of the state" and the fabric of society will bring about an authoritarian reaction. The latter, by a catalytic process, will then lead to a revolutionary and purifying civil war. The planners of the "Italian civil war of the 1980s" would like to convince all potential recruits, especially the theorists of the far Left and the militant rank and file of the PCI, that such an outcome is

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inevitable. The armed groups ignore the hypothesis that, in the uncertain conditions that prevail in a "frontier society" like Italy, terrorism might be followed by a dictatorship *tout court.* Or, even if they are mindful of what Trotsky, viewing events in Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain between the two wars, called "the short circuit of dictatorship," they accept this possibility, as long as their ideology of rejection is confirmed.

VI

When President Kennedy was assassinated, numerous conspiracy theories were advanced in America. The Cuban refugees in Florida thought it was a plot hatched by Castro because he feared being sacrificed to the Kennedy-Khrushchev test-ban accords. The nationalists of the John Birch Society accused the Russians, mindful of their long tradition of political assassination. African leaders suspected the white racists of the south. The Arab press pointed to a Zionist conspiracy since Jack Ruby, the killer of the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was a Jew.

The same happened in Italy. During and after the 54 days of the slow-motion murder of Aldo Moro, every politician's conditioned reflex suspected or accused a different enemy of being behind the Red Brigades. The Italians all looked elsewhere: "They will tell you that foreigners are involved in the Moro affair since no Italian could have prepared an operation so effectively."[13]

However, unlike the shock wave which swept over the United States in 1963, the possibility of a great political crime had been brewing in Italy for years as the greatest revolutionary guerrilla struggle ever seen in the industrialized West gradually spread. Life in Italy had already become "a series of sinister absurdities punctuated by moments of sheer horror." And yet, instead of searching for the ideological and social roots of Italian terrorism, the controversy over *cui prodest* (who will benefit) tended to spread, either subtly or vehemently, on the strength of mere hypotheses or of "logical certainties."

In the Communist ranks, in line with traditional Party logic, a patent and urgent temptation arose to combine a conspiracy theory with the question of *cui prodest*, although no one really knew whether the disappearance of Aldo Moro would drive the PCI closer to or further away from the government. The destabilization of Italy was imagined to be an anti-communist plot financed from outside like the truckers' strike in Allende's Chile (though the

[13] M. West, "Terror as an Historical Inheritance," *Esquire*, April 25, 1978.

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greatest destabilizing factor there was rampant inflation). Applying the same logic, it could just as well be argued that the events in Russia in 1917 were financed by the gold marks of the Kaiser.

Among the non-Communists, the hypotheses pointed to Czechoslovakia, and thus to the U.S.S.R., as some years earlier three Red Brigade members had spent time in Prague, or East Germany, or Libya. The Italian situation was, in any case, interpreted as a prologue to the "after Tito" phase in Yugoslavia.

The controversy rages on, fueled by lovers of theories who know nothing about the terrorist guerrillas of our times and have never studied them. In the face of the fundamental, crass inefficiency of the state, the very myth of the terrorists' incredible efficiency provides fuel for speculation about foreign conspiracies. Immediately after the Moro kidnapping, it was above all the failure of the investigations which was responsible for spreading the myth of the guerrillas' mysterious infallibility, along with far-fetched tales of complicity and secret sanctuaries which supposedly sheltered them. Actually, this infallibility was due merely to the extreme fallibility of the state and to the disorganization of society. The inefficiency of the public powers certainly did not lie in the size of the Italian police force, which is proportionately larger than its West German counterpart, but rather in the fact that a police force of peasant extraction was left to fend for itself in the face of an uprising of well-trained groups of armed intellectuals, amid the happy-go-lucky attitude and quarrelsome neglect characteristic of public life in Italy. Why should the police be expected to be more efficient than the ministries, post office, telephone service, hospitals, schools, and state-run industries?

Who *will* benefit? Well, who is behind the radical ideological terrorism in Germany and Japan, similar to Italian terrorism but on a somewhat smaller scale? And who is behind the ethno-religious and nationalistic-separatist terrorism of Ulster, the Middle East, Croatia and the Moluccans? Each of these movements may well receive aid in the form of encouragement and occasional or regular financing, but no central conspiracy theory can explain the complexity of the overall phenomenon or of each national movement.

No one will ever be able to rule out completely the possible, perhaps only occasional, influence of dark plots on Italian terrorism. But how can the 2,128 terrorist episodes of 1977 be explained away? No foreign secret service could ever expose itself so widely without the armed groups being aware of whom they were dealing with, whether it was the CIA, the KGB, the Cubans, or Libya's

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Qaddafi. Unwitting individuals can be used as dupes, as the Nazis used the Communist Marinus van der Lubbe to start the Reichstag fire, but this is not possible on a large scale. There is no doubt, for instance, that other terrorists—Germans, Arabs, South Americans—are in touch with the Italian guerrillas, though this does not imply any subordination to a superior force. A Red Brigade commando unit might well have been trained in the *fedayeen* camps or other guerrilla schools. Nevertheless, the main attention ought to be focused on the fundamental causes rather than on speculation as to occasional interference.

However, the public at large is always attracted by such speculation. Those responsible for the state apparatus are tempted to accept it since it may extenuate their own personal responsibility, while many others seem inclined to steer the conspiracy theory in the direction suggested by their own political outlook, either by a kind of ideological conditioned reflex or in order to make political capital out of it. These explanations are useful to anyone unwilling to admit, for instance, that police efficiency was grossly undermined by the dismantling of the intelligence services, by conflicting pressures from the political forces, and by appeals for the introduction of Swedish-style laws and regulations in conditions of Argentinian-type guerrilla warfare. As for the Italian Left, once the crisis had exploded in its most tragic form, a conspiracy theory was needed to conceal and explain away the errors of the past.

For example, the Communists dallied over recognizing the true characteristics and extent of the Red Brigades from 1972 until 1977. Having sidestepped the need to subject their ideology to a convincing and coherent review when developments in the Party opened a gap on the far Left, the PCI failed to assess the effects of the oversimplifications that they had spread for years and underestimated the sectarian urges to remove or do away with one's opponent. A number of PCI members long considered the Red Brigades as "that label which is convenient for goodness knows who," even though they must have known who the groups of militants were that first moved to the far Left and thence underground. However, following the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, between 1972 and 1977 the Left and the press widely claimed that the Red Brigades were merely an extension of the *trame nere* (fascist conspiracy). The intimidated police did not clarify the origin of the numerous episodes and an intimidated Minister of the Interior even went so far as to deny the existence of opposing extremisms at a time when opposing terrorisms were already rife.

The first full admission by the PCI apparatus of the fact that

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"red" sedition was taking over from "black" sedition may be found in an interview given by Ugo Pecchioli at the end of 1977. The first rigorous analysis is Bruno Bertini's report to the Togliatti Institute in January 1978, which warned that "today we are no longer faced with an extension of the strategy of tension" and that the explanations, "which were correct in the years around 1970," according to which every episode could be traced back to a "reactionary conspiracy concealed under leftist labels," are wrong. Not until early 1978 did a few Party writers begin to acknowledge publicly the significance of the facts: "Terrorism in Italy is not merely the old game of provocation in disguise; it is a real fact that has affected or neutralized considerable forces and groups."[14] Or more explicitly: "For a long time the Red Brigades were thought to be merely a disguise for fascist terrorism, perhaps carried on using the more traditional technique of infiltration. Today it must be admitted that, around 1970, left-wing terrorism appeared in Italy."[15]

And yet the theory of the conspiracy "as a plan that has been under development ever since 1968" has often cropped up in Communist circles since the Moro kidnapping. The very day of the kidnapping, a communiqué issued by the PCI directorate made reference to a "large-scale" conspiracy and to "domestic and international reactionary plans." This report coincided with the news that Wadi Haddad, who, together with the mysterious "Carlos," had masterminded the alliance between Arab, South American, German and Japanese terrorists that led to the Lod Airport massacre, the Entebbe and Mogadishu hijackings and the kidnapping of the OPEC ministers in Vienna, had died of an incurable disease in an East Berlin hospital.

Why East Berlin? Of course, asking such a question does not entail any obligation to think that a phenomenon such as modern urban guerrilla warfare, which differs so greatly from individual terrorism, was under external control. But why censor one's imagination? A few clues led back to Prague as well as to East Berlin. There, at Comintern headquarters, Pietro Secchia, the number two man in the PCI under Togliatti with responsibility for the legal organization of the Party, headed an illegal apparatus which had been providing shelter for convicted or fugitive Communists. Also, the publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a friend of Pietro Secchia and founder of the new Gruppi Azione Partigiana guerrilla groups, went to Prague on several occasions and, before dying

[14] See *Rinascita*, January 20, 1978.
[15] *Ibid.*

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in an attempt to blow up a high-tension pylon, found shelter there for Augusto Viel of the armed Genoan "October 22nd" group. The "Reggio Group," which had joined the Red Brigades, had links with the Radio Prague Communists. Red Brigade members Curcio, Pelli and Franceschini are also thought to have spent some time in Czechoslovakia, while as early as 1970 there were reports of a number of Italians having attended the guerrilla training school at Karlovy Vary.[16]

On the other hand, a PCI press campaign suggested to party militants that the Moro kidnapping had something in common with the slaying of General Schneider in Chile, while a member of the Party executive, Emanuele Macaluso, claimed that "it was now clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that powerful international forces were at work behind the terrorists and that they had key contacts in the state apparatus." At the entrance to the Fiat-Mirafiori factory, according to a *Manifesto* account, CGIL activists were warning: "It is something bigger than the Red Brigades, that's why we've got to strike." Much publicity was also given to the hypothesis that the Moro operation had been carried out by "false Red Brigades"; the jargon used, the ideology, arms, techniques, traces and clues were all interpreted as a complex, yet perfect, simulation. The multiple minor incidents during the 54 days were interpreted as multiple perfect imitations.

The Red Brigade founders themselves, Curcio, Ferrari and Franceschini, in the speeches they delivered from the defendant's box at the Turin trial, were thus thought to have been taken in by the ruse as were the collectives of "Autonomia" and the other far Left movements, who had no doubts as to the identity of those who had conducted the operation. But the magistrates were soon able to find connections between the old and new Red Brigades. The weapons found in an apartment on Via Gradoli in Rome in April 1978 were identical to those found in the hideout in the village of Robbiano di Mediglia in October 1974 and were all part of a batch taken during a Rote Armee Fraktion raid on a Swiss armory.

However, allegations of a reactionary conspiracy certainly made it much easier to mobilize the militant rank and file of the PCI against something that carried the name of Red Brigades. The Party of Togliatti was long the paternal authority—possessive and severe but patient—over left-wing extremism. The Party raised it, nourished it with its own ideological obsessions, and finally discovered it had produced a problem child. The risk of giving birth

[16] Cf. Giorgio Bocca, *Moro, una tragedia italiana*, Milan: Rizzoli, 1978, p. 24; also G. Bocca, *Il terrorismo italiano 1970–1978*, Milan: Rizzoli, p. 135.

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to a problem child had been taken into consideration, but not the risk of it being terrorism, even though both the terrorists and the PCI spoke the same language in denouncing imperialism and multinationals. Now the crazy armed child (the natural offspring of Leninism, Stalinism, of the "idea of revolution") has shown itself to be an out-and-out criminal: "While Daddy votes, sonny shoots," according to Bernard-Henri Levy's provocative simplification. The child must be disowned, disavowed, but there is also the conflicting desire to believe he has been led astray: again, imperialism, the multinationals. And thus we have come full circle.

Then, in the autumn of 1978 came the anti-terrorist services' raids on a few Red Brigade bases in Milan, and the capture of some members such as Lauro Azzolini and Francesco Bonisoli (former members of the original groups of young extremists in Reggio Emilia) and the discovery of material referring to Aldo Moro's "revolutionary trial," which confirmed, beyond all reasonable doubt, the identity and continuity of the "armed party."

VII

Italy is different from other, greater nations that have learned from cruel historical experience the pressing need to maintain their calm. The Italian nation has never known anything like a religious war, a large civil war, Stalinism or Marxism. This historical inexperience seems to exercise an irresistible attraction where crime and political hate are combined with innumerable disruptive factors which already exist in the society. It would seem that the guerrilla warfare that now exists is not enough, that there is a desire for a civil war, which could come about under the worst conditions that the modern era can offer. "The present," some suggest, "began in Russia a century ago." To an extent they are right. But the Russia of the early nihilists and revolutionary terrorists was a far cry from today's modern industrial society.

In other aspects, and taking into account the social processes, the present might have been born out of the Weimar Republic of the 1920s. Or, perhaps in Vienna, as Karl Raimund Popper's memories of Austria between the two wars suggest: "Almost all of us were without a future and with nothing to do. Civil war was endemic and, from time to time, would explode. Needless to say we were often depressed. We read voraciously, we were omnivorous readers; we argued, we snapped out opinions." Those are early examples of destabilized industrial societies.

According to the most recent report of the PCI, released in January of this year, the number of terrorist attempts and episodes

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of political violence reached 2,365 in 1978 as against 2,124 in 1977. There were 37 killings during the same period as compared to 31 in 1977. Today, 209 different terrorist groups have taken credit for terrorist attacks (76 were known to exist in 1977). Often, however, the same group will use new names to try to throw the police off the trail. About 101 of these "organizations" are leftist and most, if not all, simply mask the action of one of the two major organizations, the Red Brigades or the Prima Linea.

Among the first victims of 1979 were a Communist labor leader, Guido Rossa, killed in Genoa because he testified against a Red Brigade messenger from the Italsider plant outside Genoa, and Judge Emilio Alessandrini, killed a few days later in Milan.

In the climate of political tension among the major parties which led to the downfall of the Andreotti government, the temptation to explain these events as a permanent conspiratorial provocation by the "ideological enemy" is again on the upswing. This was expressed, for example, by one of the slogans chanted at the funeral mass held for Guido Rossa in Genoa: "Away, Away, servants of the CIA."

In recent weeks this tension has been heightened by the difficulty of trying to form a government and by the growing possibility that a stalemate might result in early elections, two problems which could stir up dangerous sectarian sentiments. It is also difficult to select the best political strategy to confront terrorism because of the contradictions that one must face. On the one hand, it would be useful to have a strong government backed by an ample consensus, including the Communists, since a weak executive can provide an incentive to armed sedition. On the other hand, the very idea of an agreement between Christian Democrats and Communists is a stimulus to armed extremism, because the terrorists see their own "revolutionary strategy" as an alternative to any such agreement and would try to block any compromise by all the means at their disposal.

Recently, the anti-terrorist forces headed by *carabinieri* General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa have scored some considerable successes with the discovery of several terrorist hideouts and the arrests of a number of Red Brigade and Prima Linea leaders. It is too soon to determine what effect these results will have on the clandestine network. But those people who had begun to lose faith in the government's ability to confront terrorism effectively at last have some reason for hope.

Unfortunately, how long it will take to root out armed extremism is still anybody's guess.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

UNFAVORABLE CONSENSUS

To the Editor:

In your very impressive issue, *America and the World 1978*, I note that in the first three articles, dealing with general global and military affairs, each of the three authors refers, directly or indirectly, to the Committee on the Present Danger in an unfavorable manner. For example: Mr. Hedley Bull writes that "President Carter's steadfastness in pursuit of SALT II displayed a finer judgment of the position of the United States in the world than did that of his critics." Professor Stanley Hoffmann says that "[The policy of the Committee on the Present Danger] offers a dangerous cure, for it imposes an artificially simple and mechanical grid on a complex international system." And, in the words of Mr. McGeorge Bundy "The Administration's position [on arms control], even if incompletely formed and insufficiently explained, was enormously better than that of distinguished critics like Mr. Paul Nitze."

I always feel a bit uneasy when I see this kind of consensus on matters that do not lend themselves to scientific demonstration but must of necessity rely on judgments and perceptions. I mean, we can dismiss out of hand the theory of phlogiston or the Lamarckian explanation of evolution because both have been demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt to have been incorrect explanations of phenomena. But can this ever be said of a disagreement over policy? And if not, should the other party not have had a chance to be heard by your readers?

RICHARD PIPES
Frank B. Baird Jr. Professor of History
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

ANGLO-SAXON BLUEPRINTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

To the Editor:

Professor Richard Fagen's article, "The Carter Administration and Latin America: Business as Usual?" in your *America and the World 1978* issue, presents an outstanding resumé of U.S.-Latin American relations in 1978. The political dilettantes in our current executive branch would do well to read it.

Beyond the chronology, however, Fagen bases his conclusions and implied remedies upon some very shaky assumptions. In fact, one may conclude that the professor recommends an egalitarian regime in each country of Latin America and the Caribbean. He writes of "social and economic rights" as if our own experience in Britain and the United States had produced some sort of mystic ability for solving urban problems, social injustice and economic maldistribution. New York and Cleveland are hardly examples to be translated into Latin-American governmental policies, though, and it has been basically the egalitarianism of political populists which has produced the mess of those cities.

Of course, Professor Fagen's approach also creates the impression that

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wealth is really public, not private, property. Through taxation and a variety of income-transfer programs we are led to assume that income maldistribution will be resolved. Have such programs worked well in our own country? Or for that matter, would they work well in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay or Chile? And in fact have they not already been implemented from time to time in those very nations?

Often we are told that such progressive liberal solutions have "worked" in Sweden or in Finland. That is still debatable; but more importantly, are the peoples of Latin America Swedish, Finnish, Anglo-Saxon or predominantly Ibero-American?

In short, culture and regional mores can and do make a difference. Fagen simply does not address himself to differences. Even today, not withstanding decades of education in modern economics, political leaders in most of Latin America define wealth as money in the bank, as currency taken *out* of an enterprise or as an exploitive, extractive abstract. Most do not conceive of wealth as products, goods, or services. Nor do they look upon development as the result of plowing profits back into the creation of more products, goods, and services.

Having lived in, studied in and worked in Latin America for more than two decades, I for one find myself increasingly discouraged with Anglo-Saxon "blueprints" for Hispanic-American development. Even Professor Fagen admits that "This continues to be the responsibility of Latin Americans themselves. . . ." Development does not seem historically to be the result of egalitarianism, though. Neither does it appear to come from the extractive Hapsburgean economics of the early Spanish Empire. And it certainly does not blossom from the totalitarianism of the Right or the Left. The question still arises for Latin America: are there any short cuts to development? If there are, there is no doubt that they should best be Latin American, in any case.

J. Robert Shaffer
Stamford, Connecticut

EXPORTING TO JAPAN

To the Editor:

In their article in the Fall 1978 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* "The Trade Gap With Japan," Messrs. Abegglen and Hout comment that:

> Indeed, the plans of Dow Chemical to establish a world-scale caustic soda facility in South Korea, in part to supply the very high-cost Japanese market, indicate that U.S. industry itself feels compelled to turn to cost-efficient, third-country sources of supply—which, however, means that the U.S. balance of payments is not improved by Japan's market needs.

It is true that our company is establishing a world-scale caustic soda facility in the Republic of Korea, but it is being located there to supply chlorine, a basic raw material, for the very large domestic polyvinylchloride industry.

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Because of the nature of the chemical process, near equal tonnages of caustic soda are co-produced with chlorine. The domestic demand for caustic soda in Korea is not as large as that for chlorine, so some of the caustic must be exported, and a portion of that exported may go to Japan.

However, I want to make it clear that any export of caustic soda from our facilities in Korea to Japan will be purely incidental to our principal objective of supplying the domestic Korean market with a basic chemical raw material which it presently uses in large quantities. The implication in the article that Korea is a more cost-efficient place in which to produce caustic soda for export to Japan is incorrect.

Having said that, I must in fairness state that I agree completely with the principal points which Messrs. Abegglen and Hout make in their excellent analysis of the trade problem between Japan and the United States. The key sentence in their article is: "U.S. private corporations will ultimately determine the level of U.S. penetration of the Japanese market." Dow Chemical has been doing business in Japan as a major exporter and investor for well over 25 years, and has achieved excellent results. However, those results have been achieved only by the investment of a lot of money, talented manpower, and patience. Doing business in Japan is more difficult for foreigners than for Japanese, but it can be done successfully if one takes the long view and has the staying power and discrimination to learn and to adapt to that dynamic but different business environment.

R. W. Lundeen
Executive Vice President
The Dow Chemical Company
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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES. Edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979, 4 vols. $35.00.

Case studies of the eclipse of democratic government in interwar Europe and in Latin America. The studies themselves, many of which go over well-trampled historical ground, are of high quality because written with the benefit of all available material and because they represent a disciplined inquiry into phenomena and causal relationships that illuminate the process of breakdown. Moreover, in his introductory section, Linz cuts into new ground in the study of the patterns of crisis, collapse and "reequilibration," all of which is of considerable importance to those concerned with democracy's survival today.

POLITICS AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS. By Raymond Aron. New York: Free Press, 1978, 274 pp. $14.95.

Previously published writings of Aron, well chosen and presented as an introduction to his philosophical and political thought. Well worth reading, or re-reading, as the case may be.

THE MANY FACES OF COMMUNISM. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. New York: Free Press, 1978, 366 pp. $14.95.

Since the fracturing of the international communist movement it has become necessary to observe the factions, the separate states and parties, and their relations with one another. Ten specialists describe here, with comparisons where useful, the "lines" and policies of the various ruling and nonruling parties in Europe and in Asia. The book is a welcome one at this stage, but, since the situation remains very much in flux, far from the last word.

A NEW STAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By N. I. Lebedev. New York: Pergamon Press, 1978, 253 pp. $20.00.

Here are the Soviet conceptions of coexistence and détente set forth for Western readers. Although largely a repetition of familiar themes and quotations from Lenin and Brezhnev, the book is useful in presenting a broad and integrated view of the world scene as it is shaped by the changing balance of forces in favor of socialism.

VICTIMS OF POLITICS: THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By Kurt

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Glaser and Stefan T. Possony. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, 614 pp. $35.00.

THE NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By James Avery Joyce. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 305 pp. $19.95.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY. By Louis Henkin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 173 pp. $14.50.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER. Edited by Abdul Aziz Said. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction, 1978, 167 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

HUMAN RIGHTS. By David Owen. London: Jonathan Cape/New York: Norton, 1978, 154 pp. $8.95.

The temper of the times—whether the cause is President Carter's crusade, the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, or something else—has loosed a flood of printer's ink on the subject of human rights. Glaser and Possony have produced an encyclopedic work full of data on all the ways in which wars, ideologies and politics have violated the rights of groups and individuals. Joyce's book, more modest in size but also broad in outlook, focuses on the efforts that have been made through the United Nations and the European Community for the international protection of human rights. Henkin, in a series of distinguished lectures, combines a legal with a political and a humanist approach in treating both the constitutional and the international aspects. The Said volume is a collection of brief but often good essays. In the volume by the British Foreign Secretary, which is a real book and not just a collection of speeches, David Owen puts human rights in the context of British policy, or vice versa, and in passing gives his views on détente, Eurocommunism and other matters. It is striking that virtually every one of these authors believes that human rights have now achieved a recognition (in law and declared policy if not in practice) they never had before.

ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS. By Jorge I. Domínguez, Nigel S. Rodley, Bryce Wood and Richard A. Falk. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1979, 288 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $6.95).

This volume joins one monograph-length study and three articles on less-or-more related aspects of international concern with human rights. Domínguez's effort to build a comprehensive index for assessing human rights, based on Lasswell-Kaplan value categories, is imaginative and instructive but probably less useful for international monitoring than the author hopes. Rodley describes and prescribes for the NGO network. Wood discusses human rights issues in Latin America with emphasis on "security, development and repression." Falk is skeptical about how much can be done for human rights short of a drastically altered world-order system. All are sensitive to the now common preoccupation with the relation between human rights and needs. All contribute to understanding and dialogue. All leave lots more to be said.

Louis Henkin

PROBLEMI BEZBEDNOSTI I SARADNJE U EVROPI. By Ljubivoje Aćimović. Belgrade: Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1978, 447 pp.

It is interesting that the most thorough book yet written on the Conference on European Security and Cooperation negotiations should be by a Yugoslav

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scholar. Aćimović, who was on the Yugoslav delegation, writes with an approach that is, as you might expect, nonaligned, and is also historically objective. He is especially informative on Yugoslav positions and policies, as he had access to unpublished Yugoslav material.

THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT. By Robert B. Seidman. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 483 pp.
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Charles Chukwuma Okolie. New York: Nok, 1978, 369 pp.

Two serious and sometimes rather strained efforts to relate law, politics and economics in the present process and future prospects of development in the Third World. Seidman's main purpose is to elaborate a theory, using examples from his experience in Africa. Much of it is an intriguing antidote to development economics. Okolie's discussion of relations between the developed (including the communist) countries and the Third World, seeking and finding an emerging "international development law," contains such a quantity of facts and opinions as to overwhelm and occasionally confuse the reader.

QUAKER EXPERIENCES IN INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION. By C. H. Mike Yarrow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 308 pp. $10.00.

A notable consistency and faith has marked the efforts of the Quakers in the field of international conciliation, for which, along with their relief work, they have won great respect. This book gives the detailed story of their activities with the two Germanies, with India and Pakistan in the 1960s, and in the Nigerian civil war. Their efforts in East-West relations and in the Middle East are not covered.

KIDNAP AND RANSOM: THE RESPONSE. By Richard Clutterbuck. London and Boston: Faber, 1978, 192 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

Author of earlier books on terrorism and political violence, Richard Clutterbuck puts the recent rash of kidnappings and hostage-holdings in that context, gives thumbnail sketches of recent notorious cases, and makes sensible suggestions about how society can cope with the problem.

WHOSE NEWS? POLITICS, THE PRESS AND THE THIRD WORLD. By Rosemary Righter. New York: Times Books, 1978, 272 pp. $12.50.
THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM. Edited by Philip C. Horton. New York: Praeger, 1978, 253 pp.

The unending controversy about what is news and how to report it, reflecting basically different philosophies in the West and in the Third World, is admirably described and analyzed in these two books. Righter's is the better organized and better written, while the Horton volume, the result of a conference of journalists held in 1977, contains a rich variety of views.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL: PART II, ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: ELEMENTS OF A NEW APPROACH. By Christoph Bertram. Adelphi paper No. 146. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978, 584 pp.

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A work of fundamental importance, by the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which should be carefully read by all those seriously concerned with arms control and East-West relations. Bertram raises disturbing questions about the future feasibility of arms control because of the impact of technological change on the ability to develop quantitative restrictions on levels of forces; the difficulty in verifying qualitative restraints; and the multi-mission role of many new weapons, which undermines traditional categories of negotiation. Doubt is cast on whether technological change can be controlled by such often-favored means as limits on testing or the curtailment of procurement. Unilaterally adopted restraints, while useful, are not capable of replacing negotiated agreements. Instead, Bertram suggests a new arms control approach based upon explicitly restraining military *missions*—such as the ability to destroy vulnerable land-based ICBMs or threatening second-strike, missile-firing nuclear submarines. This criterion—of missions rather than weapons—is, in fact, more a changed emphasis than a radical departure from current practice, for it still depends upon quantitative restrictions for implementation. And, of course, it would have to be acceptable to the Soviets. Yet this imaginative and carefully reasoned study merits wide debate as one new set of ideas for dealing with the increasing difficulties in maintaining a credible strategic balance.

FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT. By Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan. Washington: Brookings, 1978, 584 pp. $19.95 (Paper, $8.95).

A massive and impressive—in both scope and methodology—analysis of the political use of military force short of armed conflict. The authors examined 215 incidents in which U.S. forces were used, ranging from the civil strife in Haiti in 1946 to the seizure of the *Mayaguez* in 1975. The evidence suggests that the discrete application of military power is often an effective way of achieving short-term foreign policy objectives by stabilizing volatile situations. But the "success rate" erodes sharply over time. Although such actions may delay unwanted developments and offer a respite, they are usually no substitute for more basic economic and political actions. Thus, the major benefit of the demonstrative use of armed forces may be to buy time for diplomacy. A bulky and overlong study, but one which is likely to become a seminal work.

WORLD CHANGE AND WORLD SECURITY. Edited by Norman C. Dahl and Jerome B. Wiesner. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 174 pp. $14.95.

As part of its bicentennial program, MIT sponsored this series of lectures by prominent individuals including Willy Brandt, Roy Jenkins, Georgi Arbatov, Roberto Campos, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Frank Church. The connecting thread is the impact of science and technology upon the critical questions ahead, and the prognosis is far from optimistic. Though often thoughtful, the essays are too brief.

PROBLEMS OF SEA POWER AS WE APPROACH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Edited by James L. George. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, 364 pp. $11.75 (Paper, $5.75).

The product of a conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, these essays explore responsibly almost all facets of the future of the U.S. Navy. The expectation of continuing turmoil in the Third World, and

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increased dependency upon resources from abroad, suggest a continuing need for sea power. But it is far from self-evident what the proper mix of different types of ships should be, or the nature of the naval "balance" with the Soviet Union, given the asymmetries of ships, geography and missions. This is a good contribution to the debate.

CONGRESS AND ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Alan Platt and Lawrence D. Weiler. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 227 pp. $18.50.

Essays of high quality by well-chosen authors on a subject of current interest as Congress debates the SALT II agreement. In addition to strategic arms, the book includes chapters on legislative aspects of arms sales and nonproliferation. There is also thoughtful consideratio of the importance of making adequate staff and analytical resources available to the Congress as well as discussion of the powers that come with controlling congressional procedures.

MILITARY UNIONS: U.S. TRENDS AND ISSUES. Edited by William J. Taylor, Jr., Roger J. Arango and Robert S. Lockwood. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, 336 pp.

The idea that military personnel might join unions to bargain collectively with the government is a new one in America, an unexpected corollary of the all-volunteer force. At first a taboo subject within the services, then evoking strong visceral reactions, it is now emerging as a public issue. These path-breaking essays structure the issues and are noteworthy for having been edited by professor-officers at West Point.

NO SOFT OPTIONS: THE POLITICO-MILITARY REALITIES OF NATO. By Sir Peter Hill-Norton. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978, 172 pp. $12.95.

A short, pithy book about NATO and the challenges it faces, written by a former Chairman of the Alliance's Military Committee. The strength of the book lies with the insider's view and the author's willingness to speak candidly.

BLOWING ON THE WIND: THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DEBATE 1954–1960. By Robert A. Divine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 393 pp. $14.95.

A meticulous yet dramatically written study of one of the most important national security debates of the postwar period, the work of a skilled and responsible historian.

REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE: MILITARY BUREAUCRATS AND DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN, TURKEY, EGYPT, AND PERU. By Ellen Kay Trimberger. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction, 1978, 196 pp. $14.95.

Starting from the assumption that revolutions will increase in Third World nations, the author thinks that they are more likely to originate from the top, i.e., the military, than in the "lower" classes. A somewhat heavy-handed treatise with Marxist overtones, yet containing valuable insights.

THE MILITARY AND SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS. Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 348 pp. $22.50.

A group of essays which range in subject from Africa to Latin America to Asia and which discuss two questions: the domestic political situations created by the mixing of military and civilian elites in the governance of many countries, and, the national security policies of selected states.

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General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE NATURE OF MASS POVERTY. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, 150 pp. $8.95.

In his best book in some time, Professor Galbraith shows why the acceptance of poverty is so dominant a reason for its perpetuation. While some individuals who break out can improve themselves as farmers, industrialization is essential to provide jobs and opportunities for the others. And while effective government is required for some things, planning puts too great a demand on the scarcest resource, administrative talent and knowledge. "For the poor country the entrepreneur and the market are inevitable." Socialism can come later. This challenging book ends with a provocative celebration of migration as a practice that helps those who go, the places they go to, and those who are left behind.

DEFENDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: RAW MATERIALS INVESTMENTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Stephen D. Krasner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, 404 pp. $20.00 (Paper, $5.95).

For most people the greatest value of this very substantial book will be its examination of U.S. policy toward American investment in raw material production abroad over a long period of time. There is excellent case material and a careful sifting of evidence about aims and motives. The big fish the author is after, however, is evidence that there is a "statist" approach to American foreign policy in which concepts of the national interest prevail over what other theories tell us about group and class interests. He seems somewhat surprised to find that there is.

FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. VOLUME XI: ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES. By Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Cambridge: Ballinger (for the National Bureau of Economic Research), 1978, 232 pp.

This is one of two concluding volumes to a series of most valuable studies of the trade policies of developing countries. While no shorthand can do the work justice, and national variations are significant on many different issues, the conclusions drawn by Professor Bhagwati of MIT emphasize the superiority of policies that promote exports over those that protect domestic production to substitute for imports.

THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: THE WELFARE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Melvyn B. Krauss. New York: New York University Press (for the International Center for Economic Policy Studies), 1978, 119 pp.

Three topics are tied together in this clearly written work: the classic case for free trade; the costs of governmental measures to shape the domestic economy and resist change by penalizing foreign trade; and the long-run burden on growth and productivity of heavy government expenditure. It is stretching things a bit to see all the bad effects as the fault of the welfare state, but they certainly reinforce one another. This is the first product of the International Center for Economic Policy Studies, which intends to go on making the case for markets as the best way to allocate resources.

BEYOND THE NORTH-SOUTH STALEMATE. By Roger D. Hansen.

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New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1979, 320 pp. $12.95.

This important book explores the history of the North-South problem, and analyzes conflicting perceptions of its nature and its solution. The author argues that the problem arises from the gap between the very real change in the structure of the international system and the absence of change in statecraft. He proposes to overcome the resultant stalemate through a joint North-South commitment to a new policy based on meeting basic human needs, and the alteration of global regimes according to guiding principles which he outlines.

Joan Spero

KÖLCSÖNÖS FÜGGŐSÉG ÉS KONFLIKTUSOK A VILÁGGAZDASÁGBAN. By Mihály Simai. Budapest: Közgazdasági, 1978, 314 pp. 56 Forints.

In what he says is the first comprehensive work in the socialist countries on "Interdependence and Conflicts in the World Economy," Professor Simai of Budapest concludes that the world is not doing as well as it should in handling international adjustment. A study of his own highly dependent country shows that national interests can only be served by active international cooperation.

WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONALIZED ECONOMY. Edited by Bernhard Wilpert, Ayse Kudat and Yilmaz Ozkan. Kent (Ohio): Kent State University Press, 1978, 200 pp. $15.00.

Great variety in a short compass, including theory, fieldwork, Marxist views and analyses of the attitudes of Turkish and Yugoslav workers to participation in the management of German enterprises (and the German unions' view of them). One cannot add up the results but there are interesting insights and a good review of the literature in a complex field of growing significance.

MULTINATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN SOZIALISTISICHER LÄNDER. By Peter Lorenz. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1978, 187 pp. DM. 35.

Useful data on the law and organization of the international economic organizations established among the COMECON countries, plus some speculation for which there is little evidence about the kinds of changes they might foster in some of the national economic systems.

BEYOND BOOM AND CRASH. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Norton, 1978, 111 pp. $6.95.

What lies ahead for capitalism, according to this provocative analysis, is planning to permit growth, since the market mechanism cannot cope with energy and environment. But fear of this kind of "socialism" is itself a major contributor to the present difficulties.

NONTARIFF AGRICULTURAL TRADE BARRIERS. By Jimmye S. Hillman. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979, 236 pp. $13.50.
DISTORTIONS OF AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES. Edited by Theodore W. Schultz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, 343 pp. $12.95.

Two leading American agricultural economists help explain what is wrong. Hillman provides an extraordinary amount of material on the inevitable international results of domestic farm policies that keep the world market at bay. Schultz's contributors show some of the ways these policies produce poor results. The chances of improvement on some of these points are better than those of breakthroughs in international negotiations.

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SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. By M.S. Rajan. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1978, 176 pp. $8.75.

In a study sponsored by UNITAR, an Indian expert on international law and organization provides a good analytical account of the long argument in the U.N. over the control of natural resources. He is not, however, altogether persuasive in foreseeing a happy ending based on new concepts of sovereignty in interdependence—though one hopes he is right.

U.S. POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: DEFINING REASONABLE OPTIONS IN AN UNREASONABLE WORLD. Edited by Seymour Maxwell Finger and Joseph R. Harbert. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 500 pp. $24.00 (Paper, $12.00).

Security, economics, resources and the U.N. are all foci of institutional change that pose new issues for the United States or reopen old ones. A good deal of thinking has to be done and this volume is packed with examples of it, some reprinted from other sources and some stimulated by the Ralph Bunche Institute at CUNY.

THE PRESSURES OF OIL. By Peter R. Odell and Luis Vallenilla. London: Harper, 1978, 215 pp.

OIL, OECD, AND THE THIRD WORLD: A VICIOUS TRIANGLE? By Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings. Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas; 1978, 137 pp. $4.95 (Paper).

ENERGIEVERSORGUNG. By Manfred Grathwohl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1978, 294 pp. DM. 68.

Books on energy flow more freely than the oil they are mostly about. The first two focus in an interesting manner on the possibilities of cooperation between OPEC and OECD countries with the special aim of helping the poorest countries (though Odell and Vallenilla have greater ambitions). Grathwohl, scientific director of the Bundeswehr's Führungsakademie, provides a largely technical review that sees oil and coal holding until fusion and solar power take over.

A LOW ENERGY STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM. By Gerald Leach and others. London: Science Reviews (for the International Institute for the Environment and Development), 1979, 259 pp.

A thorough technical study of Britain's future energy requirements that supports the increasingly accepted view that satisfactory growth of GNP can take place with a much lower rate of energy consumption thanks to the conservation that known technology makes possible. The conclusions directly challenge the official forecasts of the Department of Energy.

J.C.C.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

IMPERIALISM AT BAY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DECOLONIALIZATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1941–1945. By William Roger Louis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 594 pp. $19.95.

For a generation, historians have written as if the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the only significant consequence of World War II. But the years 1941–1945 also witnessed the highwater mark and rapid recession of British and other white control in Africa and Asia. Those who

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wish to give the phenomenon of decolonialization the consideration it deserves must begin with this clear and learned study, the best book by a prolific historian of imperial decline.

KISSINGER AND THE MEANING OF HISTORY. By Peter W. Dickson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 197 pp. $14.95.

Excluding Presidents, no figure in American public life in this century has been the subject of as many books as has Henry Kissinger. The principal reason, of course, is the significance of the changes in foreign policy over which he presided. But there is also the challenge to the academic mind of relating philosophy to action, of discovering in Kissinger's writings the meaning of what he did in government. Dickson applies his formal training in Kantian philosophy to an analysis of Kissinger's often-mentioned but seldom-read 400-page Harvard senior thesis on "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant" (1950). He concludes that what truly separates Kissinger from other American leaders is his "rejection of America's role as a nation with a special mission or place in history."

INTERPRETERS AND CRITICS OF THE COLD WAR. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Washington: University Press of America, 1978, 113 pp. $6.50 (Paper).

Admiring commentary on the ideas of Walter Lippmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan by a philosopher of foreign policy whose own work has been influenced by all four. Thompson sees them united by similar assumptions about the nature of man and by common advocacy of "the courage to change" foreign policy.

A WORLD OF MEN: THE PRIVATE SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Lloyd S. Etheredge. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 178 pp. $12.50.

No one doubts that the personalities of leaders influence the decisions they make. But the author, using questionnaires answered by middle-ranking officials and secondary accounts of the behavior of high officials, claims a very large and dangerous role for "personality intrusions," especially in decisions involving the use of force. Provocative but unconvincing.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: THE SETTING OF PRIORITIES. By Donald E. Nuechterlein. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 246 pp. $18.00 (Paper, $8.00).

Without going so far as to claim that "national interests" are whatever leaders say they are, Nuechterlein realizes that definitions must be sought more in action than in theory. By analyzing specific cases from Wilson to Carter he develops a matrix of intensity (survival, vital, major, and peripheral) and type (defense, economic, world order, and ideological). A clarifying exercise.

LEADERSHIP IN ISOLATION: FDR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By William E. Kinsella, Jr. Boston: G. K. Hall/ Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978, 282 pp. $15.50.

In this sympathetic survey of F.D.R.'s foreign policy before Pearl Harbor, the author diligently explores unpublished material and concludes that Roosevelt never doubted the necessity of American entry into the conflict against the Axis. He endows the President with a more systematic mind and more

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foresight than do many historians.

THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. Edited by Anthony King. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, 407 pp. $6.75.

Ten authors analyze the disappearance of a political system based on cohesive, identifiable voting blocs, a system which reached its apogee in the New Deal. They find that coalition politics has given way to "atomized" politics and that there is no reigning "public philosophy." Chapters deal with the presidency, Congress, the Supreme Court, the parties, the states. A first-rate book.

THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS. By Christopher Lasch. New York: Norton, 1979, 268 pp. $11.95.

This book is so uniformly pessimistic that one wonders if the author, a distinguished historian, is suffering as is the nation from a crisis of middle age. And yet most of what Lasch says is well supported by data. The central indictment is that Americans have isolated themselves from the past and, for that reason, have lost a sense of responsibility for posterity. The analysis is informed by psychoanalytic theory as well as historical learning. This could become as influential a statement of the moral-intellectual climate of the late 1970s as Charles Reich's *Greening of America* was for the 1960s. Lasch, however, is far more profound, and his conclusions are diametrically opposite to Reich's gleeful silliness.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

TRUDEAU. By George Radwanski. New York: Taplinger, 1978, 372 pp. $14.95.

A thoughtful and beautifully written appraisal, a model of contemporary political biography. Although Radwanski, an Ottawa journalist, recognizes Trudeau's flaws, he sees him as the best of Canada's postwar Prime Ministers, a man "who cares passionately about one issue—national unity and the survival of an open-spirited, bilingual federalism."

G.S.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CANADA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP. By Roger Frank Swanson. New York: New York University Press, 1978, 278 pp. $17.50.

Too much writing about Canada and Canadian-American relations is long on handwringing and general alarm, and short on useful facts. This study, therefore, is a most welcome description of the institutions concerned with the relations of the two countries and how they work. Indispensable for anyone with a practical interest in the subject.

G.S.

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS: THE 1965 CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLT AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION. By Piero Gleijeses. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979, 460 pp. $22.50.

A thoroughly documented study, competently performed, quite critical of U.S. policy without embracing a Castroite alternative. The perspective, rather,

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is one of a non-Cuban design for social change, sympathetic to the 14th of June Group. The language and tone occasionally lapse into shrillness.

CENTRAL AMERICA: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Royce Q. Shaw. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 242 pp. $18.50.

The Central American movement is usually analyzed in terms of economic and regional integration theory, with the spotlight on the *technicos.* Here the *politicos* move to stage center, and the emphasis passes to the role of domestic politics and its leadership.

THE STATE AND SOCIETY: PERU IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE. By Alfred Stepan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, 348 pp. $18.50 (Paper, $4.95).

In Part I, the function of the state in society is delineated, with some stress on theories of corporatism. In Part II, these concepts are applied specifically to Peru. One conclusion: despite some successes, "... it was evident by the mid-1970s that as an organic-statist experiment, the Peruvian regime had failed."

PERU, 1890–1977: GROWTH AND POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY. By Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, 475 pp. $22.50.

Arguing the necessity of a "radical redistribution of resources from the modern to the traditional sectors," the authors at the same time recognize the unreality of the prescription. Their analysis of poverty and inequality, which they attribute to an export-oriented economy dominated by foreign capital, is therefore hardly encouraging.

CLASS CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE, 1958–1973. By Barbara Stallings. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978, 286 pp. $18.50.

The author judges the Allende experiment against the background of the Alessandri and Frei governments. Integration of political and economic analysis is emphasized through a focus on bridging factors such as social class, the state, the foreign sector. The underlying theory is Marxist, with Keynesian variations.

VENEZUELA'S OIL. By Romulo Betancourt. London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978, 275 pp. $20.75.

The grand old man of Venezuelan democracy returns to the fray with an interesting supplement to his 1956 volume, *Venezuela, Política y Petróleo,* in the form of essays and documents reviewing oil's influence on the life of the nation. Praise, fears, blame, are freely dispensed in these intensely personal writings.

Western Europe

Christoph Kimmich

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. Edited by Charles S. Maier. New York: New Viewpoints, 1978, 255 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $6.95).

These essays bring a welcome change in our historical perceptions of the

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cold war. Not obsessed with questions of guilt and responsibility, they examine how the cold-war antagonism shaped, or distorted, the political and social developments in Europe after World War II. They focus on Western Europe, and more on American than on Soviet policy, reflecting the accessibility of source material. The editor's own essay on the historiographical debate on the cold war, which introduces the volume, is well worth reading.

EUROCOMMUNISM: ITS ROOTS AND FUTURE IN ITALY AND ELSEWHERE. Edited by G. R. Urban. New York: Universe Books, 1978, 287 pp.

A collection of interviews conducted for Radio Free Europe in 1977-78 with leading Eurocommunist spokesmen (such as Elleinstein of France, Mussi and Radice of Italy), and with a number of experts on Eurocommunism. Although they already seem dated here and there, the interviews will be of interest to those who wonder about the nature and aims of Eurocommunism and, indeed, about whether it exists at all.

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By R. Neal Tannahill. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1978, 299 pp. $18.95.

What are the factors that shape the positions and policies of Western Europe's communist parties? How and why do they differ? What draws them together; what keeps them apart? These and other questions are answered in this comprehensive survey, broad rather than deep, with up-to-date election and membership statistics and a useful bibliography.

THE OSTPOLITIK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. By William E. Griffith. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, 325 pp. $19.95.

A useful book: the first in English to deal with West Germany's *Ostpolitik* in its entirety. It describes and analyzes the different policies, negotiations and agreements, placing them against the background of changing East-West relations. Judicious and well informed.

EAST GERMANY AND THE WARSAW ALLIANCE: THE POLITICS OF DETENTE. By N. Edwina Moreton. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 267 pp. $18.00.

Bonn's *Ostpolitik* caught East Germany between two equally undesirable alternatives: to reject Bonn's initiative and face isolation within the Warsaw Pact alliance, or to accept the initiative and risk endangering status and security. Moreton examines this dilemma, reconstructing the shifts and adjustments in policy, within the larger context of alliance cohesion and conflicting national interests. Carefully done and informative.

GUESTWORKERS IN GERMANY. By Ray C. Rist. New York: Praeger, 1978, 263 pp.

An important survey of the recruitment, utility, status, and general treatment of so-called guestworkers, who in fact tend to be immigrants. In 1976 they still constituted nearly ten percent of the German work force; almost half of them were Turks and Yugoslavs. Most aspects of the complicated process are well covered in this study.

A BALANCE SHEET OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. By Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978, 303 pp. (New York: International Publications Service, distributor, $16.00).

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The second volume of a two-part study of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 (the first volume was noted in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1978), and, like the first, more in the nature of a preliminary assessment. Half of the book consists of a close analysis of the implementation of the Agreement, and particularly of some of the unresolved disputes that remain (on the nature of West Berlin's ties to West Germany; on the maintenance of four-power status); the other half contains the text of the Agreement and a selection of related documents.

THE IDES OF AUGUST: THE BERLIN WALL CRISIS, 1961. By Curtis Cate. New York: M. Evans, 1978, 544 pp. $15.00.

A familiar tale, retold with a sense of drama and immediacy. Cate is interested in personal experiences—of ordinary Berliners suddenly caught on opposite sides of the Wall, of G.I.'s on patrol, of politicians and generals coping with emergency. In effect, he reduces the crisis to a series of human interest stories.

THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Yehuda Bauer. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978, 192 pp. $8.95.

The object of this small volume, originally delivered as a set of lectures, is to reexamine some of the central historical and ethical issues raised by the Nazis' mass murder of the Jews, and to dispel the myths and legends (even outright falsifications) that have come to veil that harsh reality. Bauer is head of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, and he writes with authority and passion.

KARL KAUTSKY, 1854–1938. By Gary P. Steenson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978, 308 pp. $15.95.

Kautsky was one of the most influential Marxists of his day, the mentor to an entire generation of Marxists. This book rescues him from relative obscurity: it guides us intelligently through the evolution of his thought (from "romantic socialist to consistent Marxist") and reconstructs his efforts to adapt Marx's theories and precepts to the political needs of a mass party. A very competent monograph.

SUEZ 1956: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT. By Selwyn Lloyd. London: Jonathan Cape/New York: Mayflower Books, 1979, 275 pp. $10.95.

As Foreign Secretary in Eden's Cabinet, Selwyn Lloyd played an important role in the events of 1956, and here, in a book that is part memoir, part history, he gives his side of the story. Like others who had experienced Munich at first hand, he saw disquieting parallels in Nasser's provocations, and urged appropriate action. But the real villain to emerge from the book is Eisenhower's Administration, whose cold betrayal of an old ally smarts to this day. In all, there is little here that will cause us to revise our views of the crisis.

BRITAIN: A FUTURE THAT WORKS. By Bernard D. Nossiter. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, 275 pp. $9.95.

Nossiter, *The Washington Post's* correspondent in London, takes on the pundits who diagnose Britain's condition as illness leading to imminent demise. On the contrary, he argues, despite some very real problems, Britain is "healthy, democratic, productive, as stable a society as any of its size in Europe." Making the choice of leisure over goods, and moving toward an economy based more on services and the arts than on manufacturing, she may in fact be a model of sorts for post-industrial societies. Readable, often lively—but is he serious?

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DIVIDED LOYALTIES: BRITISH REGIONAL ASSERTION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Edited by Martin Kolinsky. Manchester (U.K.): Manchester University Press, 1978, 216 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, $19.25).

The contributors to this symposium, all British political scientists, assess the constitutional implications of Britain's membership in the European Community and the possible devolution of power to national interests in Scotland and elsewhere. They conclude that both "Britain's nationhood" and the "continuance of her democratic regime" are threatened, a conclusion that seems unduly pessimistic.

TRANSITION IN SPAIN. By Victor Alba. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction, 1978, 333 pp. $14.95.

Since the time of its settlement, so runs the argument of this book, Spain has been living "against the grain of history"—politically immature, socially unstable, and out of phase with developments in the rest of Europe. Today, having attained political democracy, Spain is catching up at last. The author, a veteran of the Civil War and of Franco's prisons, believes that Spain's besetting problems are well on the way to solution.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF GREECE SINCE WORLD WAR II. By William H. McNeill. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, 264 pp. $12.95.

The attempt to transform Greek public life over the past 30 years has been an extraordinary success, without parallel in Greek history, argues McNeill, largely because local traditions and values have meshed smoothly with the demands and pressures of modernization. His study, infinitely rich and suggestive, will be read by all who want to understand contemporary Greece and her possible future.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

TO BUILD A CASTLE: MY LIFE AS A DISSENTER. By Vladimir Bukovsky. New York: Viking, 1979, 438 pp. $17.50.

Bukovsky's convictions and his indomitable spirit come through strongly in this compelling narrative of his ordeal in the prisons, labor camps and psychiatric hospitals of the U.S.S.R.

ALARM AND HOPE. By Andrei D. Sakharov. New York: Knopf, 1978, 200 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Statements made by Sakharov over the past few years, including his Nobel Prize lecture and the exchange of letters with President Carter.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Morton Schwartz. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 224 pp. $12.50.

The perceptions are those of G. A. Arbatov and his colleagues of the Institute of the U.S.A. in Moscow, to whom the author, an American expert on Soviet foreign policy, gives some credit for the greater comprehension of America and the greater moderation evident in Soviet policy in the past ten years.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York, Praeger, 1978, 295 pp.

Solid contributions by assorted experts to a subject which is central to Western security but has had too little informed and detailed attention. The question of "finlandization" gets a thorough airing.

MATERIALIZATSIIA RAZRIADKI: EKONOMICHESKIE ASPEKTY. Edited by V. N. Shenaev and Yu. V. Andreev. Moscow: Mysl, 1978, 346 pp. Rubles 1.30.

A series of informative studies by Soviet economists covering recent economic relations with West European countries, the U.S., and Japan.

SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICIES AND PRACTICES. Edited by Jeremy R. Azrael. New York: Praeger, 1978, 393 pp.

Essays which range widely over the general topic of the "nationality question" in czarist and communist Russia. Some are rather narrow research projects; others, broader discussions of policy. Azrael's concluding chapter on emerging problems in this area of policy finds them serious but not fatal for the Soviet regime.

SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY. Edited by Karl W. Ryavec. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978, 256 pp. $15.00.

Individual scholars address the question of how the role of the Party has been adapted to the process of economic and social change. The volume's value lies less in an overall argument, real or contrived, than in the competent way each author ploughs his own terrain.

INNOVATION IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS. Edited by Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 224 pp. $17.50.

Complementing the Ryavec volume (above), these more general and more readable essays take us into the realm of comparative communist systems and the diffusion of innovation across national boundaries. Several good contributions deal with the impact of Titoism and of Eurocommunism on the states of the Soviet bloc.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS. Edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 273 pp. $21.00.

Without providing clear answers either as to theory or to practice, this book takes us further toward an understanding of the subject than earlier ones, not least because of the comparative look at the Soviet Union, some of its Warsaw Pact allies, Yugoslavia, and China. Among the contributors are the leading American and Canadian scholars in the field.

NACHTFROST. By Zdeněk Mlynář. Cologne: Europaische, 1978, 366 pp. DM. 34.

New light on the men and forces that produced the Prague Spring of 1968 and on those that destroyed it. Mlynář, holding a high party position, was one of the architects of "socialism with a human face." He left Czechoslovakia only in 1977.

ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1965. By Aurel Braun. New York: Praeger, 1978, 217 pp.

Not a chronological account or full-scale review of Romania's foreign

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relations but a well-documented and soundly reasoned analysis of the "defenses" by which Ceausescu has assured his country's autonomy of policy despite Soviet pressures.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN ROMANIA, 1860–1940: A DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN A EUROPEAN NATION. Edited by Kenneth Jowitt. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California; 1978, 207 pp.

A book which illustrates what great strides American scholarship on Eastern Europe has made in the past decade. The discussions of Romania's development invite interesting comparisons with Third World countries today.

PATRIOT OR TRAITOR: THE CASE OF GENERAL MIHAILOVICH. Introductory essay by David Martin. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978, 499 pp. $19.00.

Statements of U.S. airmen who testified for Mihailovich in 1946 (before a private American group in New York, not in Belgrade before Tito's court which condemned him) on the question of collaboration with the Nazis, published for the first time with a long introduction by David Martin. The theme is the same as that of Martin's earlier book, *Ally Betrayed.* He concludes that more research needs to be done before the story of the Chetnik leader can be told in an evenhanded manner but makes no reference to the recent detailed studies by Tomasevich and Milazzo (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1975).

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

NASSER AND HIS GENERATION. By P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: St. Martin's, 1978, 375 pp. $22.50.

Not intended as a standard biography or history of Nasser's reign, this effort by a cultural historian and student of politics to interpret him as a personality and a product of a generational change in Egypt succeeds brilliantly, giving us the best portrait of the Egyptian leader yet published. Nasser comes through as a populist despot of extraordinary ability and accomplishment, in tune with his time; but "Nasserism" is strangely hollow both as an ideology and as a lasting achievement.

EGYPT'S UNCERTAIN REVOLUTION UNDER NASSER AND SADAT. By Raymond William Baker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, 320 pp. $16.00.

A perceptive and critical picture of Nasser's Egypt not very different from that drawn by Vatikiotis (though more pedestrian in presentation), with the addition of an assessment of Sadat's partial dismantling of Nasser's policies and institutions.

ELUSIVE VICTORY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, 1947–1974. By Trevor N. Dupuy. New York: Harper, 1978, 669 pp. $25.00.

Compressing five wars into one volume, even such a hefty one as this, is a daunting task, which Colonel Dupuy attacks boldly and with considerable success. It is not a documented history, but he has read widely, studied the conflict from both sides, and provided a reliable account for the general reader.

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CONFLICT AND BARGAINING IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE. By Shlomo Aronson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979, 448 pp. $18.95.

For the most part a narrative of familiar events from Ben-Gurion's heyday to the present, this book by an Israeli scholar and journalist is of special interest for its analysis of the personalities, motives and methods which have conditioned the Israeli approach to the conflict, and thus to the prospects for settlement.

ARMED STRUGGLE IN PALESTINE. By Bard O'Neill. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 320 pp. $20.00.

This study by an American military officer of the war between Israel and the various armed factions of the PLO, not exhaustive or definitive, is nonetheless very thorough, balanced, and also useful in fitting this struggle into a general pattern of insurgencies and guerrilla wars.

WHITE NIGHTS: THE STORY OF A PRISONER IN RUSSIA. By Menachem Begin. New York: Harper, 1979, 240 pp. $8.95.

The Israeli Prime Minister's dramatic account of his experience in the U.S.S.R.—arrest, imprisonment, interrogation, labor camp, release as a Polish citizen—during World War II. The original Hebrew edition was published in 1957.

THE ZIONIST CONNECTION: WHAT PRICE PEACE? By Alfred M. Lilienthal. New York: Dodd, Mead; 1978, 872 pp. $19.95.

For Alfred Lilienthal, who has devoted his life to the anti-Zionist cause, this is the culminating masterwork: over 800 pages of history-cum-polemics on American policy and politics, Zionist influence, the Jewish lobby, and the Arab-Israeli conflict from Roosevelt to Carter. His own solution is the "de-Zionization" of Israel and establishment of a secular, bi-national Palestine.

ISRAEL AND THE TERRITORIES. By Mordechai Nisan. Ramat Gan (Israel): Turtledove, 1978, 201 pp. $15.00.

An honest, low-keyed appraisal by an Israeli scholar of Israel's policy in the occupied Arab territories, describing purposes, means, results, and the continuing basic hostility between the two nations.

LE ROYAUME D'ARABIE SAOUDITE À L'ÉPREUVE DES TEMPS MODERNES. By Jean-Louis Soulié and Lucien Champenois. Paris: Albin Michel, 1978, 248 pp.

A survey of Saudi Arabian developments since the death of Ibn Saud, plus an essay on the state of the country today. Positive in tone, written for popular consumption, but not superficial.

IRAN: THE ILLUSION OF POWER. By Robert Graham. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 228 pp. $16.50.

A British journalist's picture of conditions in Iran based on his recent assignment there. Critical of the Shah and his regime, it captures the impact of the influx of wealth since 1973 and foreshadows many of the turbulent events of 1978.

REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM: THE FLN IN ALGERIA 1954–1962. By Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1978, 178 pp. $10.95.

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A case study which illuminates our understanding of terrorism as a revolutionary strategy. The author looks closely at the purposes of those who chose the strategy in Algeria, at how and against whom terror was used, and at how it contributed to the goal of independence.

THE CYPRUS REVOLT. By Nancy Crawshaw. London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1978, 447 pp. $32.25.

This book should take its place at the head of the extensive list of published works on the Cyprus question. It is the most detailed and objective account available on the period of the Greek Cypriot revolt against British rule, aimed at union with Greece, from World War II to the birth of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Later events are covered more summarily but with accuracy and balance.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE DUEL OF THE GIANTS: CHINA AND RUSSIA IN ASIA. By Drew Middleton. New York: Scribner's, 1978, 241 pp. $10.95.

Middleton believes that war between Russia and China is probable, that the Chinese will need extensive outside military assistance in order to continue their resistance, and that the United States will not be in a position to supply it. The book is particularly useful in describing the military situation on the Russo-Chinese border.

VILLAGE AND FAMILY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA. By William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, 419 pp. $23.00.

Based on interviews with former residents of 63 villages in Kwangtung province adjacent to Hong Kong, this is the most balanced and informative study yet produced by Western scholarship on village and family life in the People's Republic of China. Both the achievements and the failings are highlighted.

INDIA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1947–1977. By Francine R. Frankel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 600 pp. $35.00 (Paper, $12.50).

A powerful warning that time may be running out for Indian democracy if it cannot solve its potentially explosive problem of rural poverty. The author notes increasing polarization in the countryside between landed and landless groups, growing rural violence, and the erosion of the legitimacy of the upper-caste landed groups. Frankel believes that the only solution is to organize the rural poor and to bring them into politics in a way that will strengthen political stability. But she also points to the formidable obstacles to such an alternative—the weakness of the political parties, the internal divisions among the rural poor themselves, and the bitter resistance of the landowners.

STRATEGIES OF SURVIVAL: THE FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMAS OF SMALLER ASIAN STATES. By Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 346 pp. $27.50.

A useful survey of the impact of changing big-power relations on the nine smaller states of Northeast and Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the most significant recent changes—the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict after

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Mao's death and the China-Vietnam confrontation—are not given sufficient attention.

COMMUNIST INDOCHINA AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: POSTWAR REALITIES. By Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 221 pp. $16.00.

Although written before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the authors anticipate the possibility and suggest that Vietnamese rule over all of Indochina is not necessarily contrary to U.S. interests—provided a united Indochina maintains its independence from the Soviet Union and does not threaten Thailand. The question now is whether these two conditions are going to be met.

THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA: AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES. By Ralph N. Clough and William Watts. Washington: Potomac Associates, 1978, 38 pp.

The nation opposes President Carter's announced plans to withdraw the remaining American ground troops from South Korea, according to a survey of American opinion conducted by this respected Washington-based research organization. A clear majority feel that U.S. force commitments in South Korea should be kept at their present level or increased. This impressive study of American public opinion on key foreign policy issues shows little support for the view that the United States might become isolationist. An even larger majority of Americans want U.S. force commitments kept at their present levels or increased in Western Europe and in Japan.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

ETHIOPIA: EMPIRE IN REVOLUTION. By Marina and David Ottaway. New York: Africana, 1978, 250 pp. $22.50 (Paper, $12.50).

This detailed account of Ethiopia's military-engineered political and social transformation covers only the period through 1977, before the successful Soviet-Cuban-supported drive to retake the Ogaden. With an authority stemming from apparently exhaustive researches during their 1974–1977 stay in Ethiopia, however, the Ottaways provide a convincing picture of a regime—and revolution—of growing strength and increasingly sure direction.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 109 pp. $11.95.

This collection has the effect of facing mirrors throwing images of South Africa and the West—of South African reactions to Western policy and Western responses to South Africa—back and forth. Outsiders who seek to influence the pace and direction of change in South Africa can learn much from this balanced collection of papers by liberal academics, mostly at the University of Natal. Unfortunately, the book lacks a chapter on black reactions to external pressure.

SURVIVAL: TAPED INTERVIEWS WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S POWER ELITE. By Anna Starcke. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1978, 217 pp. R. 9.80.

Most of the book consists of extended interviews with 13 prominent South Africans conducted in conjunction with Ms. Starcke's prize-winning reportage

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on South Africa's future options. While one regrets the absence of an Andries Treurnicht on the white Right and of any Africans younger than Chief Buthelezi, the interviews are quite revealing of both the individuals and the nation's dilemmas. The P. W. Botha and Ntatho Motlana interviews are contrasting gems.

MALAWI: THE POLITICS OF DESPAIR. By T. David Williams. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978, 339 pp. $19.50.

This lucid history of Malawi is notable for a thorough analysis of the effect of Hastings Banda's one-man rule on the country's economic development. Although 15 years of dictatorship have kept everybody down on the farm, in the view of the author the "orderliness" of Malawi's development is the result not only of repression but of the country's extreme backwardness—which has not changed much since independence.

RISE UP AND WALK: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa. Nashville (Tenn.): Abingdon, 1978, 289 pp. $9.95.

The Zimbabwean "Internal Settlement" leader's story is particularly noteworthy for its account of the complicated machinations among rival Zimbabwean leaders from the 1974 Victoria Bridge talks until the collapse of the Geneva negotiations in 1976, and of the 1977–78 Internal Settlement negotiations. With its detailed renditions of conversations between the nationalists and with the front-line Presidents, it should be an important primary source—at least for the Bishop's side of the story.

AFRICA IN THE 1980s: A CONTINENT IN CRISIS. By Colin Legum, I. William Zartman, Lynn K. Mytelka and Steven Langdon. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1979, 288 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $6.95).

A volume rich in background information on a variety of African issues, but overly academic and too narrowly focused for a general audience. Legum predicts increased political instability in the 1980s, an escalation of Sino-Soviet competition in the continent, and a "settlement" of the South African issue by Soviet-supported violence. Zartman contends that economic conflict and food shortages approaching Malthusian proportions will be the root cause of instability, with the have-not countries becoming more authoritarian and the richer ones more democratic. Langdon and Mytelka, who provide a useful economic history of colonial development in Africa, urge an end to multinational corporate influence and a new emphasis on basic human needs and "appropriate technology" for increased self-reliance. They recognize, however, that nationalistic competition and the present distribution of power in Africa make the achievement of such goals in the 1980s far from likely.

William Cotter

LES GUERRES GRISES: RÉSISTANCE ET REVOLTES EN ANGOLA 1845–1941. LA COLONIE DU MINOTAURE: NATIONALISMES ET REVOLTES EN ANGOLA 1926–1961. By René Pélisser. Montamets (France): Pélisser, 1978, 2 vols. Fr. 280.

The well-known French scholar-journalist has assembled here a vast compendium of useful if somewhat diffuse source materials, including excellent charts and maps.

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Janet Rigney

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Asia and the Pacific Ocean

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ERRATA

America and the World 1978

1. In Chronology 1978, the "Military" subsection on page 700, currently printed under U.S.S.R., is a subdivision of Western Europe, and should appear on page 702, following the "Political" subsection.

Winter 1978/79

1. In Comment and Correspondence, in Mr. Coale's reply, page 411, lines 6–10, the references to married women of the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union and to European Russia should be corrected to rural married women of the Central Asian republics and to rural European Russia. The text should read: "On the other side, the fertility of rural married women in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union was as high in 1970 as it had been in rural European Russia as a whole in 1897. From 1926 to 1970, there had been an increase of nearly 50 percent in marital fertility in the rural population of those republics, probably the result of less prolonged breast feeding and improvements in health and nutrition."

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